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Abstract 
During the Cold War, the United States’ foreign policy relied heavily on its ability to 
project military power.  More often than not, the central component of force projection rested on 
the United States military’s effectiveness in employing air power both by establishing air 
superiority and through accurate delivery of ordnance.  As the primary service tasked with 
conducting aerial warfare, the United States Air Force (USAF) was expected to maintain this 
capability either to achieve deterrence or, when necessary, to military action.  In January 1973, 
the USAF seemed incapable of performing the latter task due to the North Vietnamese Integrated 
Air Defense System’s (NV-IAD’s) effectiveness in Operation Rolling Thunder and its successor, 
Operation Linebacker.  Eighteen years later, Air Force aircraft spearheaded the Coalition’s air 
attack on the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (I-IADS) in January 1991.  Considered by 
many to be the most effective air defense system outside the Soviet Union’s, the I-IADS was 
expected to exact heavy casualties from the allied forces.  Instead, in less than twenty days, the 
USAF’s dominance was so complete that politicians, analysts and military historians quickly 
proclaimed a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). 
  The majority of the current historiography credits advances in precision-guided 
munitions (PGMs), airframes, and computer technology as the impetus for the RMA.  Others 
have claimed that the USAF’s training methodology and construction of advanced training sites 
such as the Red Flag complex at Nellis Air Force Base were the primary drivers for the Air 
Force’s success.  While acknowledging the role all of these factors played, this dissertation also 
demonstrates the key role played by the development of Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
(SEAD) doctrine from January 1973 through August 1991.  In the aftermath of the American war 
in Vietnam, the Air Force considered defense suppression a tactical task that was secondary to 
the primary mission of putting ordnance on target.  At the end of Desert Storm, proponents of the 
Air Force’s SEAD doctrine had convincing evidence that an enemy IADS was not just an 
ancillary weapons array, but functioned a critical national system just like manufacturing, 
government, or the people’s will.  The process by which this viewpoint changed had effects on 
the development of the United States Air Force’s Cold War conventional capability in general, 
and the development of training methods, electronic warfare platforms, and modern airframes 
specifically.  
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Chapter 1: Centuries and Linebackers 
Late in the evening of 3 January 1973, B-52D #55-0056, call sign “Ruby 2” was struck 
by a SA-2 Guideline missile near Vinh, North Vietnam.  With the Stratofortress heavily 
damaged, the aircraft commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Wickline, immediately turned the 
aircraft towards the South China Sea and likely safety.  After crossing the North Vietnamese 
coastline and conducting a damage assessment, Lt. Colonel Wickline believed that he and his 
crew could reach a friendly airfield in Da Nang, South Vietnam.  Unfortunately for Wickline and 
his crew, the damage to the B-52 was far more extensive than they believed.  When their primary 
hydraulic system failed a little over 25 miles away from Da Nang, the six men aboard Ruby 2 
were forced to eject into the darkness and leave the Stratofortress to crash into the South China 
Sea.
1
  
In addition to the loss of a multi-million dollar aircraft, the shootdown of Ruby 2 was 
significant for three reasons.  First, the B-52D was the final United States Air Force (USAF) 
aircraft shot down by North Vietnam’s Integrated Air Defense System (NV-IADS).  Second, the 
Stratofortress’s demise marked the nadir of the USAF’s Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
(SEAD) doctrine and execution thereof.
2
  Despite heavy electronic warfare (EW) and defense 
suppression support, Ruby 2 had been destroyed by an obsolescent weapons system that was a 
full two generations behind the SAMs USAF and its NATO allies could expect to face in 
Western Europe.  As the 2,257
th
 aircraft the NV-IADS had destroyed, Ruby 2 seemed to indicate 
not only the death of the manned strategic bomber, but also the ascendancy of ground-based 
defenses over all jet aircraft.
3
  This, in turn, led to the final reason why Ruby 2’s loss was 
particularly fateful for the United States’ strategic doctrine: If USAF could not deliver ordnance 
against defended targets, NATO’s conventional deterrence against Warsaw Pact forces was 
significantly reduced if nonexistent. Much like the late bomber’s crew, the USAF found itself 
listless and adrift in a dark sea of troubles as the Vietnam War slowly ground to a close. 
MiG Alley Assumptions 
This result could not have been more unlikely to the United States Air Force’s leaders 
when the service was created.  Having purchased its independence with operations over Nazi 
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Germany and Imperial Japan, the USAF was born via the National Defense Act of 1947.  
Ostensibly organized to fight conflicts across the full spectrum of warfare, the Air Force’s 
mission became synonymous with the delivery of atomic weapons against the growing threat of 
the Soviet Union.  For President Harry Truman, this reliance on the United States’ atomic 
monopoly seemed an easy way to stabilize the newly formed Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 
budget.
4
  United States Army (USA) and USAF leaders concurred with Truman’s chosen 
approach, with only the United States Navy (USN) breaking ranks to argue that DoD still needed 
the ability to conduct large-scale conventional warfare.
5
   
The folly of the United States’ reliance on its atomic monopoly was demonstrated when 
North Korea, a Soviet client state, crossed the 38
th
 parallel in force on June 25, 1950.  As with 
the rest of the United States military, the United States Air Force was unpleasantly surprised by 
the Korean War.  At inception, USAF had been divided into two commands, with the Strategic 
Air Command (SAC) responsible for the delivery of nuclear weapons and Tactical Air 
Command (TAC) responsible for air defense, establishment of air superiority over the tactical 
battlefield, and close air support (CAS) to USN, USMC, and USA forces.
6
  In reality, Air Force 
officers such as General Carl Spaatz, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and Lieutenant General 
Curtis LeMay had concentrated the majority of their service’s budget on enhancing SAC’s 
ability to deliver the United States’ limited atomic arsenal in a single, debilitating strike against 
the Soviet Union.
7
  Thus, TAC found itself woefully unprepared to fight a limited conventional 
conflict half a world away from the United States. 
The USAF’s conduct in the Korean War has been well recorded elsewhere, and space 
precludes a definitive recounting here.
8
  For the purpose of developing SEAD doctrine, the 
Korean War was a particularly poor crucible.  First and foremost, air defense technology had not 
markedly changed since the conclusion of World War II.  From 1950 to 1953, North Korean 
anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) of various calibers remained the most prevalent ground-based 
system to complement aerial interceptors.  In contrast, jet propulsion and improved 
aerodynamics had improved the speed of the typical United Nations’ single-seat fighter by over 
one hundred miles per hour.
9
  Thus even with radar-controlled guns, North Korean forces had 
difficulty in engaging enemy fighters.  As for manually aimed weapons, the USAF’s decision to 
change its tactics and jet aircraft’s increased speed made hitting attacking fighter bombers more a 
matter of luck rather than skill.
10
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Regarding North Korean interceptors, USAF leaders looked at their operations and made 
several reasonable assumptions about the relative effectiveness of MiG-15 interceptors versus 
USAF aircraft in general and B-29 Superfortresses in particular.  First and foremost, USAF 
leaders assumed that the relatively high kill ratio achieved by F-86s versus Communist MiG-15s 
proved the superiority of American pilot training methods and technology.  Following from this, 
the Air Staff thus believed the relatively short loiter time of American F-86 Sabres had 
contributed mightily to MiGs’ success against both attack and bomber aircraft.  Given the  
Sabres’ short range, there were ample opportunities for MiGs to bounce the USAF’s bombers / 
attack aircraft after the F-86s departed.  Finally, unlike what could reasonably be expected in a 
general war, rules of engagement precluded USAF and other United Nations’ forces from 
conducting airfield attacks against the MiG-15 bases in China.
11
 
Despite the rhetorical pillorying subsequent USAF officers, historians, and civilian 
leaders would deliver upon Vandenberg, LeMay, and other senior Air Force leaders, these 
assumptions were not merely superficial justifications for later acquisitions.
12
  Instead, they were 
very much based in the present of 1953.  For example, the B-29 was a weapon system that had 
been developed at the conclusion of World War II.  By contrast, the B-36 Peacemaker and B-47 
Stratojet flew faster (411 miles per hour for the Peacemaker and 607 mph Stratojet versus 329 
miles per hour for the B-29) and higher (43,600 feet for the Peacemaker and 39,300 for the 
Stratojet versus 33,600 for the B-29) than the Superfortress.  The Air Force’s collective 
leadership assumed that this combination of high altitude and speed would make the MiG-15s’ 
job far more difficult.  Similarly, even had the leaders been able to foresee  the revolutions in 
electronics and computer miniaturization that would take place over the next decade, the vast 
majority of anti-aircraft artillery was ineffective over 35,000 feet.  Finally, American senior 
leaders failed to understand that a strong leavening of World War II veterans  had much more to 
do with the F-86s’ success than any issues inherent to Communist bloc pilot training programs.13  
Far more important than these tactical and operational factors, however, would be something the 
Air Force had no control over: the Eisenhower Administration. 
The Seven Centuries of the Apocalypse  
Upon assuming office in January 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began seeking 
ways to reorient and streamline the United States’ national defense policy.  Having run 
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strenuously against President Truman’s economic policies, spending, and the Korean War, 
President Eisenhower believed that the United States was far more likely to implode 
economically than face direct destruction at the hands of the Soviet Union and its allies.  
Therefore, one of Eisenhower’s first acts was to direct the National Security Council to conduct a 
strenuous series of exercises dubbed Operational Solarium.  From this, his administration derived 
what President Eisenhower called the “New Look” but what his opponents (and some 
supporters) referred to as “Massive Retaliation.”  Stemming from Operation Solarium’s 
recommendations, Eisenhower’s New Look relied upon the United States’ ability to deliver its 
new thermonuclear weapons with great speed and in large quantities to complement the 
economic and political stabilization of Europe.  Rather than being merely brandished should a 
conflict arose, the United States’ nuclear sword of Damocles was to be swung rapidly and 
violently until such time as the Communist Bloc lay in ruins.  Furthermore, the Department of 
Defense would execute this course of action regardless of the relative scale of hostile action 
against an American ally.  In this manner, the potential cost of aggression, no matter how slight, 
would be too great to justify future Communist aggression such as that which precipitated the 
Korean War.  In addition, by being able to purchase relatively cheap thermonuclear weapons, the 
United States’ economy would be saved from the ravages of maintaining a large standing Army 
in Central Europe, Korea, or anywhere else where Moscow may be tempted to strike.
14
  
Regardless of its merits, the Eisenhower Administration’s decision to pursue its New Look 
national strategy had a deleterious effect on the Air Force’s development of SEAD doctrine, its 
acquisition of the necessary weapons systems to attack both ground-based and airborne defenses, 
and the training of personnel to ensure they could operate effectively against an IADS. 
 The Role of Doctrine15 
Doctrine is a word that has numerous definitions, but for purposes of this dissertation two 
are most pertinent. According to The Dictionary of Modern War, doctrine consists of 
“[o]fficially enunciated principles meant to guide the employment of military forces under 
specified conditions.”16  The current Department of Defense dictionary, Joint Publication 1-02, 
considers doctrine to be “[f]undamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof 
guide their actions in support of national objectives [emphasis added].”17  Merging these two 
explanations, it becomes readily apparent that doctrine is loosely a military organization’s 
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methodology and thought processes for the conduct of war in support of a national strategy.  
Once it has decided on a doctrine, a military service must ensure that this doctrine is widely 
propagated among its leaders so that, should war break out, the entire organization is on the same 
page.  Otherwise, a wide range of unfortunate military and strategic outcomes may occur.  
It was this kind of disjunction between Air Force doctrine and procurement that General 
Twining and General LeMay sought to avoid in the early 1950s.  To both men, Pearl Harbor was 
both a cautionary tale and a traumatic event.
18
  They, and their political leaders, fervently 
believed that everything possible had to be done to ensure such a disaster never befell the United 
States again.
19
  Both men realized that nuclear warfare, more than any other type in history, 
rewarded the side that struck first and hardest.  Therefore, they wanted to ensure that the United 
States had sufficient nuclear firepower to annihilate the Communist Bloc’s nuclear delivery 
systems and command apparatus in one massive strike.  Alternatively, should the Soviet Union 
and its allies surprise the United States with a “bolt from the blue,” a large nuclear force 
distributed through both TAC and SAC ensured that enough delivery systems would survive to 
destroy most of the U.S.S.R. in turn.  Given the Eisenhower Administration’s strict limitations 
on military budgets, the delivery systems available at the time, and the perceived relative sizes of 
the U.S.S.R. and United States’ nuclear arsenals, such an approach made sense.20 
This mindset became codified in 1953 when the United States Air Force published Air 
Force Manual (AFM) 1-3 Theater Operations, its “bible” for conducting combat operations. 
With guidance from former bomber leaders Nathan F. Twining, Thomas D. White, and LeMay, 
USAF doctrine authors wrote AFM 1-3 with a heavy focus on nuclear delivery.
21
  Indeed, a 
layman reading Theater Operations could have easily believed that the Korean War had not 
occurred.  Rather than discussing how to establish and maintain air superiority in a prolonged 
conflict, AFM 1-3 emphasized tactical nuclear delivery as a means of supporting the United 
States’ strategic operations.  By its conclusion, the reader is left with the clear impression that 
United States Air Force expected to operate as a homogenous force whose operations would 
cause the swift, decisive immolation of the Soviet Union and its allies within a matter of days, if 
not hours.  TAC’s fighters, rather than acting as escorts to clear the way for SAC’s bombers, 
would shatter enemy squadrons and the infrastructure needed to support them with “tactical” 
nuclear weapons.
22
  SAC’s strategic bombers, in turn, would sail majestically at high altitude to 
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deliver their far larger strategic nuclear payload against Soviet cities, command centers, and 
industrial locations.
23
   
 U.S. Tactical Fighter Acquisition, 1953-1965 
As noted above, doctrine often drives a military organization’s material acquisition, 
personnel development, and training processes.  The pre-Vietnam USAF, tasked with ushering in 
the Apocalypse, took this mindset to a new, terrifying level.  From lumbering strategic bombers 
to sleek, supersonic fighters, almost every Air Force airframe purchased from 1954 through 1965 
was viewed through the simple prism of whether it helped deliver nuclear weapons against the 
Communist Bloc or prevented the Soviet Union’s bombers from striking the United States.  
Furthermore, USAF engaged in a public relations program to convince the American people that 
this was the best course for securing the United States’ present and future security.  Finally, 
despite Congressional, Secretarial (both Defense and Air Force), and even Presidential directives 
to the contrary, the Air Force paid less and less consideration to the accomplishment of tactical 
tasks such as close air support, air superiority, or battlefield area interdiction (BAI) when 
acquiring TAC systems.
24
 
This refusal to diversify fighter capabilities manifested itself in the seven tactical fighters 
the USAF acquired from 1953-1965.  Colloquially dubbed the “Century Fighters” due to their 
triple digit nomenclature, these aircraft began with the F-100 Super Sabre (first flight 1953 / 
service acceptance 1954) that was intended to rapidly impart the lessons of Korea in a supersonic 
platform.  By the end of the decade, the F-100 was joined by the F-101 Voodoo (1954 / 1957), F-
102 Delta Dart (1953/1956), F-104 Starfighter (1956/1958), F-105 Thunderchief  (1955 / 1958), 
and the F-106 Delta Dagger (1956-1959), with the F-110 / F-4 Phantom being forced upon a 
recalcitrant Air Force in 1962.  Although each airframe had its unique features, in general they 
shared three major characteristics that reflected the effects of Air Force doctrine: speed, 
technological complexity and, most importantly, the ability to deliver nuclear weapons. 
While not inherently detrimental, the focus on speed required aerodynamic tradeoffs.  
The need for high-speed penetration flights or, defensively, the ability to gain altitude quickly 
and close with incoming Soviet bombers restricted designers to employing “area rule” designs on 
all Air Force fuselages from the F-100 through the F-106.  With the U.S. Navy-designed F-4, the 
limitation on fuselage design was only overcome by employing two powerful engines to make 
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the Phantom the fastest aircraft of its era.  This resort to brute force, in addition to making the 
Phantom more expensive than its predecessors, gave the McDonnell Douglas product a large 
visual and infrared signature.  Lastly, in order to carry what was considered a useful nuclear 
payload at near top speed or catch hostile aircraft in a reasonable amount of time, the Phantom’s 
design teams made sacrifices with regard to maneuverability, airframe strength, and/or armor.  
The Air Force’s leaders, both civilian and military, believed that none of these negative attributes 
would be of any importance should the seven fighters be called upon to carry out their wartime 
mission.  Nuclear delivery and bomber interception was considered to be a relatively 
straightforward mission, and it was unlikely that any aircraft would have to fly more than one or 
two sorties if Massive Retaliation was carried out.
25
 
In addition to pressing the boundaries of aerodynamics, the Century Fighters epitomized 
an era of “technological exuberance,” i.e., the belief that a myriad number of issues could be 
solved by the application of science and engineering.
26
  In every conflict from World War I to 
Korea, air combat had been  a chaotic, dynamic experience whose outcome seemed to hinge on 
luck, weather conditions, and pilot skill almost as much as equipment. Between Korea and 
Vietnam, USAF (and to a slightly lesser extent, USN) leaders believed, future air combat would 
likely be a contest determined by precision engineering, sophisticated electronics, and advanced 
weapon systems.  As demonstrated in test after test by both the Air Force and Navy, missiles 
were so reliable that the aircraft which could acquire, track, and fire its onboard ordnance first 
would almost always prevail.  Based on these experimental engagements and on limited 
operational use by the Republic of China’s F-86 and F-100 fighters, Air Force leaders considered 
missiles so lethal that they denied requests to equip the service’s two most advanced aircraft, the 
F-106 Delta Dart and F-4 Phantom, with either external or retrofitted cannons.
27
   
While seemingly imprudent in retrospect, at the time and given the war foreseen in Air 
Force Doctrine, these decisions made perfect sense.  In the case of the Delta Dart, almost the 
entire interception was controlled by a series of ground-based control stations that made up Air 
Defense Command’s SAGE system.  Equipped with a nuclear rocket (the Genie) that had a lethal 
blast radius of over a thousand meters and Falcon missiles with a three-mile range, the F-106 
was never expected to get close enough to its prey to require a short-ranged cannon.
28
  Similarly, 
the Phantom’s battery of eight missiles included the beyond visual range (BVR) Sparrow and 
either Falcon or Sidewinder heat-seeking weapons.
29
  While it lacked the F-106’s ground-based 
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support, the F-4 was expected to create the same comparable effects as SAGE via its powerful 
internal radar and second crewman. Thus, as Eisenhower’s administration gave way to John F. 
Kennedy’s, the Air Force’s concept of a “fighter” became almost completely indistinct from 
what had previously been known as “interceptors.”30 
As the Kennedy administration began to shrink the Air Force’s portion of the Department 
of Defense’s budget, the F-4’s ability to serve as a multi-role strike aircraft became almost as 
important as its air-to-air potential.  As noted above, the delivery of nuclear weapons had 
become central to the development of all Air Force fighters.  Although retrofitted F-100 Super 
Sabres (e.g., the F-100C) and F-105s were seemingly adequate against visual range only Eastern 
bloc interceptors, in the F-4 the Air Force began to see the potential for a “self-escorting” fighter 
bomber that would destroy MiGs before being detected itself.  Furthermore, by virtue of 
requiring only slight modifications to its on-board fire control equipment, having space to add an 
additional bombing computer, and having still more room for modifications as needed later, the 
Phantom seemed perfect for the tactical strike role required AFM 1-3.
31
   
 USAF Fighter Pilot Training, 1953-1965 
Concurrent with the evolution of the Air Force’s airframes to meet the roles envisioned in 
AFM 1-3 was a similar change in what constituted a fighter pilot.  In 1953, the Air Force exited 
the Korean War with a mixture of fighter pilots who were World War II veterans, recalled 
reservists who had also fought in that conflict, and neophytes that the service trained using 
almost the same methods as their older comrades.  In all cases, combat pilots had received 
roughly 100 hours of training that included air combat maneuvering (ACM), air-to-ground 
conventional ordnance delivery, and instruction on how to evade enemy ground defenses (albeit 
almost solely anti-aircraft artillery (AAA)).
32
  By 1965, as the Air Force prepared to launch its 
first airstrikes as part of Operation Rolling Thunder, its pilot cadre was almost wholly college-
educated regular officers with some form of science or engineering degree, and, except for the 
Korean War and World War II veterans, were almost wholly ignorant of how to conduct 
conventional warfare.
33
  
There were many reasons for this decay in conventional capability.  First and foremost 
was the aforementioned nuclear mission that had spawned the Century Fighters.  As the USAF 
transitioned to a system that saw pilots receive limited training time on their particular airframe, 
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increasingly fighter wing/group commanders were expected to ensure their pilots proficiency in 
nuclear delivery.  Furthermore, under General Twining then General LeMay, TAC began to 
conduct regular inspections such as those the latter had begun with SAC.  Chief among the 
numerous pass/fail criteria for these events were the number of training hours spent conducting 
practice nuclear deliveries, accuracy of bombing during nuclear delivery practice missions, and 
inspections of individual units’ “go to war” maps, flight plans, and aircrew knowledge of both of 
these.  As wing/group leaders began to be relieved for failing these inspections regardless of their 
previous performance in either Korea or World War II, it became readily apparent where  Air 
Force’s leaders expected its commanders to concentrate their efforts.34 
Providing further encouragement to avoid training active Air Force wings in air combat 
maneuvering or conventional munitions delivery was the inherent danger of flying such 
missions.  As had become apparent to the Air Force after 1945, flying jets was inherently more 
dangerous due to their increased operating speeds. Beginning with the F-100, the Century 
Fighters increased accident rates to an almost unsustainable level.  The Super Sabre’s operators 
quickly found that its supersonic level speed had been purchased with a truly unforgiving flight 
envelope whenever a pilot slowed to near stall speed.
35
  The F-102 and F-106’s pilots discovered 
that their aircraft quickly lost speed and controllability if they placed the big delta-winged 
fighters into any type of high-g turn.  The F-104, in addition to taking literal miles to turn at high 
speed, required far too delicate handling when coming in to land due to its own stall problems.
36
  
The F-105 combined both poor turning radius with initially unreliable engines and an airframe 
that was known to disintegrate if pressed too far.
37
  Lastly, the F-4’s tendency to depart 
controlled flight at a high angle of attack became so notorious that one Phantom wing did not fly 
any ACM missions for over three years by order of its commander.
38
  Even in those cases where 
all these dangers were overcome and commanders were willing to assume risk, ACM was 
conducted against similar aircraft, i.e., Phantom vs. Phantom or Thunderchief vs. Thunderchief 
as opposed to dissimilar engagements. Combined, these factors meant that the Air Force’s flying 
officers were quite capable of flying missions that involved annihilating entire cities but were all 
but helpless when it came to destroying singular enemy aircraft. 
Even worse than their unawareness of the tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to 
attain victory in aerial combat was TAC aircrew’s ignorance of advances in ground-based air 
defenses from 1953 through 1965.  As noted above, the ubiquitous anti-aircraft gun, ranging 
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from light machine guns through large-caliber, high-angle cannon, was difficult to employ 
against high speed fighter aircraft due to the likelihood of tracking errors.
39
 In reviewing the 
Korean War and other international conflicts, TAC’s leadership assumed optically-aimed anti-
aircraft artillery (AAA) would be a lethal nuisance but hardly a major threat.
40
  Unfortunately, 
advances in radar miniaturization and ruggedness meant that AAA was often laid onto target 
with the assistance of ballistic computers, while design tradeoffs made in the quest for 
supersonic capability meant even rifle-caliber weapons could destroy a multi-million dollar 
aircraft.
41
  TAC pilots remained unaware of these vulnerabilities, and thus prepared to avoid 
AAA systems by flying at high speed and low level along sparsely populated paths to their 
Eastern bloc targets. 
While the Air Force had an understanding, albeit outdated, of the AAA threat to TAC’s 
fighters, the service’ssenior officers had made no preparation for another adversary: surface-to-
air missiles (SAMs).  Originally fielded by the Soviet Union in 1957, the U.S.S.R.’s military 
conceived SAMs as a counter to SAC’s high-flying bombers.  Most famous for shooting down 
Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 in 1960 and for destroying another U-2 during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the primary Soviet SAM was the SA-2 Guideline.  A two-stage weapon that was fired 
either singly or as part of a salvo from a fixed site, the Guideline and its accompanying Fan Song 
radar van formed a system capable of engaging an aircraft up to 25 miles away.  With a 
maximum effective altitude in excess of 80,000 feet, a speed over three times the speed of sound, 
and a 420-lb. warhead, the Guideline could not be outclimbed or outrun, nor could a direct hit by 
one be survived by USAF tactical fighters.
42
   
Due to the United States’ own air defense doctrine and Soviet deployments prior to 1965, 
USAF commanders as well as national intelligence services considered it unlikely that TAC 
would encounter Guideline missiles in a conventional conflict.  Thus unlike SAC bombers, 
which were equipped with extensive electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment and radar 
homing and warning (RHAW) detection gear, TAC fighters were built lacking the bulky, heavy 
equipment.  Using terrain analysis and intelligence information, TAC fighter wings/groups 
merely marked the fixed sites in the Eastern Bloc and then planned their attack routes either to 
avoid these or to use terrain masking to get within the SA-2’s five-mile minimum range.43  This 
was considered sufficient, since even if Congress had allocated the necessary funds to purchase 
ECM or RHAW sites, early models of these systems were known to interfere with the onboard 
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radar and navigational equipment.  As these were were critical to accurate nuclear delivery, TAC 
understandably decided not to invest time in further ECM or RHAW development.  Exacerbating 
this problem was the lack of training facilities on which electronic warfare courses could be 
taught.  Given that using available facilities would have detracted from their availability for SAC 
electronic warfare officers (EWO), the Air Force’s predilection not to research pods or sensors 
seemed to be a prudent one.
44
 
The end result of this lack of training, combined with the material decisions made with 
regard to the Century Fighters, was a TAC that looked extremely capable for all levels of warfare 
but was only suited for nuclear conflict.  There was no discussion of even rudimentary SEAD 
tactics at the wing and squadron level.  Indeed, the majority of fighter pilots believed that speed 
and terrain masking would allow them to penetrate any defensive system in the world.
45
  Unlike 
their Navy counterparts, the majority of whom had at least been exposed to air defense radars 
due to task force training operations, USAF pilots lacked even a rudimentary understanding of 
SAM or radar-directed gunfire’s capabilities.  As noted in an Air Force monograph, as the Air 
Force prepared to attack North Vietnam in February 1965, “over 50 percent of fighter pilots had 
more than 2,000 total flying hours” in jet aircraft, yet had not conducted a practical application of 
firepower in a modern air defense environment.
46
   
Operation Rolling Thunder 
General Curtis LeMay is said to have stated, in response to concerns that the Air Force 
would not be able to conduct small-scale wars, “If we can lick a cat, we can lick a kitten.”47  
Space precludes a full treatment of the United States Air Force’s operations in Vietnam, but it 
can be said without equivocation that LeMay’s confidence was proven to be spectacularly 
misplaced.  How the United States’ long, painful intervention in Southeast Asia began has been 
well documented elsewhere and, in the interest in space, will not be recounted here.  By February 
1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson believed that it would serve America’s strategic interests to 
intensify operations in Vietnam.  Deciding that the application of airpower would intimidate the 
North Vietnamese into no longer providing support for the South’s Viet Cong guerillas, 
President Johnson directed the Navy and Air Force to begin sustained aerial operations against 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).  Whereas previous air raids had been specifically 
targeted reprisals, the President intended for these raids (dubbed Operational Rolling Thunder) to 
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gradually increase pain across all of North Vietnamese society until Communist leader Ho Chi 
Minh accepted the division of Vietnam into northern and southern halves as had been done with 
Korea.
48
  When the United States called a bombing halt in November 1968, not only had this not 
been accomplished but the USN and USAF combined had lost over 900 aircraft.
49
 Far from 
demonstrating USAF’s prowess, Operation Rolling Thunder had seemingly demonstrated just 
how far the service’s conventional capability had atrophied since the end of the Korean War.  
 “Handcuffing” the Incapable 
It is necessary, before discussing Air Force doctrine’s detrimental effect on Rolling 
Thunder’s outcome, to address the persistent historical legend that civilian interference was the 
primary cause for American losses.  It is undeniable that the Johnson Administration failed to 
achieve optimal employment of American airpower against North Vietnam from March 1965 
through November 1968.  First, President Johnson and, to a lesser extent, Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara did not provide a unified strategic focus.  Indeed, at any particular moment 
during Operation Rolling Thunder there were as many as four broad, often competing, 
objectives.  Leading this was Johnson’s desire to avoid conducting an air campaign so intense 
that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Soviet Union would feel compelled to enter the 
conflict.  Competing with it was how airpower, at this time a blunt instrument, could both 
prevent PRC or Soviet entry yet inflict enough pain to break the DRV’s will.  Moreover, there 
were few attempts to determine what would break the North Vietnamese people’s will, how long 
it would have to remain broken, and whether doing so in the first place would be in the United 
States’ long-term strategic interests.50 
Further complicating the matter of applying sufficient force against the DRV was the 
Johnson administration’s simultaneous directive to interdict supplies flowing from North 
Vietnam to the Viet Cong.  With a limited number of airframes throughout the Pacific Air 
Force’s (PACAF’s) area of responsibility, there was a physical limit to how many aircraft could 
be assigned to Vietnam.  Inexplicably, neither McNamara nor his staff, despite their background 
in science and systems engineering, ever rigorously applied either of these disciplines to 
determining just how much bombing ability would be necessary to conduct interdiction, 
simultaneously provide close air support to South Vietnam, and still maintain a credible 
deterrence force in other regions such as Korea.  If they had done so, then subtracted these 
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airframes from PACAF’s contemporary order of battle, they would have realized that Seventh 
Air Force (as the entity responsible for bombing North Vietnam was designated) simply lacked 
the capability to mount a sustained bombing campaign.  Instead, in an effort to continue to 
demonstrate American resolve (the final Johnson administration objective), President Johnson 
and Secretary McNamara expected aircrews that had just prepared to bomb Hanoi on one day to 
simply and adroitly switch to flying interdiction raids against amorphous, ill-defined targets in 
Laos or northwestern South Vietnam the next.
51
    
Combined, this strategic ambivalence has led to much of the intervening years’ 
historiography blaming these two men for the many losses that followed.  This began with 
relatively benign comments in CHECO reports (e.g., “JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] targeting 
practices added a distinct, and as it turned out, significant variable to tactical planning”).52  After 
Rolling Thunder, however, the Air Force was openly critical of its former civilian masters, 
culminating with the CHECO report on Operation Linebacker stating that “Rolling Thunder was 
conducted under severe, often crippling, restraints.”53 In 1976, General William W. Momyer, 7th 
Air Force commander, bluntly stated he “deeply resented the proscription of attacks on North 
Vietnamese airfields, SAM and AAA sites, and other targets.”54  This was relatively sedate 
compared to junior officers such as Colonel Jack Broughton, who called the strategic ambiguity 
and resultant restraints “sick” in his bestseller Thud Ridge.55  Broughton then went on to 
elaborate: 
 
It’s sick because we handcuff ourselves on tactical details.  First we 
oversupervise and seem to feel that four-star generals have to be flight leaders and 
dictate the details of handling a type of machinery they have never known.  
Second, we have lost all sense of flexibility, and we ignore tactical surprise by 
insisting on repeated attacks without imagination.  Third, our intelligence, and the 
interpretation and communication of that intelligence, is back in the Stone Age.  
Fourth, our conventional munitions are little improved over 1941 and those who 
insist on dictating the ultimate detail of their selection, fuzing and delivery do not 
understand or appreciate their own dictates.  (This, of course, assumes that they 
have adequate quantities and varieties on hand to be selective.)  Fifth, we have not 
advanced far enough in the field of meteorology to tell what we will have over the 
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homedrome an hour from now.  Our degree of accuracy on vital details like 
bombing winds over the target is abominable.  Sixth, many of our high-level 
people refuse to listen to constructive criticism from people doing the job.
56
 
 
The majority of memoirs, documents, and secondary sources written about the Vietnam 
War follow the thrust of the above paragraph.  Indeed, if simply taken at face value, the 
preponderance of books, articles, and memoirs would indicate that President Johnson and 
McNamara, in addition to providing poor strategic direction, completely handcuffed the military.  
In turn, this handcuffing is what led to the destruction of almost 1,000 American aircraft over 
North Vietnam from 1965 through 1968, prevented the Air Force and Navy from bringing the 
North Vietnamese to the peace table, and set in motion the long path that culminated in Saigon’s 
defeat in 1975.  
No matter how colorful or how prevalent the presentation, putting the blame for 
Operation Rolling Thunder’s failure on civilian control of the military ignores the United States’ 
martial tradition.  As Lieutenant Colonel Ed Cobleigh put it in his own memoir War For the Hell 
of It, “[c]ivilian control of the U.S. military is a cornerstone of our democracy and must not be 
compromised, no matter how dire the situation.”57  Put another way, President Johnson and 
Secretary McNamara were acting well within their Constitutional authority and duty in sharply 
limiting the military’s actions during Operation Rolling Thunder.  It was not McNamara and 
Johnson’s first responsibility to win the war in Vietnam but to preserve the United States.  Put in 
the language of a different scenario, no one in the Johnson administration was ready to trade 
Chicago for Saigon. 
In this light, it becomes much easier to understand that Johnson and McNamara did not 
intend to conduct their actions in a capricious manner.  Instead, both men were erring well on the 
side of safety in ensuring the accomplishment of their first strategic goal.  Both men had 
observed the damage done to the nation when President Truman failed to keep General 
MacArthur in check during the halcyon days after the Inchon landings.  Whereas in 1950 this 
had led to Chinese intervention and near destruction of U.N. forces on the Korean peninsula, 
there was a real possibility that Russian and Chinese intervention in Vietnam could quickly lead 
to a broadened (and nuclear) conflict.
58
  When General LeMay said that this event would be 
positive by allowing a first strike on the People’s Republic of China’s nascent nuclear program, 
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he probably did little to lessen either President Johnson’s or Secretary McNamara’s fears.  If one 
considers the civil-military climate, especially given the various crises of 1961 through 1964, it 
is easy to understand why the Air Force was given very clear directives and limitations.
59
 
By constantly focusing on these directives, those who attempt to demonize President 
Johnson and Secretary McNamara almost completely ignore the process that led to the friction 
between those two men and their military commanders.  They also ignore General White’s and 
General LeMay’s refusal to modify their service’s doctrine in accordance with three successive 
presidents’ directives.  In 1958, President Eisenhower had made it quite clear that massive 
retaliation was no longer the United States’ overarching military policy.  In 1960, John F. 
Kennedy had run on the principle that a Chief Executive ought to have more options than defeat 
or mass murder and selected Secretary McNamara to make this happen.  Rather than going along 
with either President’s reforms, the Air Force had fought them via means both explicit and 
implicit.
60
  This had greatly slowed both President Kennedy’s and Johnson’s attempted military 
reforms and contributed a great deal to the Air Force’s unpreparedness for conventional warfare. 
Therefore, when President Johnson turned to air power to salvage the U.S. effort in 
Vietnam, his restrictions should not have been a surprise nor can failure be blamed wholly on 
them.  As Momyer himself stated, “self-imposed restraint has been a fact in all U.S. conflict 
since World War II, and obviously our hope in the age of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is 
that some restraint will be exercised by all superpowers in all future conflicts.”61  Instead, it was 
the decision of the Air Force’s leaders, consciously or not, not to acknowledge the effects that 
strategic parity (perceived or real) had on the conduct of American foreign policy which 
contributed the most to the service’s heavy losses during Rolling Thunder.  Rather than 
“scream[ing] for changes to the operational conduct of the air war,” as one Air Force officer has 
put it, the service’s leaders rightfully sought ways to minimize losses in the conventional 
environment for which they had not prepared.
62
  To their sorrow, they found that their service 
was incapable of penetrating a wholly unexpected foe in the NV-IADS. 
 North Vietnamese Weapons  
The NV-IADS began humbly with optically-aimed guns, the overwhelming majority of 
which were heavy machine guns or automatic cannons, supplemented by large-caliber cannons 
controlled by obsolescent radars.
63
  This situation, however, rapidly changed once China and the 
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Soviet Union chose to supply North Vietnam with weapons, equipment, and training as part of 
their larger Cold War strategy.  In addition to giving the appearance of aiding a fellow 
Communist state, the Chinese and Soviets were also given an opportunity to test their weapons 
and techniques in a realistic environment versus their likely opponents.  Combined, these factors 
meant that the NV-IADS grew from its humble beginnings to, by November 1968, the deadliest 
air defense network in the world outside of the Soviet Union itself.
64
 
It was not merely the weapons themselves that made this network deadly but also how 
the North Vietnamese employed them.  Unsurprisingly, the North Vietnamese did not necessarily 
strictly adhere to either Chinese or Soviet air defense doctrine.  Lacking the operational depth of 
either of their larger patrons or the means to strike back at the USN’s carriers or USAF bases in 
Thailand, the North Vietnamese could not conduct a traditional air superiority campaign.  
Instead, realizing that the United States intended to fight a limited war and that there was no 
single North Vietnamese target that was irreplaceable, the North Vietnamese military opted to 
conduct a strategy that was roughly analogous to that of their ground forces.  Whenever possible, 
North Vietnamese defenses would concentrate their most sophisticated ground- and air-based 
systems where they could be employed from a position of strength.  Just as they intended to 
exhaust the United States’ Army in the South, the North’s leaders expected to bleed the United 
States Air Force white as long as it attempted to strike the DRV.
65
 
Command and Control 
Orchestrating this campaign was the responsibility of the NV-IADS command and 
control (C
2
) nodes.  The most important component of the NV-IADS, these four North 
Vietnamese Air Defense Command (NVADC) sub-headquarters were located within Hanoi and 
Haiphong.  Tasked with coordinating the movements of the other three components (anti-aircraft 
artillery [AAA], MiGs, and SAMs) in order to avoid fratricide and cause the most damage to 
American air strikes, each center was commanded by a North Vietnamese Army flag officer.  
Each of these command nodes, in turn, was fed information by multiple subordinate commands. 
First, there was an extensive network of early warning radars whose medium- and high-altitude 
coverage extended across neighboring Laos to the west and well out into the Gulf of Tonkin to 
the east.  By detecting American strike aircraft well in advance, these systems allowed the North 
Vietnamese to quickly determine the speed and direction of an approaching American strike.  
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Second, there were numerous electronic intelligence (ELINT) and radar intercept stations that 
would attempt to discern what the 7
th
 Air Force had targeted  for the day.  Finally, there were the 
reports given by defense assets in action, all of whose secondary job was to keep higher 
headquarters abreast of the Americans’ progress so North Vietnamese commanders could direct 
additional forces against a strike if conditions were especially favorable.
66
   
 AAA Systems 
The simplest of these three assets were the aforementioned guns.  By 1968 almost the 
entire North Vietnamese populace was engaged in anti-aircraft defense.  The regular anti-aircraft 
forces of the North Vietnamese Army used a suite of cannons that were almost wholly controlled 
by Fire Can radars and associated fire control computers. Capable of tracking multiple, high-
speed targets from low altitude (around 1,000 feet) through roughly 60,000 feet, the Fire Can 
drastically increased AAA weapons’ accuracy.67  Although the Fire Can could be jammed, 7th 
Air Force strikes ignored the system at their peril, as they controlled heavy and automatic cannon 
capable of reaching jets flying up to 39,000 feet.
68
    
Complementing the radar-controlled weapons were the countless small arms wielded by 
the North Vietnamese populace.  As one USAF report noted: 
 
Added to all [the heavy weapons] was what one THUD pilot called the 
“Hanoi Habit”: even waitresses would run outside and start firing when the sirens 
sounded, using weapons from 7.62 rifles to the WW II Browning M-2 .50 calibre 
(sic) machine gun.
69
 
 
While the mental image of a cocktail waitress leaving her patrons in order to go outside 
and fire a few rounds up into the air may be amusing in the abstract, in reality those rounds 
costing a few cents were only slightly less likely to contribute to the destruction of a multi-
million dollar jet aircraft than their larger cousins.  Flying over North Vietnam at less than 
10,000 feet was an exercise in calculated risk.  Thanks in no small part to the waitresses, farmers, 
and other militia members flying at 5,000 feet altitude near a target would almost assuredly end 
in casualties.  Like citizens playing a macabre lottery, every North Vietnamese saw an American 
air strike as an opportunity to strike a jackpot.
70
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The Air Force’s leaders had not taken these defenses into account when determining their 
attack tactics.  As they had planned to do in Europe, F-105s began air operations against North 
Vietnam by ingressing at low altitude, pulling up to 10,000 feet to dive-bomb their targets, then 
egressing using the Thunderchief’s superior speed.  The North Vietnamese, after determining the 
most common USAF ingress and egress routes, then began siting the guns accordingly.  By 
Rolling Thunder’s conclusion, Air Force fighter were thus forced to ingress and egress at high 
altitudes.
71
 
 SAMs 
This solution to the ferocity of North Vietnam’s AAA defenses brought USAF’s fighters 
squarely into contact with the SA-2.  The Air Force’s passing familiarity with the Guideline 
became a lethal, regular relationship on July 24, 1965 with the destruction of Leopard 2, an F-4 
Phantom.
 72
 With this single stroke, the North Vietnamese and their Soviet advisors greatly 
complicated the American bombing offensive.  Unable to simply avoid the SA-2 sites as they 
had planned to do in Europe and often unable to spot the sites before they fired, USAF fighter 
pilots were forced to devise methods to try and outmaneuver the “flying telephone poles.”  While 
these were somewhat successful, they either necessitated the jettisoning of weapons or, 
alternatively, depleted the targeted aircraft’s energy.73  When the Guideline was fired as part of a 
salvo (a common tactic), this meant that American aircrews often found themselves blundering 
squarely into the path of a second Guideline or, even worse, the NV-IADS AAA envelope.
74
 
It was at this point that the Air Force’s dearth of SEAD doctrine began to have terrible 
consequences for the 7
th
 Air Force’s squadrons.  Attempting to attack SAM sites with 
conventional fighters was quickly shown to be almost suicidal due to the concentration of anti-
aircraft weapons around each site.  Hurriedly fitting the two F-105 wings based in Thailand with 
Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) sensors, 7
th
 Air Force then directed that tracked fighter 
bombers only begin anti-SAM maneuvers if they received a warning that their fighter was being 
tracked.
75
  Even though this was better than nothing, it was far from optimal given the similarity 
between the Fan Song’s and Fire Can’s signals, with lethal consequences for an incorrect guess.  
To a pilot transitioning through the densest North Vietnamese defenses (e.g., Route Packages 5 
and 6), reacting to the RHAW transformed a mission into a virtual roller coaster ride into and out 
of the heart of the AAA envelope.
76
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As losses continued to mount, the Air Force developed two final solutions for dealing 
with the SAM sites: Wild Weasel aircraft and electronic countermeasures (ECM) pods.
77
  The 
Air Force had first explored employing ECM pods in 1957, but initial efforts were less than 
optimal and required up-to-date intelligence on what hostile systems would be present at the 
target.
78
  Unimpressed with the outcome and believing that tactical fighters would not need 
jammers in order to penetrate defenses at low level, the Air Force had decided that continued 
development was not a budgetary priority.
79
  With the North Vietnamese providing deadly 
impetus for rethinking how their doctrine viewed air defense, the Air Force initiated a crash 
program to develop a more effective jamming pod.   
The resultant second-generation ECM pod, dubbed the QRC-160, was first fielded to 
protect the F-105 strike force and then, as numbers increased and the pods improved, their F-4 
escorts.  Although carrying the jamming pod meant that an aircraft could carry less ordnance, 
pilots and Air Force leaders considered the protection gained from turning a Fan Song or Fire 
Can’s screen into an unreadable mass of lines worth the cost.  As long as the equipped aircraft 
flew straight and level at around 18,000 feet, the various pods greatly reduced the effectiveness 
of radar defenses.  This protection grew almost exponentially if the aircraft was part of a tight, 
precise flight dubbed the “pod formation.”  Although the Fan Song could burn through the 
jamming at around six miles, the SA-2’s minimum effective range of 4-5 miles meant that 
effective engagements would have required an extremely proficient crew.  Losses to the SA-2 
initially dropped rapidly after the pods’ introduction, but there were periods of increased 
vulnerability due to North Vietnamese Fan Song operators changing their radars’ frequency in 
November 1967.
80
  Even though American ELINT quickly ascertained these new frequencies, 
with Air Force systems command making the necessary modifications to maintain effectiveness, 
it was clear that the pods as well as the formations were not the optimal solution to stop the 
Dvina.
81
 
 Guerillas of the Sky: MiGs 
Part of the reason for dislike of the pods had to do with the final component of the NV-
IADS: MiGs.  Named for the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau, their usual manufacturer, MiGs 
that were the North Vietnamese interceptors attempted to destroy USAF strike aircraft by using 
air-to-air missiles or mounted cannon.  Ground control intercept (GCI) stations guided these 
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North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) fighters to their prey by radio.
82
  The pod formation, as the 
Air Force quickly found out, made this process much easier.  Striking most often from behind 
and above, MiGs usually made a single pass on an American formation in an attempt to destroy, 
damage, or force the targeted aircraft to jettison its ordnance.
83
  In this manner, they usually 
frustrated USAF attempts to force them into extended dogfights.   
 Fighting the IADS: USAF SEAD Doctrine During Rolling Thunder  
The strength and skill with which the North Vietnamese defended their nation came as an 
unpleasant shock to the USAF’s senior leaders.  Although rules of engagement did limit 7th Air 
Force’s options, the simple fact of the matter was that Air Force tactical fighters lacked the 
capability to impose their will on the NV-IADS due to an overemphasis on nuclear doctrine.
84
  
Almost all of these shortcomings, to include the inability to react to restrictive ROE, could be 
blamed on one culprit: USAF’s lack of attention to SEAD doctrine in AFM 1-3.  Indeed, AFM 1-
3 devoted less than a page to enemy defenses, discussing them in this manner: 
(8) Countermeasures: 
 
(a) The nerve center of any modern air defense system consists essentially 
of electronic devices and equipment. It is primarily by these means that invading 
air forces are detected and located. After they are located, electronic devices assist 
in their interception and destruction. Antiaircraft artillery fire also is, to a large 
extent, controlled electronically. 
 
(b) Certain types of offensive airforce operations are facilitated and their 
success enhanced by the complementary actions of electronic countermeasures 
operations. Such complementary operations tend to disrupt and confuse the 
enemy, and thus permit greater success to the main operation. Airborne 
countermeasure devices are complex and require highly trained personnel for 
effective operation. 
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(c) Due to the far-reaching implications of countermeasure operations 
their planning and employment transcend the responsibility of any single theater. 
The overall agency charged with the direction of the war determines the role each 
theater will perform in accomplishing certain countermeasures. The theater 
countermeasures’ program is controlled at theater level, and is harmonized with 
the global plan on a continuing basis. In this manner, a concerted action is 
achieved which provides all forces irrespective of assigned tasks optimum benefit 
from such measure to deceive and confuse the enemy.
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It can be seen from above that the Air Force considered destruction of enemy defenses to 
be a theater (i.e., operational level) task. Despite this, there was no doctrine to state just how 
such a destruction should be conducted. Without an overarching operational-level doctrine, 
USAF wing commanders were forced to attack the NV-IADS with a hodgepodge of techniques 
that reflected each wing commander’s personal preferences.  This, in turn, made coordination of 
matters such as tanker support, fighter escort, and jamming even more difficult for non-attacking 
wings.
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  Finally, the Air Force’s rotation policies and senior leader attrition further exacerbated 
this approach as new officers rotated into wing command and senior staff positions. 
 This initial lack of an operational SEAD doctrine followed by a failure to embark on an 
emergency program to remedy it served to exacerbate material and tactical shortcomings 
exposed in Operation Rolling Thunder’s early days.  The former manifested against all three 
facets of the NV-IADS in spectacular fashion. Against SAMs and radar-controlled guns, USAF 
fighters lacked ordnance that allowed them to target specifically Fan Songs and Fire Cans that 
made AAA and SA-2s so dangerous.  Thus initial efforts to engage SAM sites using high 
explosive bombs and napalm resulted in heavy casualties both for the suppression flights and the 
strike packages they were attempting to protect.
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  Even after the development of Shrike radar-
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homing missiles and the F-100 / F-105 Wild Weasel aircraft, the lack of an operational SEAD 
plan made every foray into North Vietnam analogous to a parent betting on a pet mongoose’s 
ability to kill a cobra before it struck their children. In many cases, the “Iron Hand” and “Wild 
Weasel” hunter-killer packages were indeed able to suppress the North Vietnamese defenders 
into lesser effectiveness.  However, all too often either a change in NVAF doctrine, a lack of 
available Wild Weasel airframes, or the inevitable friction of trying to coordinate between 
hundreds of airframes led to American strikes suffering increased losses from guns, SAMs, and 
MiGs. 
It was North Vietnamese fighters’ continued effectiveness that was most surprising and 
frustrating to USAF’s leaders.  Due as much to a lack of suitable ordnance as to restrictive rules 
of engagement, 7
th
 Air Force was unable to destroy the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) 
fighters on the ground.  Even though, as mentioned above, MiGs fought in a style reminiscent of 
aerial guerillas, given the relative technological levels and investment in pilot development, 
fighting MiGs in the air should have been relatively simple.  Indeed, in Korea, USAF fighter 
pilots had established a kill ratio of eight to ten MiGs for every United Nations aircraft lost to 
enemy fighters.  During Rolling Thunder, this plunged precipitously to slightly over 2:1 against 
the obsolescent MiG-17 and only slightly more modern MiG-21.  While this could be understood 
due to the F-100, F-102, F-104’s shorter range and the F-105s design parameters, it was 
perplexing to USAF leaders when F-4 Phantoms often found themselves outmaneuvered and 
then destroyed by North Vietnamese MiGs.
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It was only after hurried analysis that the Air Force realized the truly detrimental effect 
that their prewar doctrine had on their readiness for air-to-air combat.  The Phantom’s lack of an 
internal gun, touted as proof of its modernity, quickly proved to be a liability as NVAF MiGs 
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swiftly closed to within the Falcon, Sparrow and Sidewinder’s minimum range.  The missiles 
themselves, so reliable in tests, quickly began to malfunction due both to Southeast Asia’s 
humidity and poor maintenance practices employed by draftee airmen facing pressure for rapid 
sortie rates.
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  Within the cockpit, systems designed to ensure that there was careful, thoughtful 
release of nuclear weapons proved ergonomically unsuitable to use during the chaotic, high-G 
dance of aerial combat.  Finally, and most importantly, pilots taught for years to fly precise, rigid 
flight formations that placed a premium on flight integrity rather than on killing enemy aircraft 
proved wholly unsuited in fighting against dissimilar aircraft manned by increasingly 
experienced NVAF operators.
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  All of these problems were exacerbated by questionable USAF 
personnel policies dictating that 7
th
 Air Force personnel would be rotated after 100 missions, 
with no officer required to return against his will until virtually all TAC officers had been sent to 
Southeast Asia at least once.
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 The State of the Air Force, November 1968 
This problem with manning was only one of the numerous issues facing the Air Force as 
Rolling Thunder ended in November 1968.   First and foremost, it was clear that USAF leaders 
had wildly exaggerated the likelihood of nuclear war when writing the service’s doctrine.  This 
had led to several poor decisions with regard to acquisition, training, and ordnance development.  
Second, the severe cost of Rolling Thunder had indicated that the Air Force’s views about hostile 
air defense systems were fatally flawed.  The NV-IADS had not only taken its measure of 7
th
 Air 
Force but it had also shot down so many Thunderchiefs that the Air Force was forced to 
withdraw the F-105D from active service.
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  Third, conventional training and pilot proficiency 
had been clearly lacking at the beginning of the bombing campaign and only faced haphazard 
improvement over the previous three years.  Unfortunately, the psychological effect of these 
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devastating losses, frustration with what the pilots perceived as indifference of Air Force leaders, 
and wide availability of jobs in the civilian sector resulted in many combat-experienced pilots 
opting for civilian life.
93
  This exodus occurred concurrently with the accelerated exit of the 
World War II and Korean War pilots who had led Rolling Thunder’s squadrons and wings.  With 
most of the experienced officers leaving, the Air Force was in great danger of losing most of the 
lessons it had learned from Operation Rolling Thunder.
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Chapter 2: SEAD Doctrine, 1968 through 1972 
General McConnell and the Air Staff took several steps in order to try and preserve the 
knowledge gained at great cost over North Vietnam.  Although senior leaders did not take the 
drastic step of outright preventing officers from leaving the Air Force, the LOYAL LOOK (later 
dubbed CORONA HARVEST) oral history program was initiated to interview as many of the 
departing individuals as possible.
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  Next, the Air Staff gave increased priority to updating its 
doctrine, a process that it had begun just prior to the initiation of Operation Rolling Thunder.
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Unfortunately for USAF, ongoing operations in Southeast Asia as well as continued 
responsibilities throughout the rest of the world constantly distracted the individuals tasked with 
updating AFM 1-3, with the end result that there was almost no change in actual SEAD doctrine 
from November 1968 through March 1972.  Lacking the pervasive guidance of doctrine, the Air 
Force made few advances toward fixing the vulnerabilities exposed by the NV-IADS during 
Rolling Thunder.  There is little evidence that USAF leaders at any level attempted to determine 
how Air Force units were to identify or destroy an IADS’s command and control elements.  With 
regard to AAA, from 1968 to 1972 the Air Force continued to preach the gospel of terrain 
avoidance and low-level ingress and egress in training and European commands.  This directly 
contradicted the medium-altitude ingress followed by dive-bombing delivery that 7
th
 Air Force 
had almost universally adopted by October 1968 after completing a hasty study of North 
Vietnamese air defenses and F-105 losses.
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Anti-radar efforts faced a similar organizational malaise throughout TAC in particular 
and USAF in general.  In addition to its own experience in Rolling Thunder, the Air Force was 
also able to observe the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF’s) issues in facing Egyptian defenses from late 
1967 through 1972 in the “War of Attrition.”98  Despite this, minimal emphasis was placed upon 
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making advances in anti-radar capability through either advanced ECM pods, internal jammers, 
or physical attack.  The EB-66, despite its creeping obsolescence and inability to accompany 
strike packages, continued to be the Air Force’s primary jamming aircraft.  As for Wild Weasels, 
USAF once again attempted to use an obsolescent airframe (the F-4C) rather than attempting to 
develop a wholly new system or diverting new Phantom production for modification.  In 
addition to not being able to carry StARMs, the F-4C had serious issues with its avionics suite 
and physical maneuverability in comparison to the new production F-4Es.
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  These proved 
difficult to resolve and, as the Air Force’s leaders failed to make development a priority, meant 
that the F-105Fs/Gs would be the primary defense suppression aircraft when combat resumed in 
1972.
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The sum effect of these changes was that Air Force aircraft went to war in 1972 with less 
electronic warfare capability than they had when Operation Rolling Thunder ended.  On the 
positive side, the ability to carry more StARMs on the F-105G, better jammers, minor 
improvements in avionics, and an increase in the total available airframes meant that Wild 
Weasels were somewhat more capable.  This increase in capability, however, was more than 
counterbalanced by the increased proficiency of the North Vietnamese, the F-105F/G’s age, the 
Thunderchiefs’ lower speed at medium altitude, and the need for Wild Weasels to be provided 
with an additional flight of escorts.  Whether one believes that the Air Force’s anti-radar 
capability actually regressed, there is overwhelming evidence that markedly improving Wild 
Weasel capability had not been a priority of the intervening four years.
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The Air Force appeared similarly disinterested in making major improvements in its 
ability to destroy airborne MiGs.  Despite the heavy losses suffered from NVAF interceptors, 
especially in the final months of Rolling Thunder, the Air Force did not increase its focus on 
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ACM.  Instead, the number of aerial combat training flights flown by new pilots actually 
decreased.
102
  Even worse, those missions which were left in the syllabus did not include 
dissimilar training, but instead were the same rigidly controlled exercises that had passed for 
training prior to Rolling Thunder.
103
  Rather than learning how to use their Phantoms’ strengths 
against an enemy’s weaknesses, new pilots were often sent to war with only a rudimentary 
understanding of their fighters’ capabilities.104    
This lack of training made the improvements the Air Force completed to the Phantom 
itself superfluous.  Equipping the “E” model of the Phantom with a gun did little good if no one 
taught the pilots flying the fighter how to bring their cannon to bear.  Improved avionics and 
ergonomically modified cockpits had little effect if the Air Force did not ensure that pilots 
received the number of training sorties to make their use second nature  When TAC did not 
develop a training regimen that instructed pilots how to fly an F-4 throughout its flight regime, 
expecting these same pilots to take advantage of maneuvering slats that were designed to 
improve the Phantom’s performance in air-to-air combat was somewhat wishful thinking.  
Finally, the continued problems with the Sparrow and Sidewinder meant that the F-4s’ primary 
armament remained ineffective.
105
  SEAD doctrine was not a panacea for all of these issues.  
However, it is clear that, in its absence, the Air Force continued most of the same policies that 
had caused the heavy losses during Operation Rolling Thunder.  From the lack of movement on 
SEAD doctrine, equipment, or training from 1968 through 1972, it appeared that Air Force 
leaders focused on the wrong issues after rolling Thunder.  As noted by Air Force historian 
Michael Worden, “TAC worked closely with Systems Command to develop cluster-bomb 
munitions (CBU), precision-guided munitions (PGM), radar warning systems…F-4E gatling 
guns…electronic warfare aircraft, and long-range aid to navigation (LORAN) systems.”  But the 
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majority of these efforts were conducted without thought to their integration with each other.
106
  
For almost four years the Air Force, in focusing on individual aircraft components and ordnance 
effects on targets, did not give enough effort to training their aircrews how to penetrate an 
integrated air defense system.  
Thoughts on Air Defense 
 
Noting the Air Force’s lack of SEAD doctrine is not intended to imply that the 1971 
edition of AFM 1-1 completely ignored the enemy air defenses.  Indeed, if the Air Force had not 
just spent three years being mauled over North Vietnam, its treatment of a possible enemy IADS 
would have appeared to be sufficient given the dearth of other information for analysis.  At the 
tactical level, the Air Force’s revised doctrinal manual provided a doctrine of what the 
“counterair mission” consisted of [bold in original copy]: 
3-4. Conventional Mission Characteristics. In a conflict involving only 
conventional weapons, the following mission characteristics will generally apply:  
 
a. The Counterair Mission. Conventional operations require the use of 
aircraft of such a scale as to be impracticable without air superiority. The 
counterair mission can best be accomplished by multiple attacks against the 
enemy’s airbases, air order of battle, and his command and control facilities, but 
must also include the interception and destruction of enemy aircraft in flight. If 
sanctuary is permitted near the battle zone, air superiority will depend on air-to-
air combat.
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This tactical definition complemented the counterair operational task [bold in original 
copy]:  
a. Counterair. Counterair operations are conducted to gain and maintain 
air superiority by destruction or neutralization of an enemy’s offensive and 
defensive air capability. The counterair mission involves both offensive and 
defensive air action. 
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(1) Offensive counterair operations are normally conducted throughout 
enemy territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, missile 
and anti-aircraft artillery sites, air bases, air control systems, fuel stores and other 
elements which constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. 
 
(2) Defensive counterair operations are generally reactive to enemy 
initiative. Air defense operations involve destroying enemy air vehicles 
attempting to penetrate friendly airspace. While air defense is vital to the overall 
counterair program and to the security of friendly forces and installations, the 
most rapid and conclusive results are obtained through offensive action. 
 
(3) Centralized allocation and direction of air forces is essential to achieve 
maximum effectiveness of the counterair effort and to insure coordination of the 
overall air campaign.
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In order to accomplish these tasks, according to AFM 1-1, aerospace forces would have 
to be “capable of”: 
 
(1) Sustained operations under austere conditions. 
 
(2) Continuous mission performance under all conditions of light and weather. 
 
(3) Continued and effective operations in a sophisticated enemy 
electromagnetic environment. 
 
(4) Survivability under enemy fire. 
 
(5) Obtaining complete and timely intelligence on enemy activities. 
 
b. Underlying the foregoing capabilities is the requirement for a secure, 
responsive, flexible control system to direct the forces, integrate their efforts, and 
coordinate operations with those of other friendly forces.  
 
c. Standardized equipment, ordnance, and operational procedures are 
desirable, however, efforts to standardize should not compromise mission 
flexibility nor create stereotyped operational patterns. 
 
d. Combat aircraft are designed to accomplish specific operational tasks. At 
the same time to achieve flexibility, combat aircraft are capable of performing 
multiple missions.
109
 
 
 
30 
 
Finally, the ordnance which these aircraft would carry would meet the following 
description [bold in original text]: 
3-3. Conventional Weapons Capabilities. Conventional weapon capabilities 
should not be considered as fixed or static. Since military capability is sensitive to 
new types of weapons and improved delivery systems, efforts to upgrade 
conventional systems must proceed alongside comparable efforts in the field of 
nuclear warfare. Smoke, incendiary agents and riot control agents are included 
within the concept of conventional air operations. 
 
These descriptions and analyses would have been understandable if written in 1965.  
However, the Air Force went through great effort to CORONA HARVEST to serve as historical 
records and influence training after Operation Rolling Thunder.  In addition, the Nixon 
Administration had made its policies clear.  Given these facts, there appears to be a clear 
incongruity between the Air Force’s intellectual efforts, stated national policy, and the doctrine 
stated above. The USAF  was tasked with myriad worldwide missions.  Of these, senior Air 
Force leaders repeatedly emphasized that a potential war in Central Europe was their paradigm 
for measuring units’ effectiveness and the basis for the service’s most important contingency 
plans.
110
  AFM 1-1’s authors wrote the above paragraphs as if many of these contingencies 
would not entail fighting the very same systems that had just savaged 7
th
 Air Force over the 
DRV.  Indeed, looking at AFM 1-1, an outside observer would have believed that an individual 
AAA site was as worthwhile a target as fuel stores for a major airbase.  If one accepts the 
purpose of doctrine as providing clear guidelines, AFM 1-1 did not meet this standard with 
regard to SEAD. 
This shortcoming did not end with target prioritization.  Based on the document’s own 
definitions, it was impossible for a theater commander to organize an effective SEAD aerospace 
force from systems available in 1971.  With only limited capability to operate at night, 
marginally better suitability to operations in an electronic environment, and no innate 
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reconnaissance capabilities, the F-4 airframe did not even meet most of the criteria for aerospace 
power in the document.  Thus, commanders who were expected to carry out SEAD would not be 
able to employ the proposed Wild Weasel IV aircraft against ground-based threats even as the 
document was being written, much less in the near future.  This dissonance becomes even more 
pronounced when one considers that the F-105 F/G, not the F-4C, was still USAF’s primary 
suppression aircraft in September 1971. 
This conflict between doctrinally stated requirements and existing Air Force capabilities 
in 1971 continues with regard to conventional weapons.  Although AFM 1-1 alludes to 
conventional weapons, there is no mention of what these weapons are expected to do to targets.  
SEAD weapons are not even described in general.  Previously the Air Force had used doctrine as 
a tool to drive procurement of the Century Fighters for a theoretical conflict.  Having learned 
through painful experience over North Vietnam that not all conventional weapons were created 
equal, it is curious that its foundational doctrine omitted any mention of SEAD.  As the intent of 
AFM 1-1 was to serve as a doctrinal foundation, having the central doctrinal text list every 
weapon by type would likely have been unwieldy.  However, given the impact of the NV-IADS, 
the Air Force’s doctrine writers could likely have delivered a general description of SEAD 
weapons and how they affected to ability to employ aerospace power in a short number of pages.  
The Air Force’s doctrinal writers did not do this and, in addition to leading to later weapons 
procurement mischief, this omission increased the likelihood that the bomber, fighter, and 
electronic warfare communities would suffer confusion when communicating with one another. 
Finally, AFM 1-1 continued to tie Air Force conventional and nuclear capabilities 
together as part of a warfighting whole.  Tying conventional and nuclear capabilities together did 
not make much sense.  By 1971 the Soviet Union had achieved near parity in nuclear weapons, 
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and thus it was highly unlikely a general nuclear exchange would occur.  Simultaneously, this 
paradigm increased the probability of a conventional conflict.  By stating that Air Force efforts, 
in everything from R&D through procurement, should be “comparable,” USAF leaders indicated 
their belief that thermonuclear exchange continued to be a viable national strategy  Further 
evidence of this mindset can be seen in the fact that conventional weapons operations are 
covered in one chapter yet AFM 1-1 dedicated two chapters to nuclear warfare.  This is 
especially confusing given the concurrent use of conventional weapons in Vietnam, their 
previous use in Korea, and likely future use should deterrence fail in Central Europe.  Put more 
starkly, although it was possible that there could be a high-intensity nuclear conflict in 1971, the 
Air Force had yet to see one.  In contrast, almost forty percent of its time as a separate service 
had been spent in conventional combat
111
   
Even harder to understand is why the Air Force included these two chapters yet did not 
include one on SEAD.  Using obsolescent systems, North Vietnam’s air defenses had accounted 
for the downing of almost 1,000 aircraft.  The Air Force was well aware that the Soviet Union 
possessed systems that were far more capable than the SA-2.   A Central European scenario 
where most of these weapons could be expected was central to most of the Department of 
Defense’s planning.  Furthermore, after Operation Rolling Thunder and concurrent wars in the 
Middle East, Air Force leaders and pilots were also well aware of the Soviet Union’s willingness 
to provide advanced systems to client states.
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Despite this knowledge, AFM 1-1’s writers saw fit to provide only three paragraphs on 
this threat.  Thus, in effect, the doctrine published in September 1971 was fundamentally 
unchanged from that published in 1953.  There was no guidance in how a theater commander 
would reduce an IADS.  Future procurement officers could not foresee what changes needed to 
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be made in future systems to meet a doctrinal intent.  Finally, there was no discussion as to how 
the Air Force could conduct joint or combined operations in support of national objectives.  
Subsequently, in both the near and mid-term, the Air Force would be largely doctrinally adrift.    
Explaining the Excluded 
There is no single event or cause that explains why Air Force SEAD doctrine did not 
evolve from 1968 to 1972.  The Air Force remained a large organization and, like all similar 
entities, had many complexities, personnel movements, and daily unit activities that served to 
hinder change through bureaucratic inertia.  However, historical evidence indicates that three 
major incidents influenced the development of AFM 1-1 in general and the exclusion of SEAD 
doctrine in particular.  First, the election of Richard Nixon and appointment of his cabinet not 
only changed the Air Force’s civilian leadership in 1968 but revamped the USAF’s strategic 
focus to conventional warfare.  The 1969 appointment of General John D. Ryan to succeed 
General McConnell as Air Force Chief of Staff meant that this reorientation occurred in a period 
when military leadership was also transitioning.  Finally, in yet another shift, General McConnell 
appointed General William Momyer, formerly of 7
th
 Air Force, to become head of Tactical Air 
Command.  Having all three of these positions change hands simultaneously had interesting 
effects on Air Force doctrine. 
President Nixon, in addition to wanting to end the Vietnam War, also sought to reduce 
American military responsibilities worldwide.  The first step towards doing this was the 
enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, in which President Nixon outlined the United States’ 
responsibilities towards its allies.  No longer could allied nations expect the open-ended 
commitment of American ground forces in order to combat communist incursions against their 
territory.  Nor would the United States, given the Soviet Union’s increasingly modern strategic 
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arsenal, provide a blanket nuclear guarantee to counteract gross disparities in conventional forces 
between allied nations and their Communist neighbors.  Instead, the United States could be 
expected to provide two things: military hardware and training to equip allied forces at 
reasonable prices and, more importantly, conventional airpower.  While this was intended to 
have major implications for NATO and Western Europe, the first test of this theory would come 
with “Vietnamization,” i.e., the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from 1969 to 1972.113    
Unfortunately for the U.S. Air Force, President Nixon’s clarity in enunciating his new 
doctrine and the military’s role met with immediate resistance within the Pentagon.  The primary 
cause of these difficulties was President Nixon’s relationship with Secretary of Defense Melvin 
R. Laird.  Laird had not been Nixon’s first choice to head DoD and, since the President did not 
know him well, did not enjoy the Chief Executive’s full confidence.114  As would be the case 
with many of his other appointees, military leaders, and members of Congress, Nixon’s paranoia 
caused him to regard Laird with increasing acrimony.  Laird’s actions during a crisis that ensued 
after North Korea shot down an American spy plane followed shortly by Nixon’s suspicions that 
Laird was the source of a leak regarding operations in Cambodia did not help matters.
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Eventually, the friction between the two men grew to the point that their relationship was barely 
functional, as Nixon began to believe that Laird was more interested in simply abandoning South 
Vietnam than achieving any semblance of victory.
116
  Although a degree of tension between a 
President and his Secretary of Defense in time of war may be typical or even healthy, the 
relationship between Nixon and Laird exceeded this standard.  This friction, combined with the 
damage done to the Department of Defense by the Johnson administration, prevented Laird from 
acting as Nixon’s agent of change within the Pentagon.  
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Unlike the tense relationship between Laird and Nixon, the tie between Secretary of the 
Air Force Robert Seamans, Jr. and General Ryan was much too friendly.  Air historian Walter J. 
Boyne describes Seamans as “able” and an “excellent match” for General Ryan when the latter 
became Air Force Chief of Staff.
117
  If one accepts that the Air Force needed change, it stands to 
reason that this was not a good thing.  Furthermore, Seamans not only reestablished the Air 
Force’s Central European focus but also gave every indication that the Air Force’s leaders did 
not have to worry about a return to North Vietnam.
118
  With this lackadaisical approach to 
solving the war at hand, Seamans likely contributed, as Earl Tilford puts it, to the “sense within 
the Air Force that the [Vietnam] war was over” in 1971.119  Finally, there are no indications that 
Seamans questioned the Air Force’s continued attempts to develop a successor to the B-52 or the 
Air Staff’s prioritization of this project over rushing into service the successor to the F-4 
Phantom and F-105 Thunderchief. Given both the Nixon Doctrine and the attrition suffered by 
TAC airframes in Southeast Asia, it is puzzling why the Secretary of the Air Force did not take a 
more active role in overseeing his service’s refurbishment efforts.120  Taken altogether, these 
actions strongly indicate that Secretary Seamans was not interested in forcing major 
modifications to any doctrine, much less specific areas such as SEAD, on the Air Force’s 
military leadership.      
 Air Force Leaders 
That impetus for sweeping changes would have to come from an external source is 
apparent from examining the three Air Force officers who were responsible for conventional 
readiness prior to Operation Linebacker.  The first of these, General McConnell, was only briefly 
on the scene.  Having served as Air Force Chief of Staff for the entirety of Rolling Thunder, 
McConnell blamed most of that campaign’s shortcomings on civilian leaders’ restrictions.121  
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Furthermore, McConnell felt that the Air Force had allowed its strategic strength to decline to 
dangerous levels.
122
  Although he had cut SAC’s research and development budget to the bone in 
order to support tactical fighters in contact, McConnell had also strongly resisted cutting 
prohibitively expensive bomber programs in order to expedite the production of conventional 
fighters.
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  It was clear that General McConnell believed the Air Force should reallocate the 
bulk of its budget from conventional operations to rebuilding SAC as soon as the Vietnam War 
was over.  It is not hard to imagine how the Chief of Staff’s views may have influenced doctrine 
writers in general, and almost certainly by what he found unimportant.  McConnell gave no 
formal guidance to TAC on training, nor did he seem to believe that suppressing enemy air 
defenses was a pressing task.  
General John D. Ryan, McConnell’s successor, believed even more strongly in the 
primacy of strategic forces.  General McConnell, desiring Ryan to be his successor, had 
appointed the latter as Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces at the beginning of Operation 
Rolling Thunder.  McConnell had done this specifically so that Ryan, who had spent his entire 
career within SAC, could gain some experience overseeing tactical fighters.  This appointment 
did not go well.  First, General Ryan regularly demonstrated ignorance of what his pilots were 
going through and gave few indications that he wished to learn.
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  Second, he displayed a very 
poor leadership style which often prevented the flow of information between PACAF and 7
th
 Air 
Force and also had a negative impact on pilots’ morale.  Finally, on more than one occasion he 
seemed to demonstrate a lack of integrity to his subordinates.
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Had Ryan not become Air Force Chief of Staff, his personality traits would not have had 
much bearing on how USAF developed doctrine.  However, General Ryan carried these same 
traits to Washington when he succeeded McConnell.  Two incidents will suffice to illustrate this 
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point.  First, after tacitly encouraging 7
th
 Air Force commander General John D. Lavelle to 
interpret liberally his rules of engagement with regard to striking North Vietnamese targets in 
1971, Ryan did not defend his subordinate when these incidents drew the ire of President 
Nixon.
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  Second, after having dispatched then Brigadier General Robin Olds to conduct an 
evaluation of 7
th
 Air Force’s capabilities, General Ryan did not reward the World War II ace and 
MiG killer for his candor.  Instead, General Olds was shuffled off to the Air Force Inspector 
General’s office, effectively ending his career.127  Justifiably or not, General Ryan began to 
develop a reputation for not wanting to hear bad news or have subordinates confront him in 
public.
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  Although the effect this environment had on doctrinal development cannot be 
quantified, it is unlikely that it was positive. 
The last Air Force leader who, by virtue of position and experience, could have had a 
great influence on Air Force doctrine was General William Momyer, commander of TAC.  Of all 
three military leaders, it is General Momyer’s unwillingness to force change that is hardest to 
explain.  The commander of 7
th
 Air Force throughout Rolling Thunder, Momyer had been an 
approachable leader who often visited his wing commanders.
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  Unlike Ryan at PACAF, 
Momyer had been well aware of the NV-IADS’s effect on his forces.  In response to the strength 
of the DRV’s defenses, General Momyer had regularly scheduled tactics meetings involving all 
of his subordinate leaders then disseminated the collective input throughout his organization.
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When General McConnell appointed Momyer as head of TAC, it was with the understanding 
that the latter would bring these same techniques with him to his new posting.  General Ryan 
reaffirmed this expectation when he succeeded McConnell as Chief of Staff.
131
  Therefore, it is 
hard to understand why General Momyer did not ensure that AFM 1-1 encapsulated more of the 
lessons, to include the necessity for SEAD, which 7
th
 Air Force had learned. 
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 One possible cause could be combat fatigue, as Momyer had overseen the longest 
bombing campaign in the Air Force’s short history while simultaneously running the air war over 
South Vietnam.  Another is that Momyer may have believed that the Air Force, and he 
especially, had executed Rolling Thunder to the best of their ability given the resources at hand 
and civilian restrictions in place.  Momyer espouses this view throughout his book Airpower In 
Three Wars and it is hard to believe that this opinion did not affect his actions as TAC 
commander.  Providing further evidence that this stance may have been a factor is a 1974 
memorandum that accompanied the CORONA HARVEST report on operations over North 
Vietnam and Laos during Rolling Thunder.  In it, Momyer states: 
 
Many of the restrictions on the attack of SAMs and AAA came from the location 
of these weapons.  The North Vietnamese deliberately sited many of these 
weapons in civilian areas knowing full well there would be a reluctance to strike 
these sites because of the civilian casualties that would ensue.  The question of 
expected collateral damage became a major consideration in the selection of 
targets at the highest level.  The SAMs and AAA that were located in the ten and 
thirty mile circle were usually surrounded by civilian structures.  Collateral 
damage could be significant when striking these targets which invariably had a 
political effect on the international scene.
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Momyer proceeds to give a similar treatment to air-to-air combat during Rolling 
Thunder: 
With the projected weapon systems now being developed and procured, 
[emphasis added] we should have a vastly improved potential for air to air 
combat.  Although the air to air engagements were dramatic in the Vietnam War, 
they were of limited significance [emphasis added] in terms of operations against 
the warmaking structure of the North Vietnamese.  The MiG force was relatively 
small and the size of the engagements was limited to four to five aircraft at any 
given time.  Even under the intensive effort by the North Vietnamese, the number 
of MiGs up for battle never exceeded fifteen to twenty aircraft.  We should, 
therefore, be cautious about the lessons derived from these limited combats.  Most 
certainly, relative performance of aircraft could be judged and restricted 
conclusions on air to air tactics could be deduced, but one should not try to 
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extrapolate these limited experiences in generalizing about the character of an air 
war in Europe where thousands of fighters would be involved. 
 
Recommendation.  Current actions are considered adequate [emphasis added].  
Care should be exercised in the application of the Vietnam experience to our 
tactical operations manuals.  TAC should be directed to review such publications 
for applicability to a large scale war.
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Considering that General Momyer wrote this in 1974, i.e., two years after the Linebacker 
Operations, it is safe to assume that Momyer had these same opinions from 1968 to 1972.  This 
means that, in Momyer’s view, it was not the Air Force’s current doctrine or its lack of guidance 
that explained 7
th
 Air Force’s inability to combat the NV-IADS.  Nor was it USAF’s inability to 
reliably detect active Fan Song and Fire Can radars, lack of a suitable ARM or conventional 
munitions to destroy SAM sites, or lack of pilot training in the delivery of these weapons that 
explained the resiliency of North Vietnam’s defenses.   
Instead, in Momyer’s view it was the DRV’s cunning use of civilian structures coupled 
with President Johnson and Secretary’s unwillingness to suffer a loss of international prestige 
that explained 7
th
 Air Force’s issues with ground defenses.  Likewise, the missiles that had failed 
to work reliably in Rolling Thunder had done so, in part, due to a lack of a target-rich 
environment or high-altitude clash between droves of MiGs and squadrons of Phantoms.  
Finally, as long as the Air Force could wait until new systems were produced, there was no need 
to change training or ensure that pilots knew how to use their high-technology mounts once they 
began to arrive in the Air Force.   
Combined, these factors meant that TAC, like the remainder of the Air Force, marked 
time and focused on attempting to repair the damage Operation Rolling Thunder had caused.  
Although Momyer did make several changes, the majority of these did not require strenuous 
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action or risk-taking on his part.  By emphasizing TAC’s focus on the development of guided 
bombs, all-weather capability, and sensor systems, General Momyer attempted to ensure that 
USAF’s next generation of warriors would go to war with the ability to threaten an ever growing 
list of targets.
134
  Unfortunately for the generation he commanded, however, the North 
Vietnamese did not wait until these projects came to full fruition.   
The Linebacker Operations 
On 30 March 1972, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) launched a surprise 
conventional assault against South Vietnam.  Dubbed the “Easter Offensive” by the United 
States, the attack demonstrated that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had finally evolved from 
an organization that employed traditional guerilla and light-infantry tactics into a modern, 
mechanized army capable of employing armored vehicles in multi-divisional attacks.  The 
purpose of the Easter Offensive was threefold.  First, the NVA would discredit the regime of 
President Thieu, South Vietnam’s leader, by occupying several of Republic of Vietnam’s 
(RVN’s) regional capitals.  Second, by virtue of targeting population centers, the NVA would 
force the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) into pitched battles for which its American 
advisors considered its small unit leaders poorly prepared.  Finally, even if the first two goals 
were not fully realized, the NVA expected that they would gain lodgments within South Vietnam 
from which they could launch future offensives.
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Given the North Vietnamese decision to pursue their objectives with the South in the 
midst of Vietnamization, the Easter Offensive seemed to be a perfect opportunity to test the 
Nixon Doctrine.  Both in order to stabilize the wavering South Vietnamese government and to 
punish the DRV’s leadership, President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force and 
Navy to resume bombing North Vietnam, with initial operations beginning on 30 March 1972.  
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Unlike his predecessor, President Nixon committed these forces with reasonably clear strategic 
goals and the latitude to accomplish them.  The North Vietnamese, in response to this onslaught, 
defended their country with the same systems they had used from 1965 to 1968.  Beginning with 
Operation Freedom Train, transitioning seamlessly to Linebacker I, and then, after a two-month 
pause (October-November 1972), ending with Linebacker II, the United States Navy and Air 
Force once again put America’s air power theories to the test.   
The Air Staff derived four major objectives from President Nixon’s guidance.  First, 
USAF aircraft, with USN support, would seek to interdict the North Vietnamese Army’s 
(NVA’s) supply lines sufficiently to preclude continued conventional operations in South 
Vietnam.  Second, the White House had explicitly stated that the Air Force was to inflict 
sufficient punishment on North Vietnam so that the DRV Politburo would be deterred from 
authorizing further aggression against South Vietnam.  Third, as implied by the Nixon Doctrine, 
USAF was to establish convincingly its ability to conduct conventional operations in support of 
an allied nation during a major conflict.
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  Finally, with the introduction of B-52 bombers in 
December 1972, the Air Force was to maintain the credibility of manned strategic aircraft as part 
of American nuclear deterrence policy. 
 Measuring Effectiveness 
There are many opinions about the outcome of this test.  Many of these judgments 
depend on how one views the ultimate objectives.  As one Air Force historian has noted, a 
football linebacker disrupts the offense through speed, strength, and the application of controlled 
violence.
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  Although urban legend has it that Linebacker I was so dubbed “because of 
[President Nixon’s] fondness for football,” the moniker was an apt analogy given American 
intentions to disrupt North Vietnam’s strategic war aims from 30 March to 23 October, 1972.138  
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However, as “disruption” is a vague term, clearly enumerating President Nixon’s objectives will 
better serve further discussion.  Generally speaking, the Air Force and USN were dispatched to 
accomplish the following objectives: 
1. Interdict the NVA’s supply lines in order to prevent the success of the Easter Offensive; 
 
2. Sufficiently punish North Vietnam, both by destroying its military capability and civilian 
infrastructure, that its leadership was both compelled to accept American peace terms and 
deterred from future aggression;
139
 
 
3. Validate USAF and USN’s ability to conduct conventional operations in a high-threat air 
defense environment; 
 
4. If USAF introduced strategic bombers, all elements were to ensure that the deterrent 
value of the manned strategic bomber was preserved. 
   
 Goal #1: Battlefield Interdiction 
 
The first two tasks were clearly and repeatedly stated by President Nixon.  By deploying 
the North Vietnamese Army in a modern combined-arms mechanized assault the Politburo had 
made their forces vulnerable to a traditional aerial interdiction campaign.  If DRV’s leaders had 
been correct in their analysis of Nixon, this vulnerability would have been of no consequence—
South Vietnam did not have an Air Force capable of many operations beyond close air support.  
However, when his military leaders made clear to Nixon the extent and type of the North’s 
attack, the President made several clear comparisons between the North Vietnamese offensive 
and the Wehrmacht’s Ardennes Offensive of December 1944.  Equally direct were his 
indications that he expected the North Vietnamese offensive to suffer a fate similar to that of the 
German one: strangulation and destruction under the weight of American air power.
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Whether air power caused the NVA’s offensive to fail is arguable even if the importance 
of American airstrikes to South Vietnamese morale is not.  On one hand, the Linebacker strikes 
wrought great destruction on the North Vietnamese logistical network through the destruction of 
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bridges, railways, and supply caches throughout that country.
141
  On the other, the NVA had 
foreseen just this possibility and had stockpiled sufficient supplies to conduct the initial phase of 
their offensive.
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  This simple preparation meant that any interdiction campaign, no matter how 
rapid, would have taken several weeks to show any effect.   
The massive amounts of air power directed against the NVA’s offensive forces, however, 
ensured that the exposed North Vietnamese divisions suffered losses far exceeding what their 
leaders had prepared for.  With myriad aircraft including everything from U.S. Army AH-1 
Cobra helicopter gunships through South Vietnamese A-1 Skyraiders up to B-52 Arc Light 
missions dropping 60,000-180,000 pounds of high explosive every thirty minutes, the NVA’s 
armored spearheads faced firepower unlike any seen to that point in warfare.  As Nixon desired, 
this resulted in the defeat of the North Vietnamese offensive in conjunction with the interdiction 
campaign.  Regardless of which phase caused more damage, the NVA’s general offensive did 
not achieve the physical conquest of the South nor did it cause the Thieu government to abruptly 
topple.  Therefore, it can be argued that the USAF and USN airstrikes met President Nixon’s first 
stated goal.
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 Goal #2: Punishment 
The military could not so easily meet the second objective -- to punish North Vietnam.  
From Nixon’s perspective, the DRV’s Politburo had rewarded three years of good-faith 
negotiating with an overt, aggressive betrayal.  Moreover, North Vietnam’s actions threatened to 
undermine Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s Cold War détente policies 
with the People’s Republic of China and with the Soviet Union.  Also, Nixon had watched his 
predecessor’s attempt at a gradual campaign become a spectacular failure.  Finally, and most 
importantly, Nixon wanted to make certain that the North Vietnamese were keenly aware of the 
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penalties involved should the DRV force the United States to intervene again in Southeast Asia.  
All four of these aspects compelled Nixon to ensure that the military understood his intent for the 
Linebacker operations to be an act of violence so extreme as to deter any future large-scale North 
Vietnamese offensives against South Vietnam for at least the remainder of his first term.   
Contrary to what the DRV’s Politburo had expected, Nixon had the will to aid South Vietnam.  
Even worse, as they were about to be made aware, the American President had the necessary 
vindictiveness to ruin North Vietnam’s civil and industrial capability if this would result in the 
DRV’s leadership being cowed into giving South Vietnam breathing room.144 
A potent force of will aside, it is unknowable whether what Nixon asked of the U.S. 
military was even achievable.  Like President Johnson’s goal of demonstrating “resolve,” 
Nixon’s desire to “punish” the North Vietnamese cannot be quantified.  The DRV’s Politburo 
was highly motivated to expedite the United States’ exit, as they felt this was the only way to 
ensure the fall of South Vietnam.  After the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, some observers 
noticed that North Vietnamese Politburo members had become increasingly concerned they 
would die before Vietnam was unified.  Ho Chi Minh’s passing also increased the North 
Vietnamese people’s motivation to reunite their country.145  Combined, these two factors meant 
that it was unlikely that the United States could achieve a sufficient level of violence to persuade 
these men to accept a divided Vietnam or, for that matter, any dictated American objectives.  
That Nixon’s goals kept changing also hindered this process by making it unclear how much and 
what type of pain the USAF’s aircrews and their USN counterparts needed to inflict.146   
Regardless of these facts, one possible guideline does exist: Operation Rolling Thunder.  
The North Vietnamese people and their leaders had weathered USAF and USN’s efforts from 
1965 to 1968.  Considering North Vietnam’s continued intransigence from 1968 to 1972, 
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infiltration of NVA regular units into South Vietnam, and the launch of the Easter Offensive, 
Operation Rolling Thunder had not greatly affected the DRV’s society nor deterred its leaders.  
Therefore, in order to have achieved Nixon’s “punishment,” the Linebacker operations would 
have had to at least equal if not surpass that earlier effort.   
Before attempting to see if the level of effort in the Linebacker operations surpassed that 
of Operation Rolling Thunder, it is necessary to examine some technical factors.  In 1972, USAF 
did not deploy as many aircraft to Southeast Asia as it had in 1968.  During Linebacker 
Operations, 7
th
 Air Force had roughly 100 fewer aircraft capable of striking Vietnam than its 
Rolling Thunder predecessor.
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  The material quality of this force, however, was far greater.  
During operations from April to October, 7
th
 Air Force’s primary strike aircraft was the F-4 
Phantom, each of which was capable of carrying slightly more tonnage than the F-105.  More 
importantly, the Air Force had developed the Paveway (laser) and GBU / HOBO (optical or 
EOGB) families of guided weapons.  In clear conditions, both of these systems allowed the F-4 
to engage targets that had been previously unassailable due to their proximity to urban centers or 
sensitive buildings.  In addition, they allowed the rapid destruction of bridges, bunkers, and other 
hardened North Vietnamese structures.  The General Dynamics F-111, the outcome of Secretary 
McNamara’s TFX program, provided an all-weather, night-attack capability from September 
1972 forward.
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Taken altogether, these new capabilities meant that General John W. Vogt, 7
th
 Air 
Force’s commander, possessed a far deadlier force than General Momyer had.  When one added 
SAC’s B-52s, first used in April 1972 and fully committed in December 1972, Vogt and his 
superiors in SAC and the White House believed USAF had more than enough firepower to break 
the will of the North Vietnamese people and their leaders.
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  Contrary to the claims of some 
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authors, this did not happen, and thus the Air Force did not achieve its second objective of 
inflicting “punishment” in the manner that President Nixon intended.  A major reason for this 
shortcoming was the continued strength of the NV-IADS.  This, in turn,  stemmed primarily 
from the Air Force’s inattention to SEAD doctrine between Operation Rolling Thunder and the 
start of Linebacker operations.   
The impact of insufficient development of SEAD doctrine and inadequate training can be 
seen from how the NV-IADS affected the employment of 7
th
 Air Force’s increased capabilities.  
For instance, a typical LGB strike began with an F-4 flight arriving in the vicinity of the targeted 
structure armed with three aircraft carrying Paveway bombs and one aircraft (usually the flight 
leader) equipped with a Pave Knife laser pod.
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  This pod was an improvement on an earlier 
system that had required the designating aircraft to remain in a gentle, predictable orbit while 
other aircraft dropped bombs.  When in the target area, the flight leader would designate the 
strike’s objective and, on his signal, the entire flight would drop the allocated number of 
Paveways on the target.  The control units on these bombs then detected the light reflected from 
the Pave Knife’s laser and guided the ordnance to impact.151   
EOGB operations were somewhat similar to those of LGBs.  Once again, a flight of F-4s 
approached a target area at medium altitude.  Upon sighting the objective, the F-4’s backseater 
would acquire the desired target visually.  The Phantom’s pilot would then bring the aircraft into 
the correct attitude, altitude, and air speed to release the glide bomb as the backseater attempted 
to lock the EOGB’s self-contained television camera onto the target’s contrast with its 
surroundings.  In optimal conditions, this process could take 5-10 seconds.  Over North Vietnam 
it could take up to 30 seconds depending on the ground haze, target contrast, and position of the 
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sun.  Once lock-on was achieved, the bomb was released and, provided there was no further 
interference, impacted its target.
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Unfortunately, there were severe limitations on both LGBs and EOGBs.  First, the 
weather had to be fairly clear and relatively windless over the proposed target area.  Second, 
there had to be no more than a minimal amount of smoke or dust in the vicinity of the structure 
to be destroyed.  In the case of LGBs, obscurants scattered the guidance laser and caused the 
weapon to “go stupid” and follow a ballistic path.  EOGBs, on the other hand, had a tendency to 
lose their contrast unless light conditions remained ideal.  Finally, and most importantly, the NV-
IADS was more than capable of providing “further interference” before, during, and after 
weapons launch.  The release parameters for both EOGBs and LGBs were in the heart of the SA-
2’s envelope, and the F-4s carrying the large bombs could only carry out the SAM evasion 
maneuver with difficulty.  These problems grew even worse once the Phantoms entered the 
target area.  While the EOGBs could be launched as “fire and forget” weapons, the more 
accurate Paveways required target illumination throughout.
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  This illumination would be 
problematic if the designating aircraft was performing the SAM evasion maneuver.   This was 
also true if the Pave Knife F-4 had to evade a determined MiG attack while designating its target.  
In order to avoid a MiG’s cannon or Atoll missiles, the Phantom would have to perform a high-g 
maneuver.  As the Pave Knife’s gimbal-mounted laser had specific g-limits, this meant saving 
the aircraft would lead to the pod’s laser being slewed off the target.154   
Collectively, all of these factors greatly constrained how 7
th
 Air Force could use its most 
effective weapons.  Exacerbating these problems was the fact that there were only six Pave Knife 
pods in 7
th
 Air Force’s inventory at the start of the Linebacker operations.155  The only crews 
certified to use the Pave Knife pods were concentrated in a single unit (the 8
th
 Tactical Fighter 
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Wing [TFW]).  Likewise, the 8
th
 TFW was also the only unit whose backseaters were extensively 
trained in the use of the EOGB.  Seventh Air Force’s guided weapon capability, in other words, 
resided in a half-dozen pods, a little more than twenty F-4s, and the fifty or so men who manned 
them.  The fragility of this force was not lost on General Vogt and his staff, and they 
immediately set about determining methods to create the permissive air defense environment 
necessary.  It was at this point that AFM 1-1’s lack of SEAD doctrine reared its head.  Rather 
than being able to refer to a common doctrine that established how to engage an IADS, 7
th
 Air 
Force was left to find their own way to prevent destruction of 8
th
 TFW aircraft.  
The method General Vogt and his staff chose had three major components.  First was the 
use of “chaff bombers,” i.e., a fleet of F-4s equipped with droppable chaff dispensers.  When 
these containers opened, they spread radar reflective metal strips specifically manufactured to 
jam the Fan Song radar.  This “chaff corridor” then descended slowly and prevented North 
Vietnamese SA-2 sites from locking onto the following strike force.  Complementing this 
technique were direct attacks on North Vietnamese radars by Wild Weasel aircraft as long as the 
F-105s could stay on station.  Finally, in order to counter the NVAF’s interceptors, several 
flights of F-4s served as MiG Combat Air Patrol (MiGCAP).
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In one way, this approach was successful—the Air Force lost only one Pave Knife to 
enemy action throughout the Linebacker operations, with the overall loss rate being far lower 
than that of Rolling Thunder.
157
  Yet the inefficiency of 7
th
 Air Force’s SEAD technique more 
than balanced the positives of lower casualties and preservation of capability.  From 30 March 
through 23 October 1972 Seventh Air Force had to dispatch 4-8 sorties of support aircraft (Wild 
Weasels, jammers, chaff bombers, and escorts) for every F-4 actually delivering bombs to a 
target.
158
  In numerical terms, this meant that the NV-IADS forced 7
th
 Air Force to forswear 4-8 
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Phantoms’ worth of ordnance (typically 16,000-32,000 lbs. maximum) for every two to four 
LGBs (2,000-6,000 pounds maximum) delivered by an 8
th
 TFW F-4.  Operationally, such effort 
meant USAF had enough aircraft to conduct interdiction missions or strikes against North 
Vietnamese infrastructure but seldom both.   
Strategically, this meant that 7
th
 Air Force could not deliver enough consistent firepower 
against North Vietnam to shake its resolve.  It is true that targets which had resisted every effort 
to attack them in 1968 (e.g., the Paul Doumer and Than Hoa bridges) were destroyed to great 
psychological and material effect.
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  Similarly, the precision weapons placed targets such as 
NV-IADS command posts at risk for the first time in the war.
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  However, the effort required to 
accomplish these feats meant that 7
th
 Air Force was unable to strike a great many others.  
Without doctrinal guidance on dismantling the NV-IADS, Seventh Air Force had chosen a 
method that had denied air power its greatest strength: flexibility.  In turn, because the NV-IADS 
forced USAF to employ so much of its force in protecting the 8
th
 TFW’s F-4s, 7th Air Force’s 
lower loss rate and ability to place all targets at risk was not fully realized.  By not being able to 
replicate the fury of Rolling Thunder, much less exceed it, USAF provided no incentive for the 
DRV’s leaders and populace to change their course of action.161   
 Goal #3: Conventional Deterrence 
In addition to preventing the delivery of sufficient punishment, the amount of effort 
required for USAF to penetrate North Vietnamese air space called into question its conventional 
capabilities.  This was not a small matter given the primacy of USAF in many alliance and 
individual allies’ defense plans.  For example, United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) was 
considered to be the primary interdiction and deep strike organization for the entire NATO 
alliance.  Similarly, the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) was organized primarily for 
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close air support with the understanding that USAF would carry the bulk of interdiction and 
strike missions against North Korean forces should a second conflict erupt on the Korean 
peninsula.
162
  In these and other contingencies, American allies expected that USAF would be 
able to achieve and exploit air superiority quickly and thus planned their own national strategies 
accordingly.  The Nixon Doctrine only served to formalize this practice. 
USAF’s leaders recognized this reality as evidenced both in AFM 1-1’s 
acknowledgments of conventional operations and the war plans developed with allied nations.  
However, thoughts and theories were one thing whereas 7
th
 Air Force’s difficulties in striking 
Hanoi were quite another.  During Linebacker operations, the NV-IADS was able to force USAF 
to adopt measures that were only feasible due to the unique situation in Southeast Asia.  
Furthermore, with bases in Thailand and NVAF possessing only a feeble strike capability, 7
th
 Air 
Force could largely ignore air defense responsibilities.   This would not be the case in the 
majority of the contingencies for which allied or national interest compelled the Air Force to 
plan.  Similarly, the NV-IADS continued to use the obsolescent SA-2 rather than being equipped 
with the far more modern systems available to North Korea, the Warsaw Pact, or other potential 
American enemies.  Finally, although NVAF’s MiGs operated in a favorable environment due to 
GCI and the existence of sanctuary, they were not present in the numbers that USAF could 
expect to face in a likely Central European, Korean, or Middle Eastern contingency.
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Combined, these factors led to a lack of internal confidence in USAF’s conventional 
capability.  By the conclusion of Linebacker operations, Air Force pilots did not have faith in 
their ability to defeat modern Soviet-bloc air defense systems either singly or when these were 
part of an integrated whole.
164
   Indeed, the mere possibility that the North Vietnamese may have 
possessed the SA-3 Goa during 1972 caused many anxious moments both to 7
th
 AF planners 
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and, once the B-52s were committed, their SAC counterparts.
165
  Similarly, Air Force pilots had 
begun to doubt their ability to combat hostile interceptors in a major conflict.
166
  Finally, TAC’s 
and SAC’s own leaders came to believe that 7th Air Force’s performance indicated that USAF’s 
conventional capability was far beneath that needed to achieve deterrence or, should that fail, to 
execute NATO’s wartime missions.167   
This lack of internal faith clearly indicated a breakdown in the Air Force’s conventional 
deterrence capability.  The President and Congress could not expect national policy to be 
executed by a service that had lost faith in itself.  Moreover, the Air Force’s performance had left 
the United States’ civilian leaders questioning the service’s capability to carry out any of its 
missions.
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  Both of these outcomes, in light of the facts, were to be expected and stemmed from 
a lack of SEAD doctrine.  Had the Air Force’s leaders provided 7th Air Force with guidance on 
how to destroy an integrated air defense system, there is a possibility that it could have done so 
and demonstrated American conventional capability.  However, as with the objective of 
punishment, USAF’s doctrinal vacuum and subsequent ad hoc arrangement made this unfeasible.  
The effort required to attack North Vietnam left the Air Force’s own pilots, America’s civilian 
leaders, and, more than likely, allies and enemies alike questioning USAF’s ability to project 
power against a hostile air defense system.  This undermined the Nixon Doctrine and was hardly 
what the President expected from the Air Force’s efforts. 
 Goal #4: Preserving the Manned Strategic Bomber Deterrent 
The inability of 7
th
 Air Force to inflict sufficient punishment on the North Vietnamese 
forced President Nixon to seek alternate means of persuasion.  In addition, Nixon needed to 
convince South Vietnam’s President Thieu to trust American promises of a long-term 
commitment towards the RVN’s survival.  With this in mind, President Nixon committed SAC’s 
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B-52s against North Vietnam in December 1972.
169
  In his memoirs, Nixon indicates that he was 
well aware of the risks when he made this decision but settled upon it with the expectation that 
the Air Force would be able to carry out this assault with little difficulty.
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Nixon’s confidence prior to the start of Linebacker II was quite reasonable.  General 
LeMay, during his time as head of SAC, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and USAF Chief 
of Staff had made the Stratofortress a symbol of American security.  Over two decades, the big 
Boeing bomber had become to much of the American public what the Royal Navy’s warships 
had been to the British people.
171
  To the Soviet Union, the B-52 was a system so fearful that it 
had elicited the development of numerous weapons systems and the wholesale modernization of 
PVO Strany after SAC had accepted the bomber into service.
172
  In deploying the bomber that 
the Dictionary of Modern War described as “the mainstay of SAC’s bomber force,” Nixon 
intended not only to send the North Vietnamese a message but also to demonstrate America’s 
power projection capabilities to the entire world.
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Had the Air Force had a unified SEAD doctrine, it is likely that this gambit would have 
worked.  Two raids against the North Vietnamese panhandle in April 1972 had demonstrated the 
B-52s’ ability to penetrate the NV-IADS with appropriate TAC and naval air support.  At that 
time, desiring to cut the NVA’s southernmost supply link, PACAF staff had conceived and 
directed a comprehensive plan that limited the big bombers’ vulnerability to SAMs and NVAF 
fighters.  Even though the North Vietnamese defenders damaged one B-52, the shock effect on 
the NV-IADS and destruction of material made the mission a great success.
174
   
Unfortunately for USAF, this planning had resulted from adherence to doctrine.  Instead, 
it had largely been the result of a theater staff applying their experience and knowledge of North 
Vietnamese defensive tendencies.  Furthermore, the raids in question had been small, sharp 
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affairs involving fewer than twenty-five bombers.  These small attacks, in turn, did not require 
the length or breadth of defensive suppression that a much larger raid would require.  Finally, a 
raid in November 1972 had led to the loss of a B-52.  Ominously, the techniques used by the 
North Vietnamese to down this bomber indicated that the NV-IADS had begun to adapt to both 
the B-52s’ internal ECM as well as tactical SEAD measures.175 
Regardless of this loss’s implications, the Air Force’s leaders still believed that USAF 
could carry out the massive raids President Nixon desired.  Due to the size of the B-52 force, 
SAC refused to delegate any authority for the operation to forces in the Pacific theater.  
Determined to demonstrate their command’s capabilities,  SAC’s staff also did not consult either 
PACAF or 7
th
 Air Force during the planning phase.  Instead, SAC’s commander, General John 
C. Meyer, with the full consent of General Ryan, used his command’s staff to compose the 
operations orders for the initial strikes.
176
  These orders were then, in turn, passed down to a 
subordinate unit, the 8
th
 Air Force.  Based in Omaha, the 8
th’s primary focus was preparing for 
nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, but it had developed plans for striking against North 
Vietnam in April.
177
  SAC’s staff, ostensibly concerned with collateral damage, ignored this 
previous work and developed its own set of orders that it dictated to 8
th
 Air Force.  SAC 
headquarters did not give 8
th
 Air Force the option of modifying the directives, citing the 
subordinate headquarters’ involvement in the coordination of support assets and the sundry 
details inherent in such a massive undertaking.
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Given these facts as well as the internecine warfare that dominated the Air Force during 
this period, it is debatable just how much influence SEAD doctrine would have had on the 
development of SAC’s plan.  However, it is clear that the lack of guidance strongly influenced 
both the planning and execution of operations conducted in support of the bombing raids.  Due to 
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the choices made by 7
th
 Air Force in the absence of SEAD doctrine, the NV-IADS had not 
suffered permanent degradation from April through December 1972.  On the contrary, emphasis 
on passive measures had allowed SAM operators and crews to gain in proficiency as well as 
develop countermeasures throughout Linebacker operations.
179
  Similarly, despite the effect that 
mining Haiphong and President Nixon’s diplomatic efforts had on retarding Soviet and Chinese 
resupply, 7
th
 Air Force’s SEAD techniques had not resulted in a gradual attriting of Fan Song or 
early warning radars.
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  Finally, instead of eliminating NVAF’s MiGs, 7th Air Force’s Phantoms 
had once more been fought to a virtual draw.  Therefore, rather than concentrating on using the 
tactical fighters to maximum effect, American staffs had to develop an escort plan that placed F-
4s on MiGCAP.  Combined, these circumstances meant that SAC was, for all practical purposes, 
engaging the NV-IADS when the latter was both experienced and at peak strength. 
The resulting carnage not only came as an unpleasant shock to USAF but also signaled 
the shattering of the strategic triad’s manned bomber leg.  Fifteen B-52s were destroyed and ten 
more damaged during what the Air Force called Operation Linebacker II but participating SAC 
crews would dub “The Eleven Days of Christmas.”  Only the strenuous intervention of fighter 
bombers, naval gunfire support, changes in tactics, and electronic jamming aircraft prevented 
losses from being far worse.
181
  Contemporary Air Force monographs and papers attempted to 
sugarcoat the losses by pointing out that the majority of B-52s lost either had their electronic 
countermeasures improperly configured, flew poorly, or simply blundered into the path of 
volley-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
182
   These statements, given SAC’s alleged strategic 
mission, were sophistry at best.  Regardless of the reason, the world had observed a second-tier 
military force equipped with obsolescent weapons inflict heavy losses on what was allegedly the 
premier Air Force in the world. 
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It is not hard to surmise the effects this had on the manned bomber as a strategic 
deterrent.  Linebacker II provided President Nixon with even more evidence that USAF could 
not perform its anticipated wartime missions despite requesting additional budgetary outlays.  In 
addition to being incensed by the casualties the losses represented, Nixon was concerned at what 
effect the U.S. loss of bombers had on the North Vietnamese.
183
  Given that the North 
Vietnamese dubbed the B-52 raids the “Dien Ben Phu” of the skies, President Nixon’s anxiety 
was quite justified.
184
  Just how unconcerned the North Vietnamese were about return visits from 
the B-52s can be seen by how quickly the NVA set about violating the 1973 Paris Accords.
185
  
The fact that USAF no longer deterred even North Vietnam speaks volumes to how greatly 
Linebacker II shattered the B-52s’ mystique.   
The United States’ primary strategic opponent, the Soviet Union, echoed this disdain for 
the bombers.  The first night’s situation (e.g., short warning time, prepared enemy defenses, and 
limited tactical fighter support) closely replicated those to be expected during a nuclear war.  The 
U.S.S.R., as North Vietnam’s main arms supplier, was well aware of three things.  First, the 
equipment of the North Vietnamese was far inferior to that of PVO Strany.  While Soviet 
doctrine dictated that military services retain obsolescent systems in order to maintain a defense 
in depth, PVO Strany had been equipped with faster, larger, and more sophisticated SAMs than 
the SA-2 for almost five years.  Second, the North Vietnamese had been able to inflict heavy 
losses on USAF without the full use of the NV-IADS due to a lack of pilots trained in night 
flying.  The Red Air Force, on the other hand, maintained at least a limited night capability with 
all of its interceptor squadrons.
186
  Finally, with the Soviet Union’s strategic depth serving to 
limit tactical fighter support, the majority of these elements would be able to operate without the 
interference of Wild Weasels or escorting fighters that proved so critical to limiting SAC’s losses 
56 
 
after the first three days’ of bombing.187  Even with total losses far beneath those expected by 
SAC, Linebacker II all but finished the manned bomber as a nuclear deterrent until more modern 
weapons were introduced.
188
 
This erosion of the B-52s’ deterrent value was far from necessary, and the Air Force’s 
response to the first three nights’ losses demonstrates this fact.  Stung by the strength of the NV-
IADS, the Air Force quickly began to revise its tactics and operational focus.  First, both SAC 
and 7
th
 Air Force began to consider the NV-IADS as an entire operational system, complete with 
supply lines and vulnerable points.  Second, after determining these vulnerable points, General 
Vogt and his staff began to place pressure against them.  Using all the weapons within their 
arsenal, SAC, 7
th
 Air Force, PACAF, and the USN’s TF 77 began to strike at MiG airfields, 
SAM assembly sites and, in a couple of cases, SAM batteries that had displayed an above-
average level of proficiency.  Finally, after the Christmas break SAC routed the B-52s in a 
manner that facilitated 7
th
 Air Force’s defense suppression efforts.189   
Although it is hard to quantify the effects of these efforts or to separate them from the 
other, non-SEAD countermeasures being conducted, the precipitous drop in SAM launches and 
number of B-52s destroyed indicates that they had a positive effect.  Whether a SEAD doctrine 
which directed these efforts at the start of Linebacker II would have lessened the losses and 
maintained the viability of the manned bomber remains an open question.  Regardless of one’s 
answer, however, the sharp decrease in losses strongly indicates that the Air Force’s initial 
problems stemmed from the lack of guidance.  It is hard to imagine a situation where a manual 
that laid out a proper SEAD doctrine prior to the start of Linebacker II would have been 
detrimental given these results.   
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 Nadir 
Even with the improvements USAF had been able to cobble together at the conclusion of 
Linebacker II, Ruby 2’s loss on 3 January 1973 constituted the nadir of the USAF’s SEAD 
doctrine.  President Nixon had dispatched the Air Force to Southeast Asia with the intent of 
disrupting North Vietnam’s offensive, punishing the DRV’s leaders, proving USAF’s 
conventional capabilities, and maintaining the strategic deterrence value of the manned bomber 
fleet.  The USAF’s only success had been the interdiction of North Vietnamese supply lines, 
with the inability to complete the other three objectives due to the improvised nature of USAF’s 
SEAD efforts.  With a well-thought out doctrine that laid out the steps necessary to disrupt or 
destroy an enemy air defense, the Air Force might have had a chance to achieve its goals.  
Without it, however, Air Force commanders were left to develop a plan that not only botched the 
suppression of the NV-IADS but also ensured that the North Vietnamese had little fear of future 
attacks.  In the end, rather than serving as a success, the Linebacker operations were a stunning 
defeat brought about by the Air Force’s military and civilian leaders’ decisions concerning 
SEAD doctrine development after Operation Rolling Thunder.  As Ruby 2’s crew awaited rescue 
in the South China Sea, the Air Force’s ability to conduct conventional warfare seemed similarly 
adrift. 
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Chapter 3: Reflections and Atonement 
With the conclusion of the Paris Acccords on 27 January 1973, the United States Air 
Force’s involvement against North Vietnam came to an official end.  Although there would be a 
handful of subsequent operational losses in operations over Cambodia and Laos, by June 1973 
the Air Force had completed its final combat operations over Southeast Asia.  Having lost over 
2,000 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and suffered almost 3,000 aircrew casualties while dropping 
over triple the ordnance it had employed in World War II, the Air Force had gained a wealth of 
painful experience over eight years.  As its final aircraft departed Southeast Asia, it was now up 
to its tactical, operational, and senior leaders to apply these lesson to the service’s primary focus 
on a possible war in Central Europe.
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The State of TAC, January through October 1973 
At the tactical level, TAC and its subordinate organizations made few immediate changes 
in the aftermath of Vietnam.  The four-plane flight remained the primary formation for Air Force 
fighter operations.  Although the Navy’s formation explained much of its success against MiGs 
during Linebacker I and II, the Air Force continued to employ the “fluid four.”  The former 
formation’s role in the USN’s success against MiGs during Linebacker was acknowledged by 
Momyer and TAC’s staff.  However, the Air Force had several sound reasons to resist such a 
transition.  First and foremost, the “fluid four” greatly simplified command and control in larger 
formations.  Second, squadron and wing commanders considered the “fluid four” to be superior 
for the accurate, concentrated employment of air-to-ground ordnance.  Third, the Air Force’s 
continued reliance on ECM pods and lack of a dedicated EW aircraft that could keep pace with 
the F-4 Phantom meant flight cohesion was necessary for maximum protection against radars.  
Finally, the Air Staff, General Momyer, and many of TAC’s wing commanders considered the 
effort necessary to retrain current pilots in “Double Attack” (as the Air Force dubbed the “loose 
deuce” in 1972) to be cost prohibitive.191   
This tactical decision was not a minor one.  The USN had largely negated North 
Vietnamese MiGs as a threat to its strike aircraft during Linebacker.  In no small part this had 
been due to the use of the “loose deuce” formation and, more importantly, training F-4 pilots 
how to properly employ it against the NVAF.  By consciously deciding not to engage in a similar 
59 
 
revision, the USAF was all but ensuring that it would either have to continue employing a 
prohibitive number of Phantoms as escorts for potential strike packages.  Furthermore, air 
combat maneuvering training remained too expensive and dangerous since the fluid four retarded 
the experiential growth of junior flight members.  Although changes were discussed via articles 
written for The Fighter Weapons Review, at USAF Fighter Weapons School (FWS) 
Symposiums, and in the aftermath of Aggressor training missions that pitted T-38 trainers 
against F-4 Phantoms, tactically TAC would not change its formations before the end of 1973.
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With the exception of increased acquisition of GBU and Paveway precision munitions, 
TAC’s conventional air-to-ground tactics also did not change in 1973.  Aircraft continued to 
employ the standardized Mark 80-series series of bombs matched to the F-4 Phantom’s bombing 
computer.  With regard to Wild Weasel and Iron Hand tactics, the long-delayed replacement of 
the F-105 with the F-4C Wild Weasel IV did not come with a commensurate update in attack 
methodology.  While the F-4C could maintain pace with the F-4 strike packages favored by 
TAC, it continued to be plagued by wiring and hardware problems.  Despite known advances in 
Soviet missile technology, F-4C Wild Weasels continued to employ the increasingly obsolescent 
Shrike due to their inability to carry the larger StARM.  To achieve full destruction of a SAM site 
or vehicle, the F-4Cs continued to rely on  cluster and high-explosive bombs.  In rare cases, Wild 
Weasel aircraft were equipped with the new AGM-65A Maverick television-guided missile, but 
a shortage of this advanced weapon meant it was usually reserved for dedicated strike aircraft. In 
effect, SEAD pilots of 1973 were expected to use the same tools as their Rolling Thunder 
predecessors.
193
    
Operationally, the Air Force continued to employ the Tactical Fighter Wing as its 
primary unit for supplying airpower in theater operations.  Still consisting for 3 or 4 squadrons of 
12 to 16 aircraft apiece, the TFW in 1973 was expected to act as a homogenous unit to 
accomplish its wartime mission.  In the aftermath of Linebacker, it was clear that fighter wings 
would need external assets to allow the penetration of enemy air defenses.  Unfortunately, while 
the 1971 Edition of AFM 1-1 detailed electronic warfare as a “supplemental task,” it did not 
outline how the aircraft which performed this task were to be arrayed with those conducting 
attack missions.
194
  Therefore, rather than a mutually understood process for executing SEAD, 
Air Force wings usually employed ad hoc method of coordinating defense suppression support 
as they began conducting post-Vietnam training exercises. 
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That such exercises existed was due to General Momyer’s belated realization that TAC, 
despite its leavening of new combat veterans, lacked a broad knowledge of how to conduct an air 
campaign.  Despite publicly stating that “[t]hrough pilot skill, improvisation, and training, the air 
battle [sic] over the skies of North Vietnam were fought and won,” in private Momyer was much 
more circumspect about inefficiencies he perceived in 7
th
 Air Force’s staffing process, C2, and 
post-strike integration of lessons learned.
195
  Momyer felt that these problems also existed at the 
wing level during Linebacker I and II. Time and time again, it seemed that wing and squadron 
commanders did not demonstrate the ability to rapidly receive, evaluate, plan, and execute the 
missions they received from higher headquarters.  This, in turn, led to 7
th
 Air Force having to 
override the wing staffing process and directly control the composition of the ever larger, tightly 
choreographed “gorilla packages” used over North Vietnam.  It was clear that a far more flexible 
process was going to have to be developed and, more importantly, trained in a realistic 
environment that replicated a full IADS.
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TAC’s first post-Vietnam attempt at just such an exercise was the ninth Operation 
CORONET ORGAN.  The first eight CORONET ORGANs had been conducted between 
August 1969 and December 1972 at irregular intervals due to TAC’s funding and equipment 
shortages.
197
  Directed by General Momyer, the initial CORONET ORGAN began with a 
reinforced fighter wing acting both as the friendly force and enemy interceptors.  In addition to 
training aircrews in dealing with an IADS, CORONET ORGANs were also intended to test 
operational mission concepts, flight tactics, tactical fighter wings’ ability to deploy over long 
distances, and crews’ conventional bombing capabilities.  The exercises slowly grew more 
complex, with Army air defense batteries and USAF Air Defense Command fighters taking part 
in attempts to simulate an integrated air defense system. In August 1973, on the ninth iteration, 
the Air Force added a new asset: Aggressors.
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The 64
th
 Fighter Weapons Squadron (later also known as the 64
th
 Tactical Fighter 
Squadron) grew from CORONA HARVEST and PROJECT RED BARON interviews of 
returning Vietnam veterans.  In response after response, Phantom and Thunderchief aircrews had 
stated that their first experience facing a dissimilar aircraft had been on an operational mission 
over North Vietnam.  In contrast, the USN’s Top Gun program, as well as unofficial policy, had 
ensured that most Navy aircrews had several opportunities to conduct an ACM flight against 
either an A-4 Skyhawk, F-8 Crusader, or borrowed USAF T-38 trainers prior to deployment to 
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Yankee Station.  The results had spoken for themselves and General Momyer, with assistance 
from Air Defense Command, had placed increased emphasis on assigning aircraft to dissimilar 
aircraft training in late-1972.  This had not, however, yielded the best results, as F-106s had not 
been able to replicate the same performance as Soviet MiG-17s, -19s, or -21s.  Therefore, 
General Momyer had turned to the Air Force’s Training Command and its T-38 Talon, with the 
expectation the TAC would eventually purchase Northrop’s F-5E Freedom Fighter. 199    
Thus, the 64
th
 FWS employment in CORONET ORGAN was a harbinger of TAC’s 
growing commitment to ACM training.  In effect, by purchasing the F-5E and creating a 
squadron that was trained solely in Soviet-style tactics, General Momyer was choosing to expend 
some of TAC’s resources on a weapons system and personnel he would not be able to use in time 
of war.  However, as CORONET ORGAN demonstrated, Phantom crews gained valuable 
experience from having to acquire, track, and maneuver against a smaller, more nimble 
opponent.  While still far behind the Navy’s Top Gun program, CORONET ORGAN was at least 
the beginning of developing techniques to operate within an IADS.  Moreover, CORONET 
ORGAN spurred the Fighter Weapons School to begin recommending changes to the Air Force’s 
tactical “bible,” TAC Manual 3-1 (TACM 3-1).  While not as authoritative or officially binding 
as AFM 1-1, TACM 3-1 guided all TFWs in their conduct of training operations and expected 
activities in warfare.  It was, at long last, a start to developing a comprehensive SEAD 
doctrine.
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General Momyer’s Thoughts on Task Organization and TAC Equipment 
General Momyer’s willingness to invest TAC’s resources into attempting new techniques 
reflected a willingness to avoid the same mistakes made from 1968 through 1972.  As his tenure 
as TAC commander came towards an end in September 1973, Momyer prepared a memorandum 
for Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Richard Ellis.  A continuation of a similar memorandum he had 
written in 1969, Momyer attempted to capture frankly his observations and recommendations 
based on his time commanding Operation Rolling Thunder and TAC.  In addition to providing a 
window to Momyer’s thoughts, the Ellis memorandum also provides a benchmark into how the 
service’s most experienced operational commander viewed its current capabilities.201 
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 The Fighter Wing 
Momyer was a strong proponent of the tactical fighter wing (TFW) as an organizational 
entity and believed it should be retained.  Although he praised the F-4 as the premier fighter of 
its time, he strongly believed that the Air Force should make every effort to expedite transition to 
the F-15 and future Light Weight Fighter (LWF) rather than maintain the current rate of 
procurement.
202
  In addition, Momyer strongly believed that it would be a mistake to consolidate 
Wild Weasel or other potential SEAD aircraft into separate, consolidated wings.  Instead, 
Momyer stated his opinion that Wild Weasel aircraft should be integrated into established TFWs 
at the flight level.  In Momyer’s view, with each 12- to 16-aircraft squadron having one flight of 
Wild Weasels, organizing and controlling strikes would be greatly simplified.
203
  Momyer noted 
that currently this capability was provided by variants of the F-4.  However, ultimately Momyer 
proposed that the Air Force modify the F-15’s avionics so that every aircraft would have SEAD 
capability available.  Like combat against enemy fighters, defeating SAM sites would be an 
additional task that USAF pilots would be trained in at the unit level via exercises.  Finally, to 
facilitate the execution of this mission, USAF should expedite the development of an anti-radar 
standoff missile with greater capability than the current Shrike.
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 Electronic Warfare 
Momyer also proposed additional solutions involving purchasing equipment specifically 
intended for disrupting an IADS.  Stating that “ECM is here to stay for all forces,” Momyer 
noted that as 7
th
 Air Force commander he had been unable to fully employ EB-66 Destroyers as 
he would have desired.  While one of these issues as organizational (EB-66s were a SAC asset), 
the preponderance of the problem had lain with the fact the Destroyers could not keep up with 
even heavily laden F-4s and F-105s.  Momyer proposed that the Air Force invest in an electronic 
warfare variant of the F-111 strike fighter, a so-called “EF-111.”205  Furthermore, given the 
expected strength and capabilities of Warsaw Pact air defenses in a proposed European conflict, 
Momyer was adamant that all future fighters be equipped with both active (i.e., jammers) and 
passive (i.e., RHAW displays) ECM capabilities.  These capabilities should be internal to the 
aircraft’s fuselage, rather than in pods, in order to maximize offensive capability.  Lastly, the 
ECM capabilities should not require predictable, limiting formations that precluded independent 
maneuver by each individual fighter.
206
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 Solutions for MiGs and SAMs 
Momyer stated that “air to air engagements were dramatic in the Vietnam War.”  
However, he believed that these were ultimately “of limited significance” since the numbers of 
NVAF MiGs was small and those present had enjoyed sanctuary for much of the conflict.
207
  
Regardless, the increased potential inherent in the F-15 and the LWF would likely serve to 
reduce weaknesses exposed in the F-4’s capabilities.  According to Momyer, also providing TAC 
with an all-weather system that allowed precise engagement of specific enemy C
2
 and GCI 
targets without a long, predictable bomb run would also provide a remedy to the MiG issue.  
Without capable controllers or radars, both current and projected Soviet tactical interceptors 
(e.g., the MiG-17, -19, and -21) would be relatively helpless at night or in bad weather.
208
   
Momyer stressed that personnel training was just as important as more Wild Weasel 
aircraft in the fighter wings, new fighters, or all-weather capability.  With several CORONET 
ORGANs completed by the time the memo was written, Momyer stressed their importance in 
“develop[ing] tactics and techniques for the penetration [of an IADS].”209 By providing both 
Stateside and United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) personnel with the opportunity to fly 
realistic combat sorties, the Air Force would avoid having fighter wings be required to train 
inexperienced personnel under combat conditions.   Unlike Vietnam, Momyer cautioned, a 
European conflict would provide neither the time nor safer environments (e.g., Route Packages 
1-2, Laos, and South Vietnam) for aircrews to be gradually exposed to increased threats.  
Although the CORONET ORGAN exercises were a good beginning, the lack of live ordnance 
ranges and limited number of Aggressors meant that conventional training was still not as 
pervasive as it needed to be.  Finally, Momyer simultaneously stated that care needed to be taken 
lest increased conventional ACM and ordnance delivery training detract from the critical mission 
of tactical nuclear delivery.
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On the topic of developing doctrine, Momyer acknowledged the importance of 
suppressing enemy defenses in strong terms.  He first asserted that “[t]he need to destroy the 
enemy[‘s] missile and radar systems at the outset of hostilities is mandatory,” and then he stated 
explicitly why this was true.
211
 First, establishing a “permissive aerial environment” was 
necessary for USAFE to employ CAS in support of its NATO mission.
212
  Unlike Vietnam 
(according to Momyer), where “tactics were effective, but restricted the type of formations and 
employment of both strike and CAP forces,” USAFE and other USAF units deployed in support 
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could expect increased SAM capability from low to medium (~35,000 feet) altitude.
213
  
Therefore, “[i]t [was] highly unlikely that strike packages the size of those used in Vietnam will 
be suitable for a larger scale war,” since the NATO forces would face “a quantitative deficiency” 
versus the Warsaw Pact.
214
  To counter this, it was absolutely essential that TAC (at a minimum) 
develop a common language and methodology to ensure “maximum flexibility in employing 
[tactical aircraft] to offset the imbalance in numbers.”215  More explicitly, the entire Air Force 
must direct changes in strike tactics, to include the employment of Wild Weasels both with 
heavy bombers and TAC fighters.
216
  While Momyer desired the Air Force include SAC future 
doctrinal, tactical, or operational developments with regard to SEAD, he took great pains to tell 
Ellis that all attempts to integrate TAC’s sister command had been rebuffed.217  
 Conflict Between General Momyer’s Thoughts and Air Force Practice 
As a whole, Momyer’s memo reflects an author who is intellectually struggling with a 
changed paradigm in air warfare.  In conjunction with General Momyer’s post-retirement work 
Airpower In Three Wars, it shows that his reputation as being a cerebral officer willing to change 
existing practices was well-deserved.
218
  Unfortunately, there were several conflicts between the 
changes he proposed and the actual activities he had supported.  For example, with regard to 
fighter development, as head of TAC General Momyer had continued to support the 
development of the F-15 Eagle as a single-role, air-to-air fighter.
219
  Indeed, so strongly did TAC 
initially resist the development of air-to-ground capability in the F-15, McDonnell Douglas’ 
initial attempts to demonstrate this capability were strictly limited to a handful of sorties that 
proved the Eagle could indeed carry and drop standard Air Force conventional bombs.  
However, when TAC began to prepare and circulate the Eagle’s proposed training syllabus in 
late 1973, Momyer did not direct that Eagle pilots be required to maintain proficiency in air-to-
ground ordnance delivery.
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In this same vein, Momyer’s fierce abstract support for the continued development of 
Wild Weasel platforms and technology was matched with tepid execution.  While calling for an 
expansion of Wild Weasel capability in the Ellis memorandum Momyer refused to authorize 
expanding Wild Weasel academic instruction or flight training.
221
  Furthermore, as with the 
Eagle’s air-to-ground capability, Momyer did not formally request that the F-15 be tested for the 
ability to deliver Wild Weasel weapons or to carry the necessary electronics to hunt radars.  Nor 
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were any steps taken to ensure that this capability was included in the LWF’s initial 
requirements.  With regard to the existing F-4C, Momyer did not make fixing that airframe’s 
wiring or ordnance difficulties a priority.  As a result, that program continued to languish in its 
incomplete state through the end of 1973.
222
   
Compounding the above issues, Momyer did not provide the same level of guidance for 
SEAD aircraft that he had for ACM.  Therefore, both F-4Cs and F-105Gs were rarely seen 
during regular TFW evaluations, meaning that most TFW officers’ first exposure to Wild 
Weasels came during major exercises such as CORONET ORGAN.  Even in these cases, the 
lack of reliable radar signal emitters,  dearth of ranges capable of allowing the employment of 
Shrike or StARM, and TAC’s continued risk averse culture meant that Wild Weasel maneuvers 
were often restricted to the point of uselessness.  When combined with the Air Force’s haphazard 
organization and constant transfer of Wild Weasel squadrons from normal TFW wings to 
consolidated SEAD organizations then back again throughout 1973, these choices greatly 
degraded the service’s conventional capability.223 
Other Influences on Air Force Doctrinal Development through October 1973 
One explanation for General Momyer’s reticence could easily be found in the Air Force’s 
numerous competing schools of doctrinal thought after Vietnam.  Jokingly called “mafias,” 
USAF’s fighter, attack, bomber, and missile communities all formed blocs within the Pentagon, 
TAC, and SAC headquarters.  Of these, one of the most strident, vocal, and successful was the 
“Lightweight Fighter Mafia (LFM)” led by Colonel John Boyd.  A fighter pilot, Boyd had earned 
most of his fame during his time at the Fighter Weapons School developing ACM tactics and 
decision theory.
224
   
The Air Force’s performance during Vietnam had convinced Boyd and those who 
believed as he did that the Air Force had become too slow and unresponsive at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels.  In everything from a top-heavy command structure to 
increasingly complex, expensive, and heavy fighters, the USAF had ossified almost to the point 
of ineffectiveness.  Accordingly, at least to the LFM, the solution was to make the Air Force 
more agile in every way.  At the tactical level, the Air Force should reduce its purchase of F-15s 
and instead increase the procurement of the Lightweight Fighter.  Vietnam, after all, had proven 
that expensive missiles and complex radar sets could easily be bested by properly handled 
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“daylight only” fighters in sufficient numbers and the correct conditions.  With the Warsaw Pact 
enjoying a massive numerical advantage, it was imperative for the Air Force to at least try to 
match these numbers.  Otherwise, the small contingent of sophisticated, costly F-15s would be 
gradually overwhelmed by an enemy that could simply generate more sorties than the Eagles 
could shoot down.  Similarly, SEAD would be accomplished by a large number of these same 
fighters employing relatively simple, autonomous anti-radar missiles built with off the shelf 
components.  With proper ground control interception or, even better, an airborne command 
post, larger groups of LWFs backed by the small number of Eagles already purchased would 
quickly wrest control of the skies in any foreseeable European scenario.
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The Air Force Turns to Central Europe, 1973 
The European scenario’s centrality in both General Momyer’s view of an increasingly 
sophisticated, better equipped TAC and Colonel Boyd’s adherence to a lightweight solution was 
not coincidental.  Since 1949, one of the United States Air Force’s primary missions had been 
deterring and, if needed, preparing to win a conflict against the Communist bloc in Central 
Europe.  Beginning with the Berlin Blockade and continuing through the Korean War, the era of 
Massive Retaliation, and even the intense combat of Vietnam, the Air Force had always 
maintained at least part of its focus on stopping the Warsaw Pact.
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This concentration on a particular theater reflected the United States’ larger Cold War 
strategy.  NATO with its guarantee of collective security had been begun as a means to maintain 
the United States’ involvement in Europe. While the cynical commentary that the purpose of 
NATO was to “keep the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out” perhaps took 
things a bit too far, in reality the alliance provided a military backstop to the Marshall Plan’s 
economic investment.  This was reinforced by the Eisenhower administration’s commitment of 
surplus equipment, training, and economic investment in Western Europe’s military industry as a 
complement to Massive Retaliation.
 227
  By President Eisenhower’s departure in 1961, NATO 
had developed long-term plans for its conventional deterrence to supplement the United States’ 
nuclear umbrella.  Although no fixed date had been given, the Alliance generally accepted that 
these plans would be implemented throughout the subsequent decade as funding became 
available. 
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The United States’ involvement in Vietnam disrupted many of these plans.  Contrary to 
the repeated assurances given to NATO allies by first President Johnson and subsequently 
President Nixon, both the United States Army and Air Force began using United States Army 
Europe (USAREUR) and United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) as a reserve bank to pay the 
fiscal, equipment, and personnel bill for operations in Vietnam.  This practice first began with 
individual personnel, then grew to unit reductions, and finally culminated in increasing 
Congressional pressure for the military budget to be balanced by reductions in force in Europe 
prior to 1968.
228
  This pressure greatly increased with the March 1968 economic crisis, as 
Congressional leaders of both parties began to question openly whether the United States’ 
NATO allies were honoring agreements on mutual defense spending made during the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.
229
  Subsequently, both the House Ways and Means 
and Armed Service committees recommended that American ground and air forces be reduced as 
part of the FY 69-FY 72 budgets.
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President Nixon embraced this viewpoint at the start of his first term in 1969.  It was not, 
however, as well received by the United States’ NATO allies.  In early 1968, it appeared to 
NATO’s European members that the Communist bloc was liberalizing many of its hardline 
policies towards the West.  The subsequent events of the Prague Spring, elucidation of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, and aggressive Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East and Asia swiftly 
reversed this view.  Indeed, the rapidity with which the U.S.S.R. was making inroads 
internationally gave the appearance that the Soviet Union was growing more capable as the 
United States was becoming increasingly distracted by Vietnam.  Thus, when President Nixon 
increased the rate by which the military was demobilized in FYs 70, 71, and 72, the NATO allies 
balked at the withdrawal of additional tactical fighter wings as well as consolidation of ground 
forces.  In order to appease some NATO members’ concerns, President Nixon relented by 
providing funds for USAFE to retain two more TFWs than the United States Air Force had 
originally intended through 1973.
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 Deterrence on the Wing 
That President Nixon considered two TFWs to be sufficient to restore a balance of forces 
reflected the ways in which the USAF’s capabilities were a key part of the United States 
conventional policy from 1968 through the end of the Cold War in 1991.  The Pentagon, in Joint 
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Publication 1-02, defines deterrence simply as “the prevention of action by the existence of a 
credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the 
perceived benefits.”232  Luttwak and Kohl, in the Dictionary of Modern War, provide a more 
complex variation: 
 
Measures designed to narrow an opponent’s freedom of choice among 
possible actions by raising the cost of some of them to levels thought to be 
unacceptable to that opponent.” 
Active deterrence describes a threat specifically intended to prevent a 
specific move on the part of an opponent, i.e., latent deterrence is the norm. 
Extended deterrence applies to a particular third party or parties. 
Minimum deterrence, politically plausible but technically dubious, is a 
concept based on the recognition that even a small number of nuclear weapons 
can be sufficiently destructive to inflict damage deemed unacceptable by almost 
all opponents in all circumstances.
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Both of these definitions are somewhat problematic when applied to the United States’ 
conventional military strategy from 1973 to the end of the Cold War.  For example, by the 
Pentagon’s current definition, NATO did not have any conventional deterrence in 1973.  
Although far from Massive Retaliation’s immediate hair trigger employment of nuclear attacks, 
NATO’s defensive plans relied heavily on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to reduce any 
potential Warsaw Pact breakthroughs in 1973.
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  Given the obsolescence of most members’ 
conventional equipment, this was the primary manner by which NATO sought to deter the 
Warsaw Pact.  The Soviet Union, in response, repeatedly stated that it did not recognize the 
West’s delineation between “tactical” and “strategic” use of nuclear weapons.235  In effect, if we 
use either the Department of Defense or Luttwak and Kohl’s definition and apply them to 1973, 
the sole “unacceptable counteraction” would have been the possibility that a conventional attack 
against, say, West Berlin would likely be met with tactical nuclear weapons. 
In reality, NATO’s conventional deterrence was multi-faceted and had three primary 
outcomes.  First, rather than convincing the Soviet Union it would face an unacceptable 
counteraction (e.g., invasion, unsustainable casualties, destruction of the Warsaw Pact), NATO’s 
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conventional forces’ primary mission was to persuade their adversaries that they could not 
achieve a coup de main.  Or put another way, NATO’s conventional forces had to provide a 
physical presence that was simultaneously competent, modern and, most importantly, publicly 
visible in a manner that made Soviet military adventurism an infeasible method for achieving 
Moscow’s foreign policy goals. In addition, this conventional capability had to be constructed in 
such a way to convince NATO’s European members that it was sustainable fiscally, socially and, 
should war break out, militarily in the face of its Warsaw Pact counterpart.  Finally, NATO’s 
conventional posture had to convince the United States’ president, Congress, and public that it 
was a worthwhile investment of American resources. 
It was this last aspect of NATO conventional deterrence that made the USAF’s ability to 
penetrate an IADS critical.  Even before the Nixon Doctrine, Central Europe’s geography and the 
alignment of NATO’s sectors meant that USAF forces were expected to play a pivotal role in 
any potential conflict: 
 
                 NATO CORPS SECTORS, 1973-1991
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  For many Americans of a certain age, much of the talk about a potential World War III 
had focused on the so-called “Fulda Gap,” i.e. the salient bulging from Eastern Germany that 
was held by the US V and VII Corps (a.k.a., Central Army Group, or CENTAG).  This was 
viewed as the most dangerous attack route from a NATO perspective, as analysts expected a 
successful attack west through this terrain to seize first Frankfurt, then Bonn in possibly less than 
three weeks.  In the case of Frankfurt, seizing the city and the area around it would not only have 
disrupted most of the German autobahn system but also hindered the United States’ ability to 
move personnel rapidly from North America to fall in on prepositioned equipment in Germany.  
Subsequently taking Bonn, in turn, would have either displaced or removed the government of 
West Germany and would likely have lead NATO to sue for peace.  Thus, at least from the 
United States’ Army and Air Force’s perspective, the Fulda-Alsfeld avenues of approach were 
the most critical in all of NATO.
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Although the U.S. Army and Air Force had not wholly ignored their mutual 
responsibilities pertaining to NATO during Vietnam, by mid-1973 the two services’ coordination 
efforts in Europe had shown the effects of being neglected during the war in Southeast Asia.  The 
Warsaw Pact’s advantage in military forces in Eastern Germany meant that NATO’s war plans 
assumed CENTAG’s forces would be heavily outnumbered within the first 48-120 hours.238  
With the United States’ post-Vietnam demobilization still ongoing, the U.S. Army also realized 
that, given planned 1975 force structures, this situation would be far worse within two years.  
Therefore, the U.S. Army began to consider how it would attrit follow on Soviet forces as they 
moved westward from their cantonments in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Poland.
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  The answer, 
at least to the Army, was clearly USAFE airpower employing either conventional or nuclear 
ordnance.   
Similarly, the European members of NATO expected USAFE to be a force multiplier in 
the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG).  Whereas American analysts and military officers were 
quite vocal the Warsaw Pact would come through the Fulda Gap, European analysts believed the 
terrain and lines of communication in CENTAG precluded the employment of massed Soviet 
armored formations.  Furthermore, given the relative weakness in numerical strength and 
obsolescence of equipment of most NATO members, the North German Plain seemed to be the 
path of least resistance to both the Warsaw Pact and NATO’s military planners.  Thus, instead of 
short, massive strike into the American sector, British, French, and German military officials 
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expected a maneuver reminiscent of World War I’s Schlieffen plan with several mechanized 
divisions penetrating NATO’s initial defensive positions.  This would be followed by Warsaw 
Pact second echelon forces penetrating to the Rhine River then executing a north to south 
wheeling maneuver that would sever West Germany from the remainder of NATO.
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Due to fiscal, political, and social constraints present in the early ‘70s, NORTHAG’s 
European forces lacked the ability to fully prepare to meet this threat.  However, much like the 
U.S. Army in CENTAG, NORTHAG expected airpower to serve as an equalizer for their ground 
forces’ inadequacies.  This was not mere wishful thinking, as the same terrain that made the 
NORTHAG sector ideal for mounted forces would also facilitate the use of massed airpower.  
Furthermore, unlike CENTAG’s short distance to Frankfurt, a wheeling offensive through 
NORTHAG would greatly extend the Warsaw Pact’s lines of communication.  This would make 
resupply and reinforcement operations much more difficult provided NATO could achieve air 
superiority.
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That such an event would occur in either the NORTHAG or CENTAG sectors was 
considered almost a given.  In the north, the NATO allies had organized their collective air arms 
into the Second Allied Tactical Air Force, or 2 ATAF, to complement USAFE.  From 1965 
through 1973 these two headquarters conducted several staff exercises to increase cooperation.  
As a result of these interaction, their commanders had agreed on certain standards with regard to 
air force’s communications, refueling operations, ordnance requirements, and targeting.  If the 
attack was in the center, 2 ATAF elements were prepared to shift to the network of United States 
and Luftwaffe (the air arm of the West German Bundeswehr) in southern Germany.  Should the 
attack fall in the north, it was understood USAF TFWs from North America would immediately 
reinforce 2 ATAF rather than USAFE.  In this manner, NATO saw airpower’s flexibility as a 
viable substitute for attempting to shift ground combat power against the Warsaw Pact.
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 The Warsaw Pact 
The forces that NATO’s airpower was expected to help counter were both more and less 
capable than the alliance believed in 1973.  While the United States was easily the most powerful 
partner within NATO, it wholly understood that its European allies would develop their own 
doctrine, equipment, and training standards.  By contrast, the Soviet Union fully dominated the 
Warsaw Pact’s processes of procurement, training and, most importantly, doctrine from the 
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alliance’s inception in 1955 to its eventual dissolution in 1991.  This control of the Warsaw Pact 
was seen as both a counter to the West’s military power in Central Europe and a check on 
nationalist movements within the Soviet Union’s near abroad.243   
Therefore, in 1973 studying Soviet military doctrine was the key to understanding how 
the Warsaw Pact expected to function in wartime.  Much like their American counterparts, the 
Red Army and Soviet Air Force (SAF) had gone through a period when organizational leaders 
believed nuclear release was certain.  This had started a period of both doctrinal revision and unit 
reorganization called “The Revolution in Military Affairs” during which the Red Army and SAF 
wrestled with how to operate on a nuclear battlefield.  Furthermore, unlike the United States 
Army, the Red Army had experienced the trauma of operating under enemy air superiority for 
long periods of World War II.  Both of these circumstances had led to a force that was both 
similar to yet quite different than what Western defense officials had expected to deal with in 
1973.
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The first contradiction was that the Red Army was not organized into staid, rigidly 
maintained “echelons” intended to attack on a firm timetable.  Soviet military literature had 
recognized that such forces, in addition to being operationally clumsy, were highly susceptible to 
conventional aerial weapons and nuclear attack.  Instead, by 1973 the Red Army began 
experimenting with what it termed the operational maneuver group (OMG).  Consisting of 3-5 
divisions, an OMG was task organized from existent Warsaw Pact forces in Germany or eastern 
Poland.  Upon the onset of war, OMGs were expected to move closely behind the initial 
breakthrough forces along either or both the NORTHAG and CENTAG avenues.  In any case, 
the attack that appeared most likely to succeed would then have a OMG immediately committed 
along its axis.  In this manner, the OMG would have the best chance to rapidly close with NATO 
forces, complete a breakthrough, and conduct a subsequent exploitation operation before a 
NATO corps commander was granted nuclear release by higher headquarters.  Although in its 
infancy in 1973, this revision of Soviet doctrine had already been taught at the Frunze military 
academy for several years to both Red Army and client states.  In short, the offensive NATO 
thought it would face was significantly different than what the Warsaw Pact had planned.
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 Warsaw Pact IADS 
To defend this form of attack from NATO airpower, the Soviet Union depended on an 
IADS that had advantages and disadvantages with North Vietnam’s. As with NATO, the 
establishment of a fixed boundary and known foe allowed the Warsaw Pact to develop extensive  
infrastructure to support command and control of the WP-IADS.  WP-IADS radar sites were 
often hardened against aerial attack, meaning that near misses might temporarily disable a site 
but were unlikely to destroy it.  Command posts were also sealed against attack by chemical 
weapons and radioactive fallout, with the side effect being that they were even harder to destroy 
with most common ordnance.
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  Finally, all sites were linked not only with radio but also 
telephonic interchanges, albeit with the limitation of only having 2-3 operators speaking at a time 
per open line.
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In theory, this arrangement meant that the Warsaw Pact, from the IGB in the west to the 
Soviet Union in the east and the Baltic in the north to the Adriatic in the south, operated under 
the same command network.  Although each country maintained nominal independence, their air 
defenses were all coordinated by Soviet field marshals and could be shifted by these officers to 
meet potential threats outside their national borders.  In using the same equipment, this also 
meant that Bulgarian interceptors could ferry to East German airfields to reinforce the latter’s 
combat air patrols.  In reality, differences in language, rigidity of sectors and, finally, variance of 
aircraft models would have made such shifting difficult.
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 Warsaw Pact Fighters 
By 1973 the Soviet Air Force’s (SAF’s) fighter aircraft were organized into Frontal 
Aviation or Air Defense (PVO Strany).  Frontal Aviation was responsible for both defensive and 
offensive operations in the Central European area of operations.  In addition to the same MiG-21 
flown by the NVAF, Frontal Aviation fighter regiments were also equipped with the MiG-23 
Flogger.  The Flogger, first tested in 1968, was flown by a single pilot, had a variable geometry 
wing and, most importantly, a powerful radar that allowed BVR engagements.  Fast enough to 
catch any Western aircraft at low altitude and roughly as maneuverable as the F-4 Phantom, the 
MiG-23 was a potent stablemate to the MiG-21.  More importantly, the Flogger gave Soviet 
pilots the ability to conduct interceptions at far greater range and with more flexibility than North 
Vietnamese pilots had enjoyed during Linebacker Operations in 1972.
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Beyond Frontal Aviation units, the East German (EGAF) and Polish Air Forces (PAF) 
also operated the MiG-17 and -19 in addition to less capable variants of the MiG-21.  In time of 
war, the SAF planned to supplement Warsaw Pact forces in East Germany and Poland with 
missile-armed Su-15 Flagons from PVO Strany.  Within thirty to sixty days of a potential 
conflict, the Soviet Union also planned to reinforce Frontal Aviation in East Germany with an 
additional 500-600 reserve fighters (Fresco, Farmers, and Fishbeds) from storage. In all cases, 
these fighters would be less effective than Frontal Aviation units due to lack of training (EGAF 
and PAF), separation from the U.S.S.R.’s advanced radar network (Su-15s), or obsolescence of 
the reserve aircraft. 
 
 Warsaw Pact Ground Defenses 
Whereas Western forces expected their fighters to be the primary means of preventing 
enemy air attack, the Warsaw Pact considered the fighters to be secondary to their primary 
defensive weapons: SAMs and AAA.  Much of this stemmed from the Red Army’s experience in 
World War II, where most of the Soviet Air Force was destroyed on the ground in June 1941.  
Even with replacements from Lend Lease, increased domestic Soviet production, and the Allied 
Bombing Offensive’s attrition of the Luftwaffe, German ground attack aircraft remained a 
significant threat to massed Soviet armor through the end of 1944.
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  With this common 
institutional experience in mind, the Red Army had invested heavily in research on fire control 
radars, heat-seeking and radar-guided SAMs, and air defense assets’ mobility after World War II.  
This decision was reinforced by Soviet observations of Vietnam and, in the Middle East, the Six 
Day War (June 1967) and subsequent War of Attrition (March 1969- August 1970) between 
Israel and most of her neighbors.  By 1973 the Red Army had developed an impressive and 
formidable array of weapons as a result of this focus.
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At the battalion level, Soviet motorized, mechanized, and armored formations each 
possessed an anti-aircraft platoon.  As a command and control effort, this organization passed 
along warnings of hostile aircraft in the area to include type, likely time of arrival, and expected 
direction of approach.  With regard to weapons, each platoon was equipped with two or SA-7 
Grail teams.  A heat-seeking missile with limited range, long preparation time, small warhead, 
and an easily decoyed guidance system, the SA-7 nonetheless was more accurate than a 
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manually-aimed machine gun or cannon.  Moreover, as demonstrated in Vietnam and wars in 
sub-Saharan Africa, the weapon was extremely deadly to helicopters and propeller aircraft.
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At the regimental level, anti-aircraft defense was provided by a battery consisting of two 
four-vehicle platoons.  In 1973, this was initially a total of eight ZSU-23-4 Shilka anti-aircraft 
guns.  With four 23mm cannon, radar dish, and fire control computer all mounted in a turret on a 
tracked chassis, the Shilka’s primary purpose was to interfere with dive-bombing or rocket-firing 
aircraft.  Shortly before October 1973, the second platoon of Shilka had been replaced with a 
platoon of SA-9 Gaskins in most Soviet formations.  Combined, both systems were intended to 
prevent the low-level ingress, dive-bombing, low-level egress model practiced by most Western 
air forces.
253
 
These regimental units would usually be reinforced by divisional assets when on the 
offensive.  The typical Warsaw Pact division in 1973 was equipped with three SAM battalions.  
Each SAM battalion, in turn, had three firing batteries of three launchers apiece for a total of 
nine launchers, plus a control battery with 2-3 radars.  The tank and motorized division batteries, 
in 1973, were usually equipped with the SA-4 Ganef or SA-6 Gainful SAMs.  Like the SA-2 
used by the North Vietnamese, these missiles were designed to engage aircraft from 1,000 
through 70,000 feet.  Unlike the Guideline, both the Ganef and Gainful were mobile.  This 
feature allowed the commander of a Warsaw Pact division to shift his medium- to high-altitude 
missile defenses with advancing forces in order to better protect them, and the division staff 
practiced it regularly during exercises.  With ranges of 35 (SA-4) and 12 (SA-6) miles 
respectively, the duo of missiles were intended to force attacking aircraft to either jettison their 
weapons in order to evade or approach at low level.
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Beginning in 1972, the Ganef  and Gainful were supplemented by the SA-8 Gecko, a 
mobile system whose guidance radar and missiles were collocated on the same chassis.  The 
Gecko and the Shilka were both intended to defend mechanized forces on the march, with the 
gun vehicle covering the SAM launcher’s “dead zone.”  With a battery of Geckos added to the 
SA-4 and SA-6 units already previously assigned, a division’s internal SAM and AAA assets 
could move forward, detect their own targets, and begin engaging them well before the NATO 
aircraft could employ their own weapons.  Furthermore, the divisional assets’ mobility made 
detecting, targeting, and destroying them before they opened fire problematic.  Finally, given 
that USAF TFWs, to say nothing of their NATO counterparts, lacked their own electronic 
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warfare aircraft, jamming or spoofing the radars that cued these weapons onto target would have 
been difficult.
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Complicating NATO’s electronic warfare options were the systems available at the 
Warsaw Pact’s front and army level.  These consisted of additional battalions of the same SAMs 
and AAA present at the division level along with the front- and army- controlled SA-3 Goa and 
SA-5 Gammon missiles with their associated radars.  The Goa and Gammon were relatively 
immobile compared to the Gainful, Gecko, and Ganef, as they were mounted on trailers rather 
than self-propelled.  Before firing, both the Goa and Gammon were usually towed to a given 
position, dug in, then oriented in the direction hostile aircraft would most likely attack.  The Goa 
was a relatively was a relatively slow missile that was a more maneuverable alternative to the 
earlier Guideline.  The Gammon was a large, long-range missile intended for use against high-
altitude targets such as bombers, jammers (e.g., the EB-66), and airborne early warning (AEW) 
aircraft.  Acting in concert, the paired weapons were intended to force a strike package to change 
its path of ingress or only approach with heavy ECM and SEAD support.
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 Warsaw Pact IADS and Deterrence 
The Soviet Union believed that these systems gave it an effective counter to NATO 
airpower.  This was based on their advisors’ observations of the United States’ efforts in 
Vietnam, actual limited participation by Soviet military personnel in Middle Eastern conflicts, 
and extensive live fire exercises conducted in Siberia and Kazakhstan.
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  By 1973, Soviet 
doctrine and published articles considered their air defense to rest on three expected events.  
First, although they were not wholly capable of independent action or besting their NATO 
counterparts in air combat maneuvering, Frontal Aviation pilots were fully capable of disrupting 
Western flights by using slashing attacks against NATO attackers in East German airspace.  
Second, these heavily-laden NATO flights would then have to ingress and egress through a 
gauntlet of highly maneuverable, radar-guided SAMs in order to reach attack range.  Finally, at 
short range the attackers would have to contend with the Shilka, Grail, and dozens of machine 
guns and cannon wielded by the attacked units.
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The goal of this combined network was not necessarily to actually destroy a large number 
of the attacking aircraft.  Instead, much like its North Vietnamese predecessor, the Warsaw Pact 
intended its IADS to force pilots to jettison their ordnance, degrade the accuracy of their attacks 
when they were still delivered, and force increased fuel consumption by necessitating low-
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altitude ingress and egress from the target area.  Frontal Aviation and the Red Army, in short, 
simply intended to deny NATO the air superiority the latter considered necessary for a successful 
defensive action.
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 Defining Effectiveness 
The complexity of the opposing doctrines, tactics, and equipment of both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact makes discussion of their relative effectiveness in 1973 (and the remainder of the 
Cold War) somewhat problematic.  The lack of a general European conflict precludes a direct 
historical assessment.  However, historical analysis is supported by three other avenues of 
inquiry.  First, there were discussion of how the United States’ president, Congress, and the other 
services viewed the Air Force’s conventional capabilities in general and with regard to the 
European area in particular.  This can be gleaned from public statements, funding decisions, 
interservice agreements, professional journals, and General Accounting Office (GAO) 
documents.  Second, foreign civilian authors, other countries’ military analysts, and decisions by 
foreign governments also present a prism through which one can view contemporary 
perceptions.  Finally, although NATO and Warsaw Pact forces did not engage in combat, nations 
aligned with either the United States / NATO or the Soviet Union employed their systems in 
other conflicts.  For purposes of understanding SEAD doctrine development, the most important 
of these took place in October 1973. 
The War of Atonement 
Like most conflicts, the Yom Kippur War did not occur in a vacuum.  As the fifth Arab-
Israeli War, its causes were rooted in the outcome of the previous conflicts.  Having achieved 
independence in 1948, Israel aligned itself with France and Britain in 1956 during the Suez 
Crisis.  In that conflict’s aftermath, Israel had faced an increasingly bellicose and nationalist 
Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser.  Over the subsequent decade, Egypt and Syria, Israel’s 
northern neighbor, grew increasingly bellicose and belligerent in their actions towards their 
smaller adversary.  This culminated in the Six-Day War in 1967, a conflict that saw Israel’s Air 
Force completely annihilate its Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian counterparts within a matter of 
hours on 5 June 1967 followed by a rapid ground offensive that seized the Sinai Peninsula, 
Golan Heights, and West Bank territories by 10 June.  For many military observers, the Israeli 
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preemptive strike and the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF’s) air-ground coordination gave a textbook 
example of how airpower could facilitate rapid maneuver.
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For their part, the Israelis came to look on the aircraft and the tank as war winning 
weapons in and of themselves at the conclusion of the Six-Day War.  Behind the IAF and the 
Armored Corps, the Israeli government’s thinking went, the IDF could strike with sufficient 
speed that future conflicts would be concluded within one or two weeks.  Moreover, aircraft and 
tanks required minimal manning when compared to infantry and artillery organizations.  
Nominally, this meant that Israel could maintain more active aircraft squadrons and tank units to 
achieve their desired decisive effects than investing in mechanized infantry or self-propelled 
artillery.  Furthermore, in case of conflict, the IDF could rely upon its air superiority and well-
trained tank crews to provide sufficient time to mobilize reserves and thus counterattack.  
Finally, as the IDF began to transition from French and British equipment to employing what 
was built by the United States, its leaders came to believe that the new equipment’s technological 
superiority more than offset the numerical superiority of Israel’s Arab neighbors.261 
Of those neighbors, Egypt and Syria remained Israel’s most implacable foes.  Egypt’s 
economy had suffered with Israel’s seizure of the Sinai and subsequent closure of the Suez 
Canal. As a result, it was forced to rely on Soviet military aid to begin replacing the aircraft lost 
during the Six Day War.  The Soviet Union, for its part, aided Egypt both so that Moscow could 
have an additional testing ground for its SAMs and as part of its Third World foreign policy.  As 
the Egyptian military launched a series of attacks that eventually became known as the War of 
Attrition (March 1969-August 1970), this air defense system gradually grew into what the IDF 
dubbed “The SAM Belt.” 262   
Running the length of the Suez Canal, the SAM Belt initially consisted of SA-2s 
supported by anti-aircraft batteries.  After the IAF initially exploited the SA-2’s limitations in 
height and maneuverability in the War of Attrition’s early stages, the Soviets provided the 
Egyptians with SA-3s, a large number of Fire Can radars, and advisors.  These new missiles 
immediately restricted the IDF’s ability to retaliate against the Egyptian Army’s attacks on 
Israeli forces in the Sinai.  Moreover, despite the United States’ provision of ECM pods and 
chaff dispensers, the SA-3 proved worryingly effective against heavily-laden Israeli strike 
aircraft.  As a result, the IAF began to use the Mediterranean and southern Nile Delta to outflank 
the SAM Belt and strike at Egyptian infrastructure rather than artillery positions and military 
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bases.  This punishing counteroffensive, combined with international pressure and the death of 
Abdel Nasser, gradually led to Egypt ending the War of Attrition with the Sinai still in Israeli 
hands.
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Publicly, the Israeli government and IDF’s leadership claimed they had achieved a 
victory over the Egyptian air defenses and their Russian patrons.  This confidence was not shared 
by Israeli regular force pilots, especially those who flew the older Mirage and less advanced A-4 
Skyhawk.  Like their contemporary American counterparts struggling with the NV-IADS, many 
Israeli squadron commanders also noted that the IAF lacked a general doctrine for dealing with 
air defense networks.  Even with superior pilot training and equipment largely eliminating 
interceptors as a threat, most of these commanders realized that in a general conflict they would 
not have the option of attempting to fly only where the SAMs were absent.  These feelings of 
professional disquiet grew as the SAM Belt was complemented by mobile SA-6 Gainfuls and 
ZSU-23-4s.
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The situation was similar on Israel’s northern front.  While Syria did not fully participate 
in the War of Attrition, that nation also sought Soviet aid to replenish its losses.  Moreover, this 
aid was primarily geared towards conducting an armored offensive using Soviet doctrine to 
regain the Golan Heights.  Emphasizing mobility, by October 1973 the Syrians had acquired a 
proportionally larger number of SA-6 Gainfuls, ZSU-23-4s, and SA-7s than their Egyptian allies.  
More critically, the Syrian Army began to train in night operations, intending to use darkness to 
protect themselves against the Israeli Air Force.  While a limited number of SA-2s and SA-3s 
were emplaced along the road between Damascus and the Purple Line, as the 1967 ceasefire line 
between Israel and Syria was called, for the most part the Syrians eschewed the fixed SAMs in 
favor of the Gainful or Grail.  The IAF, having limited to no exposure to the SA-6, believed their 
primary threat to be Syrian fighters (which they regularly defeated) and anti-aircraft artillery.  As 
with the Egyptians, the IDF’s leaders did not feel that there was much of a need for a dedicated 
SEAD doctrine.  Squadrons, operating as complete units, were expected to simply task a flight to 
perform the Iron Hand / Wild Weasel operations as necessary.
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 The IAF Versus the Egyptian and Syrian IADS 
At 2:30 PM local time on 6 October 1973, Syria and Egypt simultaneously initiated the 
Yom Kippur War by attacking the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula.  On the Southern Front, 
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the Egyptian Army breached the sand wall erected by the IDF as part of its Bar Lev line.  On the 
Northern Front, the Syrian Army launched an armored offensive against the IDF’s 7th and Barak 
Armored Brigades with a force that enjoyed over 3:1 superiority in tanks, artillery, and infantry.  
These ground attacks were supported by attacks on Israel’s airfields and headquarters by both the 
Egyptian and Syrian Air Forces.  Although the latter were ineffective, they did serve to disrupt 
and delay the initial IAF response to the ground incursions by at least an hour.  Rather than 
conducting their prior plans, Israeli squadrons were expected to conduct ad hoc attacks by flights 
since the IDF’s Northern Command considered the situation desperate.266 
The result of these choices was a debacle for the IAF.  On both fronts, the SA-6 Gainful 
forced Israeli A-4s, Phantoms, and Mirages to descend to low altitude.  Once there, the ZSU-23-
4, previously unused in active combat, caused great losses among attacking Israeli fighters.  
More importantly, they forced attacking Israeli aircraft to adopt ingress and egress methods that 
prevented them from efficiently acquiring and striking targets.  For their part, Egyptian and 
Syrian interceptors were mainly kept away from the front lines to prevent fratricide, but still 
played an active role in harassing Israeli flights as they approached and departed previously 
established air defense zones.
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The Arab nations’ tactics were effective insomuch that they denied the IAF the air 
superiority it had grown accustomed to in previous conflicts.  On the Southern Front, this meant 
that the Egyptian Army was able to establish a strong foothold across the Suez Canal and 
conduct resupply operations across hastily erected pontoon bridges under the SAM Belt’s 
protection.  This subsequently allowed Egypt to attain a strong military position on the east bank 
of the Suez Canal and defeat initial Israeli counterattacks.  It was only when the Egyptian Army 
unsuccessfully attacked to seize the Mitla and Gidi passes on 14 October that the Israelis were 
able to reverse the situation.  Having moved beyond the SAM Belt’s range, the Egyptian attack 
first suffered the depredations of the Israeli Air Force, then was soundly defeated by dug-in 
Israeli tanks.  The ensuing Israeli counterattack not only crossed the Suez Canal in the south, but 
allowed the reduction of the SAM Belt by ground attack.  Beginning on 15 October, the arrival 
of updated ECM pods from U.S. war stocks previously earmarked for use in a Central European 
conflict also reduced the SA-6’s effectiveness.  It was only at this point that the IAF once again 
enjoyed freedom of action over the battlefield, a situation that continued until the ceasefire on 25 
October.
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On the Northern Front, desperate Israeli close air support missions did little to affect or 
disrupt the Syrian offensive.  Battlefield air interdiction missions launched against the Syrian 
supply lines and second echelon forces were only marginally more effective over the first forty-
eight hours.  Rather than the actions of the IAF, it was a combination of Syrian miscues and 
heroic defenses by the IDF’s ground forces that prevented the Syrians from regaining the Golan 
Heights.  As on the Southern Front, Israeli ground counterattacks and new ECM pods disrupted 
the Syrian air defense network beginning on 10 October.  By the ceasefire on 25 October, Israeli 
aircraft were able to fly over Syrian territory almost at will.
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 Western Analysis of the War of Atonement 
Despite the conflict’s seemingly positive outcome for the IAF, the Yom Kippur War was 
a major shock for not only the Israelis, but the USAF as well.  First, it was readily apparent that 
the newest Soviet air defense systems were extremely effective.  Publicly, air power proponents 
in the United States and NATO countries pointed out that the Israeli loss rates overall were not 
much heavier than those suffered by the USAF over North Vietnam.  Professionally, the USAF 
realized that the initial loss rates in the first seventy-two hours of the war were so prohibitive that 
they would have led to the IAF’s destruction within two weeks of combat had they continued.  
Indeed, the IAF had required the USAF, USN, and USMC to divert F-4E Phantoms and A-4 
Skyhawks as well as the aforementioned ECM pods from NATO war stocks in order to remain 
operational.  Inversely, the Soviets’ failure to anticipate how rapidly the Syrians and Egyptians 
would deplete their missile stocks had forced the latter to be far less profligate in their 
engagements after 10 October.  This had contributed to the IAF’s success in supporting Israeli 
counterattacks, which in turn had allowed close air support to have a freer hand on both fronts.  It 
was unlikely, analysts observed, that such a supply shortfall would occur in a Central European 
scenario.
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USAF and NATO military observers also recognized that the Arab air defenses had 
forced marked changes in IAF mission planning and tactics.  On the Northern Front, the IAF had 
been forced to violate Lebanese and Jordanian airspace in order to outflank the Syrians’ 
extensive air defenses.  On the second day, an attempt to hunt the mobile SA-6 batteries had led 
to the loss or damage of most of an Israeli F-4 Phantom squadron, with the remaining aircraft 
jettisoning their ordnance to little effect.  Skyhawk squadrons, lacking effective internal ECM, 
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suffered so many losses that the Israelis temporarily restricted their use on the Northern Front.  
In the South, having to fly circuitous routes over the Mediterranean in an attempt to outflank the 
SAM Belt led to reduced ordnance loads and increased fuel consumption.  On both fronts, strikes 
against headquarters, infrastructure, and oil facilities had little effect on the battlefield even if 
they reduced the IAF’s losses.271 
It was the IAF’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield that was most ominous of all to the 
USAF and NATO.  Although the Israelis were themselves not provided with the exact same 
versions of fighters flown by American and NATO forces, they were similar enough.  In any 
case, Western intelligence agencies were aware the Soviet Union had provided Egypt and Syria 
with the same “export” versions of their systems employed by the Warsaw Pact.  Therefore, the 
relative disparity in capabilities combined with superior Israeli training should have been 
decisive.  That the Arabs had not only neutralized Israeli air superiority but had been able to do 
so while conducting twenty-four hour operations was a capability that Western military 
observers had not believed either the Soviets or their clients possessed.
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Operationally, the Syrians and Egyptians had both employed a reasonable facsimile of 
Soviet doctrine against well-trained Israeli regular forces on the defensive.  In the case of the 
Syrians, that doctrine had been mostly effective, with battlefield friction, poor decisions, and 
inexplicable delays in deploying their forces the main reason for their defeat.  The Egyptians had 
achieved their initial war goals, but had taken a strategic and operational gamble in an attempt to 
relieve pressure on Syria as the IDF counterattacked.  Neither of these outcome bode well for a 
potential NATO defense that relied a great deal on air power as an equalizer.  As the United 
States dispatched several military missions to Israel in an attempt to find out what happened, 
there were questions as to whether modern air defense systems had made the manned jet aircraft 
obsolete.
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  It would be up to the United States Air Force to begin answering this question in the 
negative over the next seven years.  
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Chapter 4: Weasels, Warthogs, and the Second Echelon 
The State of the Air Force, 1974-1980 
The United States, in the aftermath of its conflict in Vietnam and the Yom Kippur War, 
found itself in a far different situation than at the start of Operation Rolling Thunder.  In January 
1974, the Air Force was doctrinally adrift, had a force that was experiencing a dramatic drain on 
personnel as experienced pilots were lured away by airlines, and possessed obsolescent 
equipment that seemed decidedly ill-suited for the threat it faced.  Also, the Yom Kippur War 
seemed to indicate the service’s ideas on training, its purpose and, most tellingly, its foundational 
guidance were flawed with regard to destroying an IADS as part of a larger campaign.  In short, 
there were valid questions both within the Pentagon and outside the Department of Defense on 
whether the Air Force was capable of carrying out its designated responsibilities.
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Within six years, this situation was dramatically changed. By 1980, the Air Force not 
only had new foundational doctrine that acknowledged enemy IADS as a holistic tactical system 
and Joint agreements with the Army on how to defeat the IADS pursuant to facilitating close air 
support and battlefield area interdiction (BAI).  In addition, it would apply this new way of 
viewing SEAD to the development of individual, flight, wing, and theater training regimens.  
This development of personnel was also matched with a development of new equipment, 
ordnance, and airframes specifically targeted at disrupting or destroying SAMs and MiGs 
influence on the modern battlefield.  Finally, the Air Force developed Red Flag, a training site 
intended to develop conventional capability to a level equivalent to the first ninety-six hours of 
combat in a military conflict.  Although doubts would remain among analysts and external 
observers as to the Air Force’s capabilities in 1980, within the service it was readily apparent 
that great strides had been made with regard to crews’ ability to achieve conventional air 
superiority.
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 Views on Military Force in the Presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy 
Carter 
 A Demi-Presidency: The Ford Administration 
By the time Richard Nixon resigned and gave way President Gerald Ford on 9 August 
1974, the 38
th
 President was well aware of and suffering through the United States’ military and 
diplomatic limitations.  Internationally, South Vietnam’s stability continued to decay while an 
Arab oil embargo impacted America and NATO’s military readiness.  Domestically, stagflation, 
racial tensions and, most of all, the continued political fallout from the Vietnam War and 
Watergate all served to limit President Ford’s ability to shape policy.  Seemingly, in addition to 
inheriting much of Richard Nixon’s national security team, Gerald Ford had been bequeathed his 
predecessor’s military and strategic shackles.  The nation, the presidency, and the military had all 
been chastened by their experiences in Southeast Asia.
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Despite these experiences, President Ford considered military force to be a viable 
component of his national policy.  This power would not be used, however, based on ideological 
grounds but due to a cold blooded assessment of national interest and chances of success.  
Furthermore, given the military’s need to refurbish both its equipment and personnel after the 
Vietnam War, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s views that a “multipolar” world better 
served the nation’s interest, the Ford administration sought ways to employ military power with 
minimal long-term investment and precise violence.  In NATO, given Western Europe’s 
increased economic power, this meant that Ford continued to expect the Air Force to be the 
United States’ major contribution to the alliance’s conventional deterrence.  This stance enjoyed 
bipartisan support as part of the broader policies of Détente, and seemed the best path forward in 
Vietnam’s aftermath. 277   
Overall Ford, while not as bellicose or willing to skirt Congressional authority as Nixon, 
firmly considered it within his purview as Chief Executive to direct and control military action.  
In April 1975, Ford’s White House initiated the necessary deployments to respond to North 
Vietnam’s invasion of the Republic of Vietnam. While the War Powers Act, public 
dissatisfaction with Vietnam, lack of Congressional approval, and the rapidity of South 
Vietnam’s collapse precluded American action against Hanoi, Ford had every intent of using 
military force.  When Khmer Rouge forces seized the Mayaguez two weeks after Saigon’s fall, 
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this intention was carried through to a military response.  In both cases, airpower played a 
prominent role in the Ford administration’s method for employing the military.  Although the 
circumstances of his term precluded development of a strategy truly independent of Nixon’s, the 
small number of examples (e.g., South Vietnam’s implosion and the Mayaguez incident) 
indicated a belief in deploying either USAF or USN fixed-wing assets in the national interest 
rather than ground units.
278
   
 The Carter Administration 
President Jimmy Carter defeated Gerald Ford primarily due to the impact of a stagnant 
economy, anger at the latter’s pardon of Richard Nixon, disgust with the Nixon and Ford 
administrations’ realpolitik, and the Democratic Party’s promise to reform Washington.  When 
President Carter was inaugurated in January 1977, he became the first president since Lyndon B. 
Johnson to enter office without a major war or crisis affecting his administration.  Furthermore, 
through President Nixon and Ford’s efforts in establishing Détente, Carter inherited a national 
security situation in which the United States enjoyed far better relations with the Soviet Union 
and the People’s Republic of China than had been the case in 1968.  Despite Republican (and 
some Democrat) claims that Soviet power had eclipsed that of the United States, neither country 
enjoyed an objectively overwhelming advantage in strategic nuclear weapons in 1977.  Finally, 
Carter’s party controlled Congress, which ostensibly meant that his administration would find it 
far easier to shape the Department of Defense’s priorities as it saw fit.279 
President Carter initially intended to minimize military commitments and interventions in 
order to facilitate trimming the Department of Defense’s annual budget.  This fell in line with his 
personal beliefs that, with the exception of the nation’s NATO obligations, the United States 
should minimize its military commitments elsewhere by applying other elements of national 
power. However, Carter fully believed that the United States could achieve military advantages 
through modernization of individual weapons systems and the leveraging of technology.  
Therefore, despite many concurrent and subsequent claims that Carter was “dovish” or “weak on 
defense,” there was little evidence to support these accusations.  In reality President Carter, like 
Dwight Eisenhower, believed that out-of-control defense spending was a threat to the United 
States’ economy.  Therefore, whereas the latter had attempted to achieve military overmatch 
through the use of nuclear weaponry, President Carter and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
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intended to achieve the same effects through purchasing fewer systems that were technological 
superior than their Soviet counterparts.
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This belief was also reflected in how President Carter approached the arming of nations 
friendly to the United States.  Although not openly espousing a stance similar to the Nixon 
doctrine, President Carter continued Nixon and Ford’s policies of arming non-NATO allies with 
advanced weaponry in hopes of promoting regional stability, deterring hostile aggression, and 
facilitating U.S. efforts should military action be necessary.  This mirrored  Secretary Brown’s 
efforts within Western Europe, where Carter intended for the nation’s European allies to also 
purchase weapons systems that were compatible with the United States’ own programs.  In aid of 
the latter, Carter’s administration simplified the process by which European nations could obtain 
American weapons systems such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon or advanced ordnance (e.g., 
Paveway laser-guided bombs).  This in turn lowered the overall cost of these items for the United 
States Air Force. Unfortunately for his administration, both domestic economic realities (e.g., 
inflation) and foreign events (e.g., aggressive Soviet activity and the Iran hostage crisis) denied 
Carter’s Department of Defense the ability to fully realize any of his overall defense plans before 
his loss in the 1980 election.
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The Air Force’s Changing Mission 
Given this strategic backdrop, the United States Air Force found itself in a time of 
transition from 1974 through 1980.  At the strategic level, the Air Force continued to develop 
intercontinental missiles while maintaining a manned bomber fleet.  The Minuteman III’s 
deployment and initial development of the MX missile absorbed a significant portion of the Air 
Force’s budget, but, otherwise, ICBMs had little effect on SEAD doctrine.  In contrast, 
developments in manned bomber doctrine reinforced the USAF’s desire to develop tactics, 
doctrine, and air frame to penetrate IADS at low level and high speeds.  Recognizing the losses 
suffered during Operation Linebacker II, successive Air Force Chiefs of Staff General George S. 
Brown, General David C. Jones, and General Lew Allen all pushed for the replacement of the B-
52 Stratofortress with a more advanced, supersonic low-level bomber.  To meet this need, the 
Nixon and Ford administrations directed the purchase of the shorter-ranged FB-111 (a variant of 
the F-111) and development of the B-1 Lancer.  Although the Carter administration cancelled the 
Lancer in 1978, SAC’s embracement of low-level penetration implicitly recognized that the days 
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of overly cautious training were drawing to a close throughout the entire Air Force.  
Furthermore, training and facilities for electronic countermeasures developed in support of SAC 
were also tasked to begin supporting TAC training.
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 Army-Air Force Initiatives and Agreements 
Simultaneous with SAC’s decision to ingress at high speeds and low altitudes in order to 
defeat an IADS was TAC’s move to formalize close cooperation with the United States Army.  
This process had formally begun with the mid-1973 meeting of Major General Leslie W. Bray, 
USAF Chief of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives, and Major General John H. Elder, United 
States Army, as the representatives of their respective Chiefs of Staff, General Brown and 
General Creighton Abrams.  Bray and Elder, studying the problem of close air support, BAI, and 
the frictions that had arisen during the Vietnam War, decided that a European scenario would 
require strict “primacy” that established areas of control for their respective services.  These 
decisions would reduce fratricide, prevent duplicate targeting of high priority Warsaw Pact 
systems, and ensure unity of command in combat.  Moreover, it would allow the Army and Air 
Force to “reduc[e] the costs of weapons research, development, and acquisition” while 
“eliminating Air Force and Army duplication of capabilities.”283   
With this in mind, Bray and Elder decided that the Army should have control of all 
operations along the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), a line defined by the point where 
ground troops were in direct fire contact, and for 25 miles into enemy territory.  In the proposed 
Bray-Elder system, the Air Force provided a given number of CAS sorties to a designated Army 
corps or division.  The supported Army commander would determine into which subordinate 
sectors these fixed-wing sorties would be directed.  The corps would also be responsible for 
controlling NATO air defense assets in the given sector in order to prevent fratricide from 
friendly SAMs or AAA systems such as Hawk, Chaparral, or Vulcan.  The division commander 
receiving air support would then determine where to assign these aircraft to best support his 
offensive or defensive scheme of maneuver.  The brigade and battalions in contact would mass 
direct and indirect fires against Warsaw Pact ADA assets in an attempt to suppress them.  Army 
attack helicopters would support this SEAD mission, thus removing the Warsaw Pact’s air 
defense assets at the regimental level and below as the Air Force CAS attacked the designated 
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hostile ground forces.  In order to ensure this complicated process was carefully coordinated, the 
Army would start requiring it to be trained in all staff exercises.
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 The United States Air Force, as the provider of these close air support sorties, ensured 
that CAS sorties would be second only in air defense / air superiority missions when the Air 
Staff allocated resources.  Furthermore, in contrast to what it had done the last two decades, the 
Air Force would prioritize the acquisition of a single-role attack aircraft (the “A-X”) as opposed 
to carrying out the mission solely through multi-role aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom or 
forthcoming F-16 Falcon.  All aircraft would require ordnance specifically tailored to CAS, and 
existing USAF ordnance (e.g., the Maverick missile, optical glide bombs, and laser guided 
weapons) would need additional funding for development.  Under the Bray and Elder proposals, 
the USAF would also treat training for the CAS mission as being equal in importance with air-to-
air training.  The Air Force would also ensure that at least a third of its tactical performed air-to-
ground missions as their primary role.  Air Force pilots would be slated to serve a two- to three-
year tour as air liaison officers (ALOs) with designated Army units, with the expectation these 
officers would serve as forward air controllers if war broke out.  In peacetime, they would 
enhance the Army’s understanding of Warsaw Pact air defense tactics in order to facilitate 
targeting by that service’s artillery and rocket battalions around the FEBA.285 
  Bray and Elder also conducted an analysis of how the Army and Air Force could 
cooperate in attacking the Warsaw Pact’s second echelon, the so-called “Deep Fight.”  It was in 
this role that the Air Force’s F-4s, F-16s, and F-111s were expected to penetrate the regimental 
and division ADA assets rather than deal with the entire IADS from west to east.  The likely 
routes for such an attack would employ the “open flank” provided by the Baltic or the hillier 
terrain in the southeastern Germany in order to penetrate the WP-IADS.  Once through the 
defenses, NATO and USAF aircraft would attack Warsaw Pact fuel depots, bridges, railyards, 
and command posts in addition to conducting AI / BAI.  Geographically, these attacks would be 
conducted from the expected FEBA to the eastern edge of the Polish and Czech borders.  Due to 
their depth, they were expected to be almost wholly USAFE affairs, since at this time NATO 2 
ATAF lacked the requisite aircraft types, training, and tanker assets to conduct attacks at such 
long range.
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The Bray-Elder papers were a massive departure from the Air Force’s way of war prior to 
its experiences in Vietnam.  Unsurprisingly, resistance to these ideas from within the Pentagon 
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was immediate.  There were those within the Army who believed their service needed internal 
organic close air support assets just as the Marines possessed.  These individuals pointed out that 
the Air Force had paid lip service to CAS before the Vietnam War as well.  Many senior Army 
officers recalled that the Air Force had been forced to develop CAS capability through many 
painful trial and error experiences in the initial stages of the war in Southeast Asia.  Such 
development had been almost wholly due to the USAF’s neglect of conventional weapons 
training.  Within the Air Force, senior and mid-level officers expressed concerns that enacting 
the proposed reforms would be the first step towards dissolution of their separate service.  The 
Bray-Elder framework seemed like a dangerous precedent to set for U.S. Army control of air 
assets in a European conflict.  It also called into question several of the agreements between 
USAFE and NATO’s 2 ATAF regarding operational control of Alliance aircraft in a 
conventional war.
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Concerns about aircraft control were not limited to NATO.  Neither the United States 
Navy nor Marine Corps had forgotten the Air Force’s attempts to eliminate the sea services’ air 
component in the 1950s and early 1960s.  This initial source of friction had been exacerbated by 
USAF actions regarding controlling CAS during Vietnam and conduct of the Route Pack system 
over North Vietnam.  As a result, USN and USMC officially refused to consider the Bray-Elder 
procedures or provide input on their enactment.  Although TAC was able to conduct a series of 
joint service exercises in which Bray-Elder suggestions were employed, these were done more 
though General Dixon’s machinations than any official directed activity.288  The Navy, in the 
midst of its own doctrinal renovations and modernization program, wanted no official part of 
what seemed to be an Air Force-Army circumvention of established Pentagon roles and 
functions.
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The Army and Air Force’s next steps did nothing assuage those who disagreed with the 
Bray-Elder suggestions.  General Brown, having formerly worked for General Abrams when the 
latter was commander of all U.S. forces in Vietnam, asked the Army Chief of Staff if he would 
mind TAC and TRADOC initiating direct coordination to further the Bray-Elder developments.  
This process began initially with phone calls then culminated with General Dixon visiting 
General William E. Dupuy, head of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
throughout 1974.
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  As General Dixon recalled, General Brown had told him the purpose for 
this face to face coordination at the Army headquarters was:   
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[To avoid engaging] the doctrinaires; we won’t engage the JCS we won't 
engage those people who jealously guard their narrow strips of turf. We will move 
forward, if you like, under the guise of procedures, and we will let doctrine get 
altered by the procedures instead of trying to alter doctrine which we have been 
trying to do for years and failed.
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Put another way, General Dixon, with the explicit support of General Brown, specifically 
arranged a meeting with his Army counterpart to circumvent previously established Air Force, 
Army, and Joint Chiefs of Staff methods for establishing doctrine.  It was understood by both 
General Brown and Abrams that any procedures stemming from this meeting would then have 
the weight of Air Force and Army manuals guiding the employment of tactical airpower.  The 
meeting paid immediate dividends: 
 
We established ALFA [Air-Land Forces Application agency], which is the 
Army-Air Force get together. Our staffs had regular and frequent meetings, and 
we started writing joint procedures. I worked very hard with General [William] 
DePuy on that subject. There is no more accomplished tactician in the world. 
Nobody understands the battlefield the way he does. He understands it from A to 
Z, perfectly. He is as close as you can get to having an open and receptive mind 
like Abrams had. He joined wholeheartedly, though both of us were limited by 
our resources. While it was easy to say we will work procedures, it was hard to do 
that because, although we were doing it away from the Pentagon, the Pentagon 
was watching us; the rest of the Army was watching him, and the rest of the Air 
Force was watching me. 
There were people who criticized what we were trying to do, but we hoped 
to make enough progress during his [General DePuy’s] tenure and mine to 
institutionalize the process so when we left it wouldn't be just us; it would be a 
way of life.
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Although it is debatable whether either service realized Dixon’s lofty goals, that the 
efforts yielded change is inarguable.  For the Army, General DePuy ensured that the discussions 
on employing fires were inculcated throughout the 1974 draft edition of FM 100-5 Operations of 
Army Forces in the Field.
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  In a similar effort, Generals Dixon and Brown, with the 
enthusiastic aid of Major General Bray, set about to make a major revision to how the Air Force 
viewed its basic doctrine, AFM 1-1.   
  January 1975 Edition of AFM 1-1 
There were five major changes between the September 1971 and January 1975 editions 
of AFM 1-1 United States Air Force Basic Doctrine.  First and foremost, General Bray’s authors 
did not devote over one third of the document to the conduct of nuclear war.  Détente and the 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) treaties made it apparent neither President Ford nor 
President Carter wished to expend the resources necessary to make a nuclear war even notionally 
“winnable.”  Therefore, unlike the September 1971 edition, the 1975 edition stated that the 
“deterrence of strategic nuclear war is the highest defense priority of the United States,” 
proceeded to expound upon the virtues of the Strategic Triad for two paragraphs, and then spent 
only four paragraphs directly discussing employment of nuclear weapons throughout the 
remainder of the document.
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This lack of emphasis on nuclear combat was not the only major change.  In the 1971 
edition of AFM 1-1, close air support was an operation that was “centrally directed at the 
appropriate level for effective management and overall efficiency,” but with “detailed 
control…decentralized to provide flexibility, rapid response and adjustment to local 
requirements and conditions.”295  Further discussion strongly implies that said control, regardless 
of decentralization, would remain with an Air Force headquarters and be subservient to the air 
commander’s overall plan for conventional warfare.  In contrast, the 1975 edition explicitly 
states that “close air support operations require detailed integration with the fire and maneuver of 
friendly forces” in order to “limit the enemy’s capability to directly engage friendly forces in 
close combat.”296  In light of the TAC-TRADOC discussion, either implied or explicit 
discussions of which service will control CAS is conspicuously absent from the 1975 manual.  In 
similar fashion, air interdiction operations (including BAI) transition from being implicitly 
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planned and executed by an air component headquarters in 1971 to being explicitly responsive to 
the changing needs of the ground component.
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In undertaking these subtle changes, Generals Dixon and Bray ensured that the bulk of 
their planned changes to tactical and operational missions would still be well within the spirit of 
Air Force doctrine.  Furthermore, while not explicitly spelling out tactical SEAD within the 
vicinity of the FEBA, AFM 1-1’s tying both air interdiction and CAS to the ground maneuver 
force echoed the Bray-Elder suggestions and Dixon and DePuy’s ongoing dialogue.  Finally, 
when read in conjunction with the January 1976 edition of the U.S. Army’s capstone manual, 
FM 100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field, it becomes clear that the Army understood 
their mission and fully intended to employ their assets to destroy or suppress the ZSU-23-4, SA-
8 and, where feasible, the SA-6 on the Central European battlefield.
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  Although less clear 
regarding major theater operations elsewhere (e.g., the Middle East or Korea), General Abrams 
and General Jones felt the interlocking doctrine of FM 100-5 and AFM 1-1 was sufficiently 
flexible to be employed elsewhere.  Far from perfect, the cooperative efforts of DePuy and 
Dixon were sufficient to provide an intellectual foundation for tactical SEAD.
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 Operational SEAD 
The Air Force’s close cooperation with the Army on tactical operations in support of 
close air support still left the issue of operational-level SEAD.  The Air Force recognized that in 
local conflicts, allies would “often lack adequate air power, and the Air Force is likely to play the 
key role in any future US response for support.”300  Moreover, the allied nations supported by the 
Air Force were likely to have placed “major emphasis upon developing and maintaining the 
capabilities of their ground forces.”301  Therefore, the Air Force clearly expected that, both in the 
expected NATO scenario or an unplanned international contingency, it would be responsible for 
establishing and maintaining air superiority.  Furthermore, the Yom Kippur War had 
demonstrated such air superiority may require overcoming a sophisticated IADS such as those 
fielded by Egypt and Syria in 1973.
302
  Unfortunately, while the manual’s authors had built in 
doctrinal flexibility with regard to tactical SEAD that supported CAS and BAI, the 1975 edition 
of AFM 1-1 still provided very little instruction on how to reduce an IADS at the operational 
level.  Indeed, the only guidance on attacking enemy air defenses was implied in one sub-
paragraph in Chapter 3: 
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(1) Offensive counter air operations are normally conducted throughout 
enemy territory to seek out and destroy those targets that constitute or support the 
enemy air order of battle.  These operations are the most effective means for 
achieving air superiority and are essential for gaining air supremacy.
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These two sentences were the lone reference to establishing air superiority and air 
supremacy over hostile territory in AFM 1-1.  In 1971, the Air Force’s basic doctrine had 
directly stated that air superiority would be determined solely by air-to-air combat only to have 
this thesis disproven by Vietnam and the Yom Kippur War.  The 1975 edition did not overtly 
restate this incorrect belief on the primacy of enemy fighters within an IADS.  Instead, the 
manual once more mentioned enemy fighters, then seemed to imply an IADS’s ground 
components were not worthy of being individually named.  Instead AFM 1-1 collectively 
described SAMs, AAA, and IADS C
2
 centers as “targets that constitute or support the enemy air 
order of battle.”304  The refusal to explicitly outline these components is curious given the 
amount of discussion dedicated to tactical SEAD in the Bray-Elder papers, TRADOC-TAC 
ALFA discussions, Air Force professional journals, and fighter pilot’s observations regarding 
this era. 
Despite this decision to omit hostile ground systems in Air Force’s basic doctrine, 
General Dixon personally took several steps to ensure that TAC was prepared to conduct 
operational SEAD.  First, Dixon directed ALFA to write a field manual that established airspace 
control.  Published in November 1976, AFM 2-14 / FM 200-42 Airspace Management in an 
Area of Operations formally established the policies by which the Air Force and Army would 
control movement of friendly rotary and fixed-wing aircraft to the FEBA.  It also charged the air 
component commanders at all levels (i.e., squadron through numbered air force) with 
responsibility for “[c]oordinating the operations of his forces, aircraft, and weapons with other 
Service components, as required.”305  The manual then went on to list both friendly and enemy 
air defense assets among the items that were to be covered during this coordination.  Combined, 
these two facets provided a means through which Army division and corps commanders were 
compelled to discuss SEAD with their Air Force group and wing counterparts within a given 
operational area. 
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Second, Dixon established two additional numbered air force headquarters underneath 
TAC.  These organizations, the 9
th
 and 12
th
 Air Forces, ostensibly had a peacetime function of 
overseeing training throughout TAC.  Dixon, however, also used them to test new staff methods 
for planning and conducting aerial campaigns using different operational scenarios.  In this 
manner, they began to develop the methods by which TAC expected to engage and defeat a 
modern IADS, with the primary focus being on European operations.  In addition, through his 
previously established relationship with Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Commander of the Navy’s 
Atlantic Fleet, Dixon ensured that staff from both headquarters were able to conduct unofficial 
exercises in which USN carrier aircraft provided SEAD assets for Air Force exercises.  These 
were often conducted in conjunction with “Blue Flags,” i.e., TAC-designated staff training 
events.  Finally, Dixon ensured that the two organizations conducted liaison with their PACAF 
and USAFE counterparts in order to provide wartime redundancy and shared dissemination of 
developed procedures across the Air Force.  Much as fighter pilots gained experience with 
additional air combat maneuvering sorties, these numbered headquarters began to increase their 
efficiency as TAC forced them to go through planning and exercises.
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New Roles, New Equipment: The Air Force Modernizes 
In 1974, the Air Force consisted primarily of aircraft either purchased directly for or 
inspired by the need to conduct Massive Retaliation.  The ubiquitous F-4 Phantom was still 
being purchased in its F-4E variant for frontline service and to replace the obsolescent “C” and 
“D” models.  The F-111 had evolved from being the fighter that the USAF had never wanted to 
serving as its primary long-range, all-weather strike aircraft.  Close air support and battlefield air 
interdiction were considered the province of the F-4D / F-4E and Vought A-7D Corsair, another 
USN aircraft that Secretary McNamara had forced upon the USAF.  SAM and radar suppression 
missions were performed either by aging F-105G aircraft or the problematic F-4C Wild Weasel 
IV variants.  Reserve units continued to fly the F-100 and F-105 in various roles, and air defense 
units continued to operate the F-106.  Airborne command and control was executed by a small 
number of EC-121 Constellation aircraft, while there was no electronic warfare craft capable of 
penetrating hostile airspace in company with a strike formation.
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General Jones and General Dixon both recognized the Air Force’s obsolescence in light 
of how they planned to conduct a future conflict.  In a 1974 memorandum, General Dixon stated 
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his intent to have two thirds of these obsolescent aircraft replaced by 1981.
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  The Air Force did 
not quite meet this goal, but still achieved a marked increase in capability that belied its numbers.  
By 1980, of USAF’s 41 active and reserve fighter wings, roughly half of them were equipped 
with the F-15 Eagle or F-16 Falcon.  In Europe, the first A-10 Warthog wings had been 
established, thus vastly increasing USAFE’s ability to conduct CAS.  Finally, the EF-111 Raven 
had completed acceptance trials and was going through its final upgrades before assignment to 
USAFE and CONUS F-111 wings.  As Massive Retaliation drove the weapons acquisitions of 
the Air Force that fought in Vietnam, TAC’s support of Flexible and Measured Response guided 
USAF procurement and organization through the Carter and Ford administrations.
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The Means of Air Superiority 
 Whereas the Century Fighters had their genesis in an apocalyptic view of warfare, the 
USAF and USN’s post-Vietnam fighters embodied many of the lessons learned from that 
conflict.  A comparison of how both services examined the same problem (destroying MiGs) and 
came to vastly different solutions help to show how doctrine drove design.  Unlike the Air Force, 
the Navy had conducted little official coordination with its fellow services with on how to 
conduct conventional operations in case of a general European conflict.  However, as an 
instrument of American national policy, the Navy was ostensibly bound by the same guidelines 
that spurred the Air Force’s doctrinal changes.  Although the Air Force considered itself the 
service of first choice for striking hostile countries, in reality this was often not the case.  Air 
Force fighters required long runways and support facilities, neither of which were certainties in a 
given conflict.  On the other hand, the proximity of international waters to most potential crises 
had historically made presidents far more likely to rely on carriers to as an instrument of military 
force than USAF squadrons.
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Like the Air Force, the Navy had learned a great deal from Vietnam.  When attacking 
North Vietnam, the Navy’s plans for attacking the NV-IADS was relatively simple.  Carrier air 
wings (CAWs), unlike their USAF counterparts, had been inherently heterogeneous.  A typical 
CAW had consisted of 2-3 attack squadrons of 10-12 aircraft apiece, a detachment of 4-6 
electronic warfare aircraft, and two fighter squadrons with an organization similar to that of their 
attack brethren.  Whether attacking with another CAW or with only their own assets, a USN 
carrier strike’s solution to SEAD was to arm 1-2 flights (usually from an attack squadron for that 
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mission) and occasionally reinforce with a dual-armed F-4 flight from the strike’s fighter escort.  
In this manner, a strike consisting of 20 bombing aircraft would be escorted by 4-8 aircraft 
equipped for suppressing SAM / AAA, with another 4-12 tasked with defeating any MiGs.
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Despite its relatively dynamic CAW, the USN found itself woefully deficient in 
conventional warfare capability through 1968. After Operation Rolling Thunder, the USN 
conducted a thorough review of its tactics, training, and equipment.  Some of these (e.g., Top 
Gun, additional fleet wide ACM sorties, ordnance modernization) were implemented in the lull 
between Rolling Thunder and Linebacker.  During this review, the Navy found that the F-4 
Phantom was reaching obsolescence based on the observed performance of the MiG-21 and the 
expected capabilities of the MiG-23.  Furthermore, with its dedicated attack community, the 
Navy did not feel it was necessary for its next fighter to be a multi-role aircraft.  Instead, in July 
1968 the USN decreed that the F-4’s replacement, currently being sought in the Naval Fighter 
Experimental (VFX) Program, would concentrate solely on the air-to-air mission.
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Issuing this decree was far easier for the Navy than delineating what the mission was.  
Many Navy aviators believed that the Phantom’s poor performance against NVAF MiGs was 
proof that the next USN fighter needed to be much lighter.  This mindset had been reinforced by 
the relative success the smaller, lighter F-8 Crusader had enjoyed during Rolling Thunder.   
Although Top Gun graduates’ success in 1972 had somewhat undercut this argument, the Navy’s 
equivalent of the “Lightweight Fighter Mafia” still strenuously advocated for smaller aircraft. 313   
However, unlike Colonel Boyd’s acolytes in the Air Force, the Navy’s lightweight fighter 
advocates’ desires for the VFX fell on deaf ears due to one major reason: fleet defense.  The 
Phantom’s genesis had begun in response to the Soviet Union’s development of anti-ship 
missiles with range in excess of two hundred miles.  As the USN had been conducting operations 
against North Vietnam, Soviet Naval Aviation had continued to develop its anti-ship missiles and 
had fielded the Backfire bomber to carry them in 1967.  So the VFX would now have to possess 
the means to engage and destroy Soviet bombers more than three hundred miles from a carrier’s 
flight deck with onboard armament.  It would also need the ability to launch, accelerate 
supersonically to a loiter point, then be able to remain on station for several hours.  Last but not 
least, the new aircraft would have to carry the powerful, but heavy, AWG-9 radar developed for 
the failed F-111B.
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 When purchased in 1970, the F-14 Tomcat capitalized on advances in computer 
technology, ergonomics, metallurgy, and systems design to markedly improve on the Phantom.  
The combination of the AWG-9 and the Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix missile allowed it to engage 
multiple targets at over one hundred miles.  In order to facilitate a beyond visual range 
engagement, the Tomcat was also equipped with an onboard camera that allowed it to confirm a 
fighter-sized target’s identity at over forty miles.  For close range dogfights, the Tomcat was 
armed with the Sidewinder and designed from the outset with the M-61 Vulcan.  Finally, the F-
14 was aerodynamically designed to allow the large aircraft to be fuel efficient, with low wing 
loading that made it relatively maneuverable for its size.
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The F-14’s negative traits demonstrated how even specialization was no guarantee of the 
optimal design.  The Tomcat was underpowered, with engines that were unreliable and prone to 
shut down during air combat maneuvering.  Its primary weapon, the AIM-54, was a heavy 
missile whose carriage rails limited the Tomcat’s flight envelope in an ACM environment.  Due 
to its weight, it accelerated sluggishly in and out of turns.  With regard to vertical maneuvers, its 
thrust-to-weight ratio better than the Phantom’s but not by a large margin and only in 
afterburner.  Finally, the Tomcat was prohibitively expensive, with the cost precluding any 
attempt to purchase a possible strike variant for the Marine Corps.
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Combined, all these factors indicated that the Navy, by virtue of attempting to satisfy 
several needs, had purchased an interceptor rather than at true air superiority fighter.  As 
performance at Top Gun demonstrated from 1972-1979, the Tomcat was far from hapless in 
ACM.  However, its size and preferred weapons suite made it an aircraft that was better suited to 
destroying an IADS’s interceptors from long range before closing to ACM.  Furthermore, unlike 
the Phantom, the F-14 lacked an advanced bomb computer, limiting its ability to be used in air-
to-ground operations.  Its size, cost, and limited capabilities would contribute to Iran being the 
only other nation to fly the Tomcat.
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 The Air Force Path 
Facing the same difficulties with gaining air superiority in a conventional conflict, the Air 
Force chose a different path than the USN.  This was based in large part on their underlying 
assumptions of what a future conflict would be like after Rolling Thunder.  When the Air Force 
selected the Eagle in 1969, it had the difficulties of integrating the Phantom into USAF service 
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fresh in the Air Staff’s mind.  Rather than the MiG-23 or similar aircraft the USN expected to 
face attacking from the ocean, the Air Staff was greatly concerned about the MiG-25 Foxbat. In 
addition, the Tomcat’s early engine problems were so profound that the Air Force did not believe 
it would prove to be reliable enough to meet TAC’s operational readiness standards.  Therefore, 
the Air Force made every effort to avoid any direct comparisons between the two fighters during 
the design process, expedited the F-15’s procurement, and placed a moratorium on any official 
air combat maneuvering between the two fighters during the Eagle’s initial entry trials.  The end 
result was that the Air Force obtained a single seat fighter that, while similar to the Tomcat in 
size, performed the air superiority mission in a much different manner.
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When placed into production the Eagle offered an airframe that, while not truly multi-
role, at least had a modest air-to-ground capability.  In addition, the F-15A had been modified 
from its prototype to reflect the need to escort strike groups as far away as western Poland, 
intercept and destroy the Warsaw Pact’s new generation of supersonic fighter bombers (e.g., the 
Su-17 Fitter and Su-24 Fencer), and also loiter for extended periods of time as escorts for 
NATO’s AEW and tanker aircraft in case of a conventional conflict.  Although the F-15 was 3-
4,000 pounds heavier than the Phantom and had a larger airframe, its  engines provided 
sufficient thrust to allow the Eagle to conduct sustained maneuver in three dimensions when 
carrying its standard air-to-air load.  Furthermore, its large fuselage served as an additional lift 
surface, with an extremely low wing-loading for an aircraft of its size.  Consequently, the Eagle 
was surprisingly nimble, being far more maneuverable than the Phantom and arguably superior 
to the Tomcat.  Its battery of eight air-to-air missiles matched the Phantom’s firepower, while its 
onboard radar allowed it to track and engage multiple targets with ‘look-down / shoot-down’ 
capability.
 319
  When compared to the design of the Phantom’s twin cockpit, the Eagle enjoyed a 
great deal more visibility: 
   
Once airborne for the first time in the F-15 I noticed, with a great deal of 
satisfaction, that a fighter aircraft again had been built with that most valuable of 
characteristics, visibility out of the cockpit.  You can look back over your 
shoulder and actually check the six o’clock position by looking between the twin 
tails.  In a 60° bank turn it is possible to look over the canopy rail and check the 
99 
 
belly area for bandits.  This was one of the first of many pleasant surprises for me 
during my checkout.
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To the Eagle’s detractors, however, these improvements over the Phantom were more 
than balanced by the F-15’s major flaws.  First, its size made it visible almost at the extreme 
limit of human eyesight, i.e., 10-12 miles.  By contrast, a Fishbed-sized aircraft was often only 
visible at eight miles, with the difference in visible range even greater if the Eagle was in a bank.  
Seemingly a trivial issue, this shortcoming grew in importance when one considered that the 
overwhelming majority of air-to-air encounters in Vietnam and the Middle East had been within 
visual distance.  In addition, electronic warfare conditions during a European conventional 
conflict would likely greatly reduce the range and reliability of the Eagle’s radar. Thus, to those 
who opposed the Eagle, one of the fighter’s most expensive components would be rendered an 
accessory of little to no use against the Warsaw Pact.
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  Even if the radar functioned as 
advertised, it seemed optimistic at best to expect a single pilot to effectively control and manage 
the radar, fly the aircraft, and maintain situational awareness.  From a maintenance perspective, 
the radar, the airframe, and the electronics within seemed to be too sophisticated, as from 1976-
1980 the Eagle’s maintenance costs per flight hour and operations readiness rate were both 
below TAC’s expected targets.  Finally, and most importantly, the Eagle was so expensive that 
the Air Force could not afford to buy F-15s in the initially expected numbers.
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 The F-16 Falcon 
The F-15s shortcomings, despite Air Force having made the decision to purchase the 
Eagle in 1967 and with initial production beginning in 1973,  provided an opportunity for the 
Lightweight Fighter Mafia to persuade the Air Force staff to explore other options.  It was clear, 
from Air Force doctrine, that the service would need far more fighters to carry out its obligations 
with regard to BAI and CAS.  Put bluntly, no matter how capable the Eagle was at air-to-air 
combat, NATO allies of the United States could not afford to purchase the aircraft.  Nor could 
the USAF procure it in sufficient numbers to meet the service’s projected need given the USAF’s 
budget.
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That NATO allies needed an alternative was not in dispute.  Smaller NATO countries 
such as Belgium, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands entered the mid-70s still flying 
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obsolescent F-104 Starfighters and utterly outclassed F-5 Freedom Fighters.  After the Yom 
Kippur War, none of these nations’ defense ministries expected these aircraft to be able to fulfill 
their designed role in concert with USAFE platforms.  With their own aircraft industrial base as 
limited as their defense budgets, these NATO allies could not develop a domestic, modern 
replacement for these aircraft.  Nor did these countries believe the purchase or French or British 
alternatives would meet their needs despite pressure from the United Kingdom and France to do 
so.  First the Ford and then the Carter administrations moved to fill this gap by proposing a 
common airframe that would provide a modern fighter for their allies while simultaneously 
driving down the USAF’s costs to purchase the same.324 
The F-16, as the eventual winner of the Lightweight Fighter Program, reflected a vastly 
different technological approach than the Eagle yet was still influenced by USAF views on air 
combat.  Unlike the Eagle, the Falcon was conceived and initially developed purely as a 
daylight, clear-visibility fighter that would be able to destroy Warsaw Pact aircraft in the vicinity 
of the FEBA.  In this vein, the Falcon lacked the expensive radar necessary to employ AIM-7 
Sparrow missiles as well as the associated electronics.  Instead, the F-16 was expected to be 
vectored in the vicinity of a target and achieve kills using the AIM-9 Sidewinder or, if necessary, 
its internal M-61. With this in mind, everything in the Falcon’s design was optimized for 
conducting high energy dogfighting at low to medium altitudes.  Conceived, developed, and 
pushed through the Pentagon by acolytes of Colonel Boyd from 1972 to 1977, the Falcon was 
expected to be the Century Fighters’ antithesis with regard to aerial warfare.325 
At the operational level, the Air Force expected to purchase sufficient F-16s to meet a 
portion of its CAS needs as well as contribute to the gaining of air superiority.  Chosen in part 
because of its extended range over its Northrop YF-17 competition, the F-16 was also expected 
to support battlefield air interdiction via the delivery of “dumb” bombs or employment of 
Maverick missiles.  In order to meet this task, it was equipped with a bombing computer, a 
solitary nod towards sophistication that facilitated its eventual purchase.  However, its 
proponents were adamantly opposed to the development of any F-16 variant that had ground 
attack as a primary mission.  Indeed, so deep was this antipathy that the F-16 program manager 
and his superiors refused to consider a 1975 General Dynamics proposal for a SEAD variant of 
the F-16.  The Falcon, according to those who supported it, would support SEAD by being 
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present in sufficient numbers to allow the establishment of air superiority near the FEBA, not by 
gaining weight and size in an attempt to replace the F-4.
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Like the Eagle, the Falcon had its proponents and detractors.  The former pointed out that 
the Falcon was, bar none, the most lethal dogfighting aircraft in the world when it entered 
official service in 1977.  In exercise after exercise, the nimble Falcon was able to use its small 
size and high agility to gain a position of advantage against larger NATO aircraft.
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  This often 
occurred before the fighter was visually acquired, seemingly proving Boyd’s theories on future 
air combat correct.  Unlike the larger F-15, the Falcon was a true multi-role aircraft that 
performed the air-to-ground mission almost as well as dedicated strike aircraft (e.g., the A-7 and 
F-111).
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  Finally, as with the F-15, the Falcon was relatively easy to control for neophyte and 
experienced pilots alike.  In the words of Dan Hampton, experienced F-16 pilot: 
 
[The ease of control] was largely due to a computerized, modular concept that 
permitted easy expansion as technology and weapons advanced. A lethal 
dogfighter, the F-16 can only fly by using computers to offset its aerodynamic 
instability. This designed instability is like starting a fistfight with your first swing 
nearly complete.
329
 
 
To those who opposed the Falcon, this virtuosity came at the cost of low expected 
survivability.  First and foremost, the new jet was single-engined, which seemingly ran counter 
to the operational experiences from both Vietnam and the Yom Kippur War. While a European 
environment was not expected to have a civilian populace performing the “Mad Minute” found 
in Hanoi, there would be enough manually aimed anti-aircraft fire at low level to be a concern.  
Next, the initial F-16A design had only limited electronic countermeasures.   Indeed, the 
Falcon’s program managers had been so zealous about saving weight that initially the F-16A had 
been expected to have no internal ECM capability, but would use external pods.  Overruled by 
the Air Staff, the officers of the Lightweight Fighter Program had provided the F-16 with only a 
limited ECM suite that was arguably vulnerable to SAMs and the Shilka’s gun radar.330 
Other F-16 opponents (of which F-15 pilots were often the most vocal) pointed out that 
the Falcon’s lack of BVR capability would be a marked disadvantage in either a European or 
Middle Eastern contingency.  To these experts, the proliferation of modern fighters such as the 
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Mirage F1 and the Soviet Union’s export of the Flogger to friendly nations meant that eventually 
the F-16 was going to find itself facing enemies that could engage it at over twenty miles before 
it was in visual range.  At that point, the F-16 would be analogous to the world’s greatest knife 
fighter attempting to kill a man armed with an assault rifle while charging across a wide open 
football field.
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  Moreover, the Falcon’s initially poor acceleration compared to the Flogger at 
low altitude meant that the latter would ostensibly be able to disengage rather than dogfight.
332
  
Despite these negative views, the F-16 was a major improvement to the USAF’s SEAD 
capability, with an impact arguably greater than the Eagle’s.  Almost immediately, the fighter’s 
agility and dual-role capability led to USAFE employing it in hunter-killer teams with that 
command’s Wild Weasels.  Initially, this was an unofficial, “habitual relationship” between the 
F-4C Wild Weasel III squadrons based at Spangdahlem and F-16 squadrons assigned to USAFE 
beginning in 1978.
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  As the F-4G was introduced to USAFE beginning in 1978, this 
arrangement became much more frequent, with F-16s often replacing the 52
nd’s own integral F-
4Es in “hunter-killer” packages.334 
 The F-4G 
As the “hunter,” the F-4G Wild Weasel V leveraged advances in computer processing and 
electronic warfare technology to be arguably the best defense suppression aircraft the USAF 
produced in the Cold War.  The impetus for producing a new Wild Weasel variant sprung both 
from the poor performance of the modified F-4Cs and the USAF’s analysis of the Yom Kippur 
War.  With mobile SAMs and the lethality of the ZSU-23-4, the Air Force’s electronic warfare 
officers determined that tactical fighters required the capability to acquire enemy ground-based 
air defense assets, track their movements and, most importantly, direct other aircraft to attack 
them.  Almost as importantly, the new airframe needed to be able to employ the full range of 
USAF ordnance, from the Standard ArM to the new Maverick guided missile.  Finally, the new 
airframe needed to be maneuverable enough to operate at low level unlike the F-4C Wild Weasel 
or F-105G.
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In order to expedite production and with the expectation that the airframe was a stopgap 
measure, the USAF chose to use the newest model F-4E as the basis for the new Wild Weasel.  
Although the Air Force did not consider it as sophisticated as the F-15 or as nimble as the F-16, 
the slatted-wing F-4E was maneuverable enough, fast enough, and sufficiently spacious in the 
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fuselage to allow the introduction of computer-based electronic warfare equipment.  Rather than 
modifying existing airframes, the Air Force purchased new F-4E Phantoms as part of its defense 
budget beginning in 1974.  USAF then directed McDonnell Douglas to replace the fighters’ nose 
mounted cannons with the APR-38, a radar acquisition system, and other internal systems that 
would facilitate targeting enemy ground-based air defenses.  With deliveries beginning in 1975, 
the first squadron of F-4Gs became operational at Spangdahlem in 1978.
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The difference in capability between the F-4G and all other aircraft that preceded it was 
marked.  While not possessing the same straight-line speed and acceleration as the F-105G, the 
Wild Weasel V was more maneuverable at low level.  At medium to high altitude, the F-4G not 
only possessed greater speed but had a longer range.  Unlike the F-4C, the F-4G could carry 
StARM as well as Maverick missiles, and it was a more survivable aircraft.  Finally, the F-4G 
retained the ability to carry up to four AIM-7 missiles without detracting from its SEAD 
capability.  This meant the Wild Weasel V and the F-4E that usually accompanied it could 
provide a some of their own escort if necessary during ingress and egress.
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Despite these improvements, the F-4G was not the best means of meeting the 
commitments to the Army to which the Air Force had consented.  Much like the F-4E on which 
it was based, the Wild Weasel V could not loiter near the FEBA for extended periods.  As an air-
to-air platform, it had inherited all of the Phantom’s faults while also reverting to lacking a gun.  
In order to accompany penetrating aircraft to distant targets, the Wild Weasel V had to carry three 
external fuel tanks, thus limiting the aircraft’s top speed, maneuverability, and ordnance.  
Finally, as first the F-15 and then the F-16 began replacing the F-4E, the F-4G became 
increasingly dissimilar to the other aircraft in USAF strike groups.  This made it easy for air 
defenses, both those in exercises and potential Warsaw Pact systems, to differentiate the Wild 
Weasel V from other aircraft in the strike package.
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 The E-3 Sentry 
General Dixon, as the commander of TAC, felt that developing a means of controlling a 
strike group and its associated escort, as well as any other fighters in the area, was as important 
as developing modern aircraft.  The Air Force had begun developing this aspect of aerial warfare 
during Vietnam by using EC-121 Warning Stars as airborne command posts.  Realizing these 
aircraft’s limitations and, once again, taking advantage of both computerization and Doppler 
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technology, the Air Force began developing a successor.  Designated the E-3 Sentry under the 
Department of Defense’s joint naming convention, the Air Force more commonly referred to this 
new airframe as the Airborne Warning and Control System, or “AWACS.”  Built on the same 
modified 737 airframe as most USAF tankers and electronic reconnaissance aircraft of the 
period, the Sentry was designed to operate in an orbit that allowed its radar to track airborne 
contacts for a radius of 2-300 miles depending on various target variables (e.g., size, speed, 
relative altitude, and ECM).
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Although pitched to Congress primarily as a defensive aircraft, like the Eagle, Falcon, 
and Wild Weasel V, the Sentry was a major facilitator of all Air Force operations within a given 
theater.  Unlike ground based radars, the Sentry could see over the Earth’s curvature out to its 
full range.  Moreover, its Doppler radar was far less susceptible to the “ground clutter” that 
plagued radars such as those in the EC-121 or F-4 Phantom.  Finally, using computers housed in 
the aircraft’s fuselage that projected contacts’ heading, speed, altitude and (after later upgrades) 
probable aircraft types, the Sentry presented its controllers with as much information as their 
ground-based IADS counterparts.
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This capability was a major advance in command and control.  USAF (and later NATO) 
staff aboard the Sentry could alert a strike group to hostile interceptors and, if necessary, vector 
escort flights to attack these same aircraft.  When dealing with a friendly strike group equipped 
with the proper IFF, the Sentry’s controllers could also clear the escort to engage with BVR 
missiles.  Indeed, once the E-3 received upgrades in the late 1970s, its radar could reliable track 
even SAMs once these missiles were airborne.  While not responsive enough for Wild Weasel 
targeting in real time, the AWACS’ ability to record what its radars had detected would 
ostensibly aid in pattern analysis of Warsaw Pact or other hostile actors’ SAM deployment 
patterns in a full-scale conventional conflict.
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A Symphony of Destruction—Training to Defeat the IADS 
There are many different viewpoints on what sparked the revolution in training that 
greatly enhanced the United States Air Force’s conventional capabilities by the end of the 1970s.  
In his work The Air Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training After Vietnam, Air Force 
historian Brian Laslie credits Generals Disosway, Momyer, and Dixon with “pav[ing] the way 
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for subsequent commanders to train pilots realistically.”342 Laslie goes on to discuss the fact that 
all three successive TAC commanders decentralized training, empowered wing commanders to 
change tactics, and attempted to change USAF training programs to better reflect what would 
occur in potential conflict.  While Laslie does not argue that the transition from staid, pre-
packaged exercises to dynamic, fluid training events was wholly driven from above, he does 
present senior leaders as being the primary impetus of changes to TAC training during the latter 
stages of Vietnam through 1979.
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This viewpoint contradicts the memoirs of Air Force officers who were junior and field 
grade officers during this same period.   According to F-4 / F-105 pilot Ed Rasimus, TAC pilot 
C.R. Anderegg, Brigadier General Robin Olds, and future USAF general Charles Horner, 
Disosway and Momyer were openly hostile to proposed recommendations to improve training 
presented in the aftermath of Rolling Thunder.  Horner, in his memoir Every Man A Tiger, 
further suggests that Dixon did not initially wish to change the Air Force’s methodology for 
training pilots on its merits but was basically outsmarted by junior officers.
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  To these men and 
historian Marshall L. Michel III, the changes in TAC during the 1970s were due to a “revolt of 
the majors,” i.e., field grade officers who outright demanded that they never be sent into a 
conflict without proper training again.
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  Given this approach, rather than directing change, 
senior officers reluctantly acknowledged it was inevitable and then tried to control the field 
grades’ impetus rather than let it disrupt the Air Force.346 
The reason for these quite disparate viewpoints is that much of the available evidence 
supports both.  By January 1974, it was clear not only that USAF’s training methodology was 
insufficient, but also that the entire service required a massive change in its training mindset.  It 
is true, as Michel points out, that “’[a]cerbic [was] a charitable way to describe Dixon.”347  In 
person and when writing correspondence, Dixon was blunt, to the point, and not one to be overly 
concerned with the feelings of peers or subordinates.
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  These traits were often taken by his staff 
and subordinates to be dismissiveness or outright anger at their suggestions.  However, 
reviewing his memoranda, directives, and policies, makes clear that General Dixon’s initial 
pugnaciousness often masked a driven, concerned commander who feared that his organization 
could not perform its wartime mission.  In his five years as TAC commander, Dixon took many 
explicit and implicit steps that set the conditions within which the “iron majors” would operate 
and also provided the senior officer “top cover” that protected their efforts from interference.  
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Although General Momyer initiated some of the measures that helped TAC enhance its 
conventional capability, it was General Dixon who shepherded these and other changes critical to 
his command’s enhanced conventional capabilities through the Pentagon. 
 The DOC System 
General Dixon, like his predecessor, had determined that TAC’s training did not properly 
replicate the modern combat environment.  Unlike General Momyer between Rolling Thunder 
and Operation Linebacker, Dixon personally ensured that the TAC staff developed a plan to 
change this state of affairs and then enforced it.  First, building on the discussion of the 
December 1972 Tactical Fighters Symposium, Dixon developed policies that assigned each 
tactical fighter wing within TAC a particular wartime mission based on weapons platform and 
location.  Called the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) training system, this new plan 
reflected the reality that the Air Force was constrained by both the ongoing oil crisis of the mid-
70s and the budgetary constraints exacerbated by inflation.
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The assumption underpinning the DOC system was that almost no Air Force pilots, 
including those who were veterans of Southeast Asia, were fully proficient in the skills necessary 
for modern combat.  A baseline of academic knowledge regarding the realities of air combat over 
both Vietnam and the Middle East was the initial building block for success.  This school 
instruction occurred concurrently with a classroom curriculum emphasizing a pilot’s assigned 
aircraft and mission.  For example, a pilot assigned an F-4E or F-15 and tasked for an air-to-air 
mission would spend a set number of hours learning the proper employment of the AIM-7, AIM-
9, and M-61 cannon in aerial combat.  This would include actual operational experiences gleaned 
from the Red Baron program, USAF and IAF pilot interviews and, where possible, intelligence 
gathered regarding NVAF, EAF, and SAF tactical operations.  In this manner fighter pilots 
became academic experts in their particular field, be it defense suppression, air superiority, or 
ground attack.
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The reason for this rigorous academic training became readily apparent when the TFW’s 
assigned pilots began the next two phases, basic and air combat maneuvers.  Basic combat 
maneuvers were, as the name implies, a selection of drills in which a pilot performed the most 
common operations used in aerial combat.  The drills were first performed alone, but at the end 
of the training phase the pilot was faced with an adversary (usually from within the wing) who 
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flew a predictable, pre-arranged path.  In this manner, the pilot was able to transfer academic 
learning to practical exercises in a low threat environment.
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 It was in the final phase, air combat maneuvers, that Dixon’s influence and that of the 
“iron majors” most directly intersected.  ACM training, especially with the Air Force’s initially 
inexperienced pilots, was inherently dangerous.  When training against aircraft of the same type, 
i.e., “similar ACM,” pilots could become easily disoriented as to which aircraft was a wingman 
and which was an adversary.  Moreover, even with its numerous improvements, the F-4E 
remained a very unforgiving aircraft when pressed to the edge of its flight envelope.  Although 
much more tolerant of pilot mistakes, the F-15’s and F-16’s capabilities encouraged pilots 
transitioning from the Phantom to overestimate the limits of their new mounts.  Finally, the 
Falcon’s single engine, the same Pratt & Whitney F100 as used in the F-15, showed a disturbing 
tendency to flame out due to the smaller fighter’s greater agility and different design.352   
The combination of all these factors meant that TAC’s accident rate climbed alarmingly 
rate from 1974 to 1977, with 1976 being the worst year for crashes in the command’s history.  
The high number of losses in aircraft and corresponding numbers in aircrew deaths caused great 
consternation both within and outside of the Air Force.  Officers of the Air Staff and members of 
Congress openly questioned the utility of ACM training in the modern combat arena.  Rather 
than listening to those who believed the training was excessive, Dixon increased the directed 
amount of ACM training in 1977.  He also directed that this training be conducted year round, at 
low altitude, and at night. Moreover, in collusion with the Navy, Dixon conducted unsanctioned 
joint dissimilar ACM training between USAF F-15s, F-4s, and USN F-14s off the Virginia coast 
during this same period.  In all cases, Dixon stressed that these sorties were necessary for the 
USAF to carry out its wartime mission according to its new doctrine.
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In this environment, the “iron majors” became critical to success.  While TAC conducted 
regular operational inspections, forced wings to practice “wartime surge” operations, and 
performed all of the myriad administrative tasks of a major combatant command, majors and 
lieutenant colonels oversaw daily flight operations.  These same officers, in conjunction with 
their wing commanders, ensured that captains and lieutenants did the necessary academic work.  
Finally, and most importantly, the field grades began to conduct impromptu meetings and 
discussions, both in person and via professional journals.  The Fighter Weapons Review was the 
most prominent of the latter, but field grade officers also discussed the Air Force’s role in 
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national policy, conventional deterrence, and weapons development within the pages of The Air 
University Review.
354
 
 Win Every Fight: Individual Pilot Training in ACM 
These formal and informal discussions of SEAD doctrine led to a gradual, but 
revolutionary change in how the Air Force viewed the destruction of hostile airpower.  
Throughout Vietnam, the USAF had clung to its World War II / Korean mindset that air 
superiority was gained through either smashing the enemy on his airfields or shooting down 
large numbers of his fighters in the air.  The former had been reinforced by the Israelis’ success 
in the Six Day War, and seemed relatively straightforward.  The latter was more difficult, but 
was usually achieved by virtue of determining which pilots were the best at destroying enemy 
aircraft, then giving said individuals every possible chance to do so.  It was in this manner, Air 
Force senior leaders believed through the end of Vietnam, that American forces had achieved air 
supremacy in both theaters in World War II and Korea.
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By 1974, General Dixon and most of the TAC community began to consider this 
construct irrelevant.  The Warsaw Pact, having seen the contrast between the IAF’s relative 
ineffectiveness in striking EAF and SAF airfields in 1973 compared to 1967, began to emphasize 
hardening its own aircraft shelters in the 1970s.  Although hostile runways remained a vulnerable 
asset that both NATO and USAF targeted, airfields were also heavily defended by SAMs.  Over 
North Vietnam, attempting to emphasize an elite “ace culture” had certainly not worked for the 
USAF, and was actually considered detrimental by many of F-4 escort pilots during Operation 
Linebacker.  Finally, during the Yom Kippur War the EAF and SAF’s MiGs had effectively 
operated as “disruptors” rather than attempting to seize air supremacy in any meaningful way.356 
In this instance, the Air Force’s field grades led the push for change.  By 1975 the 
Fighter Weapons Review began to emphasize that Warsaw Pact fighters would have to be 
destroyed in the air.  More importantly, articles by the “iron majors” emphasized that this would 
have to be done by all USAF pilots, not only those tasked with air-to-air as their DOC specialty.  
According to these formal articles as well as the informal professional circles created in the 
aftermath of Vietnam, all TAC aircrews had an obligation to prepare to defeat enemy aircraft 
from the first day of a potential conflict.  Indeed, according to the Fighter Weapons Review, the 
only way the Air Force (and by extension, NATO) was going to win a potential Central 
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European fighter was if every officer in TAC prepared on a daily basis for ACM.  Furthermore, 
this admonition applied to every officer in TAC, from the most junior second lieutenant flying 
A-7s to an F-15 wing commander.  While the Eagle was far more likely to have an opportunity 
to destroy MiGs, numbers and expected roles meant the Corsair II pilot could not expect to 
simply hope he would never have to defend himself against enemy aircraft.
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Expressing this opinion in the Fighter Weapons Review was one thing, but many mid-
level officers knew these opinions had been voiced before under General Momyer.  However, in 
the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and constant losses to Aggressors, the Fighter Weapons’ 
School’s field grade officers decided to take matters into their own hands.  The first step was to 
simply rewrite their organization’s training curriculum to introduce the Navy’s “Loose Deuce” 
system as the “Double Attack” formation.  Rather than outright copying the Navy’s tactics, the 
Fighter Weapons School actually made the formation more aggressive.  This was done by 
emphasizing that if either the #2 or #4 were the first to sport an enemy aircraft, they were to 
report it and then immediately attack.  The #1 and #3, while ostensibly more senior, were in turn 
to support the offensive maneuver until either the enemy aircraft was destroyed or the situation 
let them resume leading their pair or flight.
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This upending of the previously established Air Force system was not done with official 
sanction.  Indeed, no flag officer was tacitly consulted, nor was the decision staffed through 
normal channels before implementation.  However, once he was made aware of it, General 
Dixon defended it against any outside interference or attempts to reverse it.  The new “Double 
Attack” method, as well as realistic air-to-air training, was codified in 1976 with the publication 
of TACM 51-50.  Provided with regulatory sanction, iron majors at the squadron and wing levels 
ensured their commands vigorously practiced the new tactic.  Although not quite a full scale 
“revolt,” this was a prime example of how change was sparked from below and underwritten by 
above.
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The effect of the change on ACM capability was marked.  The USAF Aggressor 
squadrons, in 2 versus 2, 4 versus 4, and full squadron versus squadron fights initially had their 
own way when first introduced in 1973.  By 1977, DOC air-to-air pilots were beginning to 
become proficient in spotting, engaging, and “destroying” the smaller F-5s / T-38s in ACM by 
the second or third day of a week-long Aggressor visit.  In the same time frame TAC pilots 
specializing in air-to-ground operations, while not gaining the same level of proficiency, were 
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certainly not as hapless as their Operation Linebacker predecessors had been.  When General 
Dixon turned over command of TAC to General Wilbur Creech in 1978, the Aggressor 
squadrons noted that they were often defeated by the F-15 and F-16 air-to-air squadrons on the 
first day in full squadron engagements and had mixed results when conducting flight and pair 
ACM maneuvers.  Externally, when facing NATO or other allied aircraft in exercises, DOC air-
to-air units were consistently besting their friendly counterparts in a lopsided manner.  Thus, by 
1979, it was clear to internal USAF observers and allies alike that the DOC system and its 
supporting doctrine had succeeded in increasing the Air Force’s capabilities against the expected 
Warsaw Pact MiGs.
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 The Construction of Red Flag 
After Vietnam, the Air Force had begun to understand that modern aerial warfare was 
roughly analogous to a symphony of destruction.  Although new equipment and the changing of 
the Air Force’s training system were important, these were the equivalent of giving talented 
musicians new instruments and a chance to play in their respective sections.  What CORONET 
HARVEST, the Red Baron reports, Blue Flag, and other exercises seemingly indicated was a 
need for the proverbial “concert hall” in order to achieve the necessary synergistic effects in a 
training environment.  In the aftermath of Vietnam, many Air Force officers, both relatively 
junior field grades and senior flag officers, believed that the key to lower losses in any 
contingency operation was for pilots to perform their wartime tasks in as close a simulation of 
wartime as possible.  Only in learning how to coordinate aerial refueling, electronic warfare, 
fighter escort, SEAD and, finally, ordnance delivery in real time would flight, squadron, and 
wing commanders gain the necessary experience in peace to avoid costly casualties in a 
conflict’s initial stages.361 
The concept for developing this training area, designated “Red Flag,” is usually credited 
to then Major Richard “Moody” Suter.  Captain John Vickery, a F-4D pilot, is in turn listed most 
often as the officer who turned the concept into the information paper circulated amongst the Air 
Staff.  Various other Air Force officers, civilians, and veterans played a crucial role in 
conducting the coordination to bring together the disparate pieces to make Suter’s concept a 
reality.  To replicate the Warsaw Pact’s SAMs, Suter recommended that Army air defense units 
use both their own systems and SAMs captured by the Israeli Defense Forces.  Defense industry 
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manufacturers were asked to provide material solutions to eventually develop range 
instrumentation that would track, evaluate, and record engagements in order to provide a higher 
fidelity than human umpires.  Various Department of Defense intelligence organizations and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were asked to provide the most accurate information 
available on Warsaw Pact systems.  Preparations complete, Major Suter briefed General Dixon 
on the final plan in May 1975.
362
 
The TAC commander immediately took to Suter’s proposal.  So strong was Dixon’s 
support, he reallocated funds allotted to other operational inspections and requirements in order 
to rapidly initiate of Red Flag exercises.  In addition, Dixon made it known that none of the 
senior officers at Nellis Air Force would have their careers adversely affected if there were a 
high number of crashes in the first few exercises.  To ensure continued Army participation, 
Dixon personally invited General DePuy to observe Red Flag as his guest in early 1976.
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Finally, Dixon set in motion the development of Tonopah Air Force Base, Nevada, as a facility 
for the most realistic training aids the Air Force had: its very own MiGs.  Through these and 
various other methods, Dixon signaled his support of Red Flag and protected it against members 
of the Air Staff and SAC who considered it to be a dangerous, wasteful use of Air Force 
resources.
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This combination of field grade preparation and flag officer support culminated in Red 
Flag’s first exercise in December 1975.  Dubbed “Red Flag 75-1,” the training event involved 
only a single squadron of F-4 Phantoms.  From these austere beginnings, Red Flags grew to 
multi-squadron events by 1976.  Red Flag 78-2, flown in December 1977, became the first 
iteration to add night missions.
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  By 1979, the Royal Air Force (RAF), West German Luftwaffe, 
and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) had all participated in Red Flags.  Although the general 
consensus by 1980 was that Red Flag’s capabilities remained several years behind the actual 
Warsaw Pact’s, it was seen as a vast improvement over what had come before it.  Slowly but 
surely, TAC had begun realistic training that would help demonstrate its growing capability to 
NATO allies.
366
    
The Air Force Publishes New Doctrine 
When General Dixon relinquished command of TAC to General Wilbur Creech on 1 May 
1978, he provided his successor with a far more capable force than he had inherited.  Despite 
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having a budget crippled by inflationary pressures, increased system costs, and sharply disparate 
guidance from the Ford and Carter Administrations, General Dixon had accomplished a great 
deal with TAC.  In support of the service’s primary mission, he had strengthened coordination 
between TAC and USAFE in preparation for reinforcing the latter should a Central European 
conflict arise.  He had also used his own personal connections to coordinate interservice training 
and doctrine development with the United States Navy and Army.  In Red Flag, General Dixon 
had developed a training facility that served both to develop USAF combat capability in a 
realistic environment and also emphasize to allies the service’s ability to perform its wartime 
mission.  Finally, in conjunction with the Army’s General DePuy, General Dixon had done much 
to erase the schisms caused between the services during Vietnam.  Throughout all these steps, 
TAC’s commander had explicitly and implicitly insisted that his subordinates and staff solve the 
problem of the Warsaw Pact IADS.  Although he did not wholly succeed in all of these 
endeavors, his influence on the topic would be seen in the final edition of AFM 1-1 published 
before the Cold War’s conclusion. 
 February 1979 Edition of AFM 1-1 
The February 1979 edition of AFM 1-1, according to its authors, was designed to answer 
four questions (emphasis, centering, and spacing as per the original): 
 
Why do we need military forces?  
Why do we need an Air Force? 
How do we build an Air Force? 
How do you best use an Air Force?367 
 
The subsequent pages after these four questions were, in stark contrast to previous 
editions of AFM 1-1, direct and simple answers to these questions.  The military existed to 
provide the National Command Authority with “a clear and unmistakable capability to apply 
force to meet any known or potential threat, and to win the military objectives that support[ed] 
national policies.”368 This was accomplished by maintaining a “dual triad” of forces at the 
strategic and theater level to “meet possible military threats throughout the spectrum of 
warfare.”369  Primarily, the intent of these forces was to, in conjunction with allied forces, deter 
threats so that conflict was not necessary. 
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Within this framework of military force, the USAF was expected to execute several 
responsibilities related to aerospace operations.  Tellingly, the first listed purpose for the Air 
Force was to “[c]onduct prompt and sustained combat operations in the air to defeat enemy 
airpower.”370  Moreover, this was listed separately and distinctly from “[p]rovide forces for 
strategic air warfare.”371  In other words, for the first time since its inception, the Air Force 
clearly considered the defeat of enemy airpower to be a separate and distinct mission from the 
execution of strategic air warfare.  The document continued to emphasize this fact by outlining 
the Air Force’s responsibilities in theater conflict and discussing how theater air superiority 
would be achieved in subsequent chapters.  Finally, strategic bombers were cast as an aspect of 
the strategic triad and thus part of the “nuclear umbrella,” thus implicitly indicating that B-52s 
and FB-111s would only be used in times of extreme national peril.
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  The Air Force, at least in 
doctrine, seemed to have abandoned the concept of strategic attack against the Warsaw Pact or 
other major theater opponents. 
In contrast to deemphasizing strategic bombing, support of the Army and allied land 
forces was given increased primacy throughout the new AFM 1-1.  In everything from tactical 
close air support to strategic airlift, the Air Force codified most of the tentative agreements 
reached between General DePuy and General Dixon during the TAC-TRADOC initiatives.  
AFM 1-1 emphasized the coordination of Air Force efforts with the land commander’s 
operational concept when planning close air support or battlefield air interdiction.  Whether 
cutting enemy lines of communication or directly attacking his formations, USAF assets were to 
shape their operations with a view towards achieving the land component’s tactical and 
operational gains.  The Air Force, it seemed, had abandoned thoughts of achieving operational 
victory solely through the application of airpower.  While not a full subordination to the Army, 
the February 1979 edition of AFM 1-1 was an acknowledgment that modern warfare and the 
Central European mission both required success by conventional land forces.
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Another acknowledgment that much had changed in the past decade was AFM 1-1’s 
discussion of what was necessary to achieve air supremacy.  Innocuously entitled “Counterair 
Operations,” the section devoted to “gaining and maintaining air supremacy” specifically 
acknowledged the role of defense suppression in modern operations.
374
  Indeed, rather than 
implying that SEAD was a tactical task of secondary importance, AFM 1-1 stated that defense 
suppression tasks “must be fully integrated” in order to achieve air supremacy that enabled 
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support of ground maneuver.
375
  After the travails of Vietnam, the Israeli experience during Yom 
Kippur, and four years of exercises, the Air Force had finally directed that SEAD be planned for 
in order to achieve its other tasks.  This was a watershed moment in Air Force doctrine, and it 
would shape the following decade in ways that greatly enhanced both USAF training, 
procurement and, in at least one case, combat operations. 
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Chapter 5: From the Valley to the Canyon 
The Air Force made no significant changes to its SEAD doctrine between April 1979 and 
January 1980.  However, the doctrine espoused in the February 1979 edition of AFM 1-1 had far 
reaching effects on how the Air Force trained to execute its SEAD mission.  In turn, these 
training methods, the Air Force’s improvements in airframes and weapons and, finally, combat 
experience were indicative of the Air Force’s increased capability.  In January 1980, military 
analysts, NATO military leaders, and domestic American observers all questioned the Air 
Force’s ability to project power, thus indicating a lack of conventional deterrence.   By 
December 1985, not only would the Air Force’s projected capabilities have improved, but its 
weaponry and methods would have been proven in combat operations.  
State of the Air Force, January 1980 
Organizationally, the Air Force had shrunk to three major commands from the four with 
which it had begun the 1970s.  With the absorption of the fighters from the Air Defense 
Command into Air Defense, Tactical Air Command (ADTAC) in 1979, TAC became the sole 
controlling headquarters for developing fighter combat doctrine.  Given the Soviet Union’s 
increasing reliance on ICBMs and low number of strategic bombers, ADTAC began to be seen 
as an Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve mission rather than one conducted by the Air 
Force’s regular component.  Still, ADTAC continued to be funded and equipped with modern 
fighters, with the latter continuing to provide support to Red Flag exercises.
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Operationally, in 1980 the standard unit remained the Tactical Fighter Wing with its 
usual organization of 2-3 squadrons of 16-24 fighters.  European TFWs continued to be 
modernized, with the F-4D being phased out of USAFE service to be replaced by F-4Es as the 
latter was in turn replaced by new Eagles.  Within the United States, F-15 production increased 
as President Carter’s final defense budget increased the number of Eagles purchased.  Israel and 
Saudi Arabia also began taking deliveries of the big fighter, with the IAF conducting its first 
combat operations on 27 June1979.  As for the F-16, the Air Force’s plan to expedite the 
Falcon’s introduction by replacing two wings in USAFE by 1980 was delayed by the Carter 
Administration’s decision to allocate fifty of the new fighters to American allies in the Middle 
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East.  Even with this diversion, however, the Air Force had managed to field its first F-16 wing 
in January 1979 at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.
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Training for the employment of these new fighters continued to be driven by the doctrine 
espoused in AFM 1-1.  This was supplemented by local unit tactics, techniques, and procedures 
and TAC manuals published or updated in the first two years of General Creech’s stint as TAC 
commander.  The Air Force also found new areas to train in and allies to exercise with.  In 
addition to Red Flag, TAC squadrons were regularly invitees to the RCAF’s biannual Maple 
Flag exercises.  Complementing these two sites in North America, USAFE squadrons and their 
NATO counterparts were given access to several of the RAF’s range complexes in northern 
Scotland, while PACAF forces conducted Cope North in the vicinity of Guam.  Although none 
of the European or Pacific exercises replicated the full panoply of an IADS as Red Flag did, they 
still provided opportunities to develop techniques for evading interceptors, dropping live 
ordnance, and conducting dissimilar ACM.
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Strategically, the Air Force’s stance and posture had not changed from relying on both 
strategic bombers and ICBMs.  However, SAC began to increase its participation in Red Flags 
beginning in 1978.  These exercises led to B-52 cell commanders growing increasingly 
independent in their planning and execution of missions.
379
  In addition, development of new 
nuclear capabilities (the AGM-88 Air Launched Cruise Missile) and further refinement of old 
technologies (the AGM-69 SRAM) within SAC supported concurrent conventional weapons 
capabilities.
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  Despite this, in general the Carter administration’s attempts to update ICBM 
basing, upgrade the missile fleet, and modernize the B-52 all suffered from a lack of 
Congressional support.   
TAC, on the other hand, benefited from President Carter’s negative foreign policy 
experiences, the Soviet Union’s perceived bellicosity, and the increased attention the American 
electorate gave to military strength.  Compared to the first two budgets Carter presented to 
Congress, the FY 79 and FY 80 budgets both requested increased outlays to purchase more 
tactical fighters and conventional weaponry for the Air Force.  These attempts to strengthen the 
Air Force, however, did not seem to cause a commensurate reassurance of domestic or foreign 
military analysts’ opinions of the United States’ military ability.  Both within the Pentagon and 
its foreign counterparts, there were grave doubts about the U.S. Air Force’s ability to support 
anticipated treaty obligations in wartime.
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 Deterrence at the End of Détente 
It is easy to assess both allies’ and domestic observers’ views of the United States Air 
Force’s conventional capability due to the plethora of articles and books published between 1976 
through 1981.  The most well-known work that presents NATO allies’ opinions is Sir John 
Hackett’s The Third World War, August 1985.  A former commander of NORTHAG, Hackett 
gathered together NATO senior officers who had all held major commands in their respective 
nations’ military to evaluate a potential Central European conflict occurring on the eponymous 
date.  Basing the outcome on several wargame sessions, Hackett intended his work to be more a 
cautionary tale than one of popular fiction.  Establishing a possible casus belli involving Soviet 
excesses in Eastern Europe leading to what is intended as a limited war, Hackett’s scenario posits 
a major conflict that the West wins only through the purchase of sufficient numbers of 
sophisticated weaponry.  Lest the reader believe that The Third World War, August 1985 is 
meant to imply that enough is already being done, Hackett quickly dispels this notion in his 
afterword.  Stating “[t]here is also a very high probability that unless the West does a good deal 
within the next few years to improve its defences a war with the Warsaw Pact could end in early 
disaster,” The Third World War concludes by outlining that then current defense plans and 
expenditures are hopelessly insufficient.
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  This belief that NATO was inferior in conventional forces was especially telling with 
regard to airpower.  NATO, having established Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe 
(COMAAFCE) in 1974 to exert centralized control of the alliance’s airpower, had also 
reorganized its subordinate aerial headquarters.  2
nd
 Allied Tactical Air Force remained 
established in support of NORTHAG, with German Luftwaffe units in southern West Germany 
joining the bulk of USAFE as the 4 ATAF.  In Hackett’s opinion, 2 and 4 ATAF would be able 
to complete their missions only if they were provided “area-denial and cluster weapons…in 
abundance,” since NATO’s aircraft would not be able to employ precision guided munitions in 
sufficient numbers to affect the battlefield given the Warsaw Pact’s air defenses.383  In Hackett’s 
estimation, only investments in human capital, sophisticated platforms, and increased pilot 
training would allow NATO’s air arm to influence a ground war.  Even then, it would be a near 
run thing that would require stripping NATO forces from Southern Europe and a wholesale 
commitment of reinforcements from TAC.  Failing any of these, the air arm would not be able to 
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influence the ground battle, leading to the eventual need for release of tactical nuclear weapons 
or to Western Europe’s subjugation to a Soviet military threat.384  
An even grimmer estimate than Hackett’s was the similarly titled World War 3.  Edited 
by Shelford Bidwell, a former British brigadier, World War 3 gathered a similarly esteemed 
panel of analysts and experts to provide their viewpoint on a potential war in Central Europe.  
Like Hackett, Bidwell and his group believed that the increased sophistication of NATO’s 
weapons did redress the numerical imbalance in 1978.  However, World War 3 posited that 
NATO’s parsimony and the overwhelming strength of Warsaw Pact numbers would surely lead 
to the former employing nuclear weapons.  Unlike the limited exchange discussed in Third 
World War, Bidwell and his companions’ scenario concluded with a general exchange that 
resulted in civilization’s destruction.385   
Unsurprisingly, Bidwell’s projection concerning aerial combat was also pessimistic. Due 
to the disparity of training levels among NATO allies and the continued use of obsolescent 
aircraft by some European nations, World War 3 assumed that the Warsaw Pact would manage to 
keep the kill ratio at 2:1 in aerial combat.  Furthermore, given publicly available information on 
weapons procurement, Bidwell’s team estimated that the NATO air arms would run out of 
standoff munitions within the first 48 hours of the war beginning, while the United States Air 
Force would follow suit less than a day later.  This meant, in Bidwell’s opinion, that all NATO 
aircraft would have to penetrate into the heart of the Warsaw Pact air defense envelope.  Based 
both on the recent wars in Southeast Asia and the Middle East as well as the outcome of 
exercises such as Red Flag, the expert opinion of Bidwell’s team was that the resultant losses 
would render NATO airpower not nearly as effective as it would need to be to affect the ground 
war.  Only the training and skill of individual NATO aircrews, improvements in the alliance’s 
electronic warfare, and the Warsaw Pact’s expected profligate use of ammunition would allow 
the air attacks to make any headway against the second echelon at all.  This failure would in turn 
contribute mightily to the eventual tactical nuclear exchange that would spiral out of control and 
become a general nuclear conflict.
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These grim views of NATO’s chances in a conventional war were also held within the 
United States.  In a 1979 report, the Congressional Budget Office stated it could “only 
acknowledge that air forces (both Warsaw Pact and NATO) could affect the battle” as opposed 
to playing the decisive role USAF had planned.
387
 However, the report’s authors proceeded to 
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indicate that these effects would be so negligible that air attacks would basically be ignored 
when determining force ratios.  The report then went on to highlight the modernization of 
Warsaw Pact forces, to include air defense units, and how this negatively impacted NATO’s 
ability to mass firepower of all kinds against Warsaw Pact forces.
388
  In professional journals, 
senior RAF officers and USAF field grades both questioned whether NATO’s airpower would be 
rendered ineffective by a combination of the Warsaw Pact’s improved air defenses and Europe’s 
inclement weather.
389
  Given that deterrence relied on convincing allies, domestic decision 
makers, and opponents alike that the United States Air Force could project power, the situation 
was less than optimal as the United States began turning away from détente. 
Transition to the Reagan Administration 
Ronald Reagan’s victory in the 1980 election signaled a change in the United States’ 
Cold War strategy.  Although not the revolutionary paradigm shift often claimed by Reagan’s 
admirers, some Cold War historians, and members of his administration, President Reagan still 
caused a major change in the United States’ strategic guidance.  Presidents Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter had largely decided to accept the Soviet Union as a necessary adversary and spent the 
majority of their time in office avoiding overt confrontation.  President Reagan, on the other 
hand, ran on the platform of confronting the U.S.S.R. politically, diplomatically, economically 
and, militarily.  Borrowing heavily from some aspects of President Eisenhower’s strategic 
outlook, President Reagan believed that America’s path to success lay in invigorating the 
economy in order to finance increasing military strength.  Only when relative strategic and 
conventional parity had been achieved would the United States be able to compel the Soviet 
Union to step back from the perceived bellicosity of the Brezhnev Doctrine.  In turn, a less 
aggressive Soviet Union could then be engaged diplomatically and politically on issues such as 
human rights, arms agreements, and establishment of a mutually palatable world order.
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 Strength at All Levels of Conflict 
Strategically, the Reagan administration almost immediately began to reverse what they 
perceived as the Carter administration’s miscues.  The Reagan administration immediately 
sought to revive the M-X missile and the B-1 bomber as counters to perceived Soviet nuclear 
superiority.  Simultaneously, the administration also asked Congress for increased funding for 
the Trident missile system and further development of the land attack version of the Tomahawk 
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cruise missile.  Finally, Reagan began to publicly discuss establishing an anti-ballistic missile 
defense system known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.
391
   
The sum effect of these strategic initiatives, contrary to the rhetoric of the time, was to 
greatly decrease the chances of a thermonuclear exchange.  As with the Soviet development of a 
credible ICBM force, the United States’ increased capabilities created a quandary for the 
U.S.S.R.’s strategic planners.  It is arguable whether the U.S.S.R. ever possessed the capability 
to deliver a “first strike” that would destroy the United States’ ICBM and bomber capabilities.  
Thankfully the hypothesis that the Strategic Rocket Forces could do so, held to various degrees 
by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, was never put to the test.  However, in 
modernizing SAC and the USN’s SSBN fleet, publicly renouncing the SALT treaties, and raising 
the specter of SDI, the Reagan administration successfully negated many of the perceived 
advances the U.S.S.R. had made from 1972 through 1979.  In addition, it served notice to the 
Soviet leadership that their already strained economy would face additional challenges if they 
wished to maintain the current strategic balance.
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 The Reagan Administration and NATO 
This strategic impasse affected the development of USAF conventional preparations in 
general and SEAD doctrine in particular in several ways.  First and foremost, it increased both 
the United States and NATO European nations’ focus on conventional warfare.  The Carter 
administration’s efforts in the last two years of its existence had begun an era of increased 
defensive cooperation.  With the outcome of elections in Great Britain (1979), France (1981), 
and West Germany (1982), the Reagan administration was able to build on this foundation by 
successfully encouraging their chief Western allies to increase spending on conventional arms.  
In addition, the Reagan administration coordinated with its NATO allies to increase emphasis on 
deployment exercises, command post exercises, and maneuvers beginning in 1982 and 
continuing through 1986.
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 Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s Guidance 
The intent of these various operations was to demonstrate American resolve and 
increased capability.  The primary architect behind redesigning the United States’ conventional 
forces so that these capabilities seemed credible was Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger.  
Secretary Weinberger felt that a strengthened defense was “the most important of [Reagan’s] 
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foreign policy” and conducted his conventional modernization plans according.394  To 
Weinberger, the United States had already established a qualitative edge in technology due to the 
weapon systems designed after the Yom Kippur and Vietnam Wars.  The problem with the 
Carter administration, at least from Weinberger’s point of view, had been that these systems had 
not been purchased in sufficient quantity.  Nor had the military in general and the Air Force in 
particular been given enough money to adequately train on their new systems to gain 
proficiency.  Finally, although the Air Force’s new systems (e.g., the Eagle, Falcon, Sentry, etc.) 
all had, at the time of purchase, the ability to be modified and made even more capable, the 
Carter Administration had consistently refused to request funds for upgrades from Congress.
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Weinberger’s plan to reverse these shortcomings was simple.  First, one of President 
Reagan’s first acts was to ask Congress for more funding for FY 81 and FY 82.  Second, 
Weinberger loosened the restrictions on the transfer of military technology among the United 
States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany.  Finally, although a significant portion of this 
increased funding would be put towards strategic weapons, Weinberger directed that the majority 
of the Air Force’s increased budget be devoted to weapons and training that would support 
conventional operations.
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General Creech and Modernizing TAC 
The officer who set in motion most of this modernization was General Dixon’s successor 
at TAC, General Wilbur L. Creech.  A former fighter pilot, General Creech had been selected as 
TAC’s commander after serving time as a flag officer in USAFE.  Creech had also overseen the 
Air Force’s development of command and control systems, electronic warfare, and long-range 
communications as the head of Systems Command.  During his time there, Creech had initiated a 
procedure through which the Air Force set a cost cap for a given system, asked Congress for that 
amount of money, then ensured that the program came underneath that budget.  First used during 
the E-3 Sentry’s acquisition process, this methodology would serve Creech in good stead as head 
of TAC.
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Although General Creech and General Dixon shared much the same mindset about the 
Warsaw Pact’s conventional threat, the two men differed on what aspect of it held primacy.  
General Dixon’s experiences and analysis had caused him to fear the WP-IADS’s capabilities 
with regard to the SAM and MiGs ability to destroy aircraft or force them to jettison their 
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ordnance.  General Creech’s own time in USAFE and other staff positions led him to be 
concerned more with the Warsaw Pact’s advantages in electronic warfare.  Specifically, Creech 
firmly believed that USAF and its NATO counterparts were woefully unprepared to deal with 
Soviet jamming of both radars and communications equipment.  In Creech’s mind, the finest 
weapons in the world were going to be useless if they could not communicate. Having spent the 
first two years of his tenure focusing on decreasing TAC’s number of crashes without 
compromising realism, by 1981 Creech had decided to make marked changes in the way tactical 
fighters prepared to defeat an IADS.
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 Electronic Warfare 
Creech’s initial steps in convincing the service of the need to pay attention to electronic 
warfare (EW) had been to ensure its inclusion in AFM 1-1.
399
  The next step was to provide hard 
evidence of the threat’s seriousness to the fighter community.  This was done by creating an 
exercise called “Green Flag” in 1981.  Occurring concurrently with Red Flag, Green Flag was 
based on the employment of jammers against the participating USAF and allied aircraft’s radios.  
This was a particularly brutal introduction to the effects of electronic warfare, as “[s]eventy-two 
percent of the [training unit] sorties were ineffective.”  The Air Force, having not faced effective 
electronic warfare over Vietnam, had simply assumed that they would always be able to 
communicate over their radio networks.  The initial Green Flag, followed by subsequent 
iterations, proved just how dangerous this assumption had been.
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Defensively, this caused the Air Force to “get religion,” especially as Creech directed that 
Green Flags would continue to be conducted biannually with designated Red Flag exercises.
 401
  
This also caused SAC to support the development of anti-jamming radios, as continued exercises 
demonstrated that the heavy bomber fleet’s tactical communications were also vulnerable.  After 
the Navy had a strike package similarly crippled during a joint exercise, the USN also lent their 
support to obtaining Congressional authorization to acquire anti-jam radios as well.  Both 
services would begin fielding the new radios by 1986, with immediate improvement being seen 
in subsequent Green Flags.
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 The EF-111 Raven and EC-130 Compass Call 
Offensively, the demonstration of EW’s effectiveness also led the Air Force to increase 
production of the EF-111 Raven as well as fund the development of the EC-130 Compass Call. 
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The former aircraft, as suggested by General Momyer, was intended to accompany a strike 
package into hostile territory.  Unlike General Momyer’s original vision, the EF-111 was not an 
additional Wild Weasel aircraft.  Although the Raven could be armed with Shrike and, later, 
AGM-88 HARM missiles, this was not an optimal use of the airframe due to its poor 
maneuverability and limited numbers.  Instead, the EF-111 was best suited for penetrating the 
initial band of Warsaw Pact defenses with a strike group, then loitering at a distance from a 
target to avoid engagement from short-range SAMs and AAA batteries.  When used in this 
manner, the EF-111 could limit targeting radars’ effectiveness during the final stages of weapons 
delivery, then rejoin the strike group as it egressed out of hostile territory.
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Like the Vietnam-era EB-66 Destroyers, the EC-130 Compass Call lacked the 
performance to penetrate hostile territory.  However, due to it being based on the Air Force’s C-
130 Hercules cargo aircraft, the Compass Call traded its relatively slow speed for a large cargo 
bay, carrying capacity, and loiter time.  These abilities meant it could simultaneously perform 
several critical SEAD functions.  First, in acting as a “barrier jammer,” the EC-130 could prevent 
the Warsaw Pact’s radars from acquiring the E-3 Sentry and tanker aircraft at long range.  
Offensively, the Compass Calls antennae array allowed it to triangulate fire control radars, thus 
providing their location for later targeting by Wild Weasel hunter-killer flights.  Finally, due to 
the EC-130 having more room for jammers than the EF-111, the Compass Call could perform 
these missions while also interfering with Warsaw Pact communications networks.  This would 
help negate the interceptor portion of the triad by preventing communication between 
interceptors and ground control stations or command nodes trying to prevent SAM batteries from 
committing fratricide against interceptors.
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These electronic warfare capabilities were unfamiliar to TAC when first introduced.  
Creech firmly believed that the electronic warfare systems, while not as directly destructive as 
ordnance delivered by Wild Weasels or immediately measurable such as a kill made by a F-15 or 
F-16, would greatly reduce the WP-IADS’s effectiveness if properly planned and employed.  To 
deal with the former, General Creech increased the role of EW during Blue Flag command post 
exercises.  To solve the tactical issue, Creech not only increased the number of Green Flags, but 
also required EF-111 participation in Red Flag exercises.  Even if the Ravens were not always 
allowed to use their full EW capabilities due to U.S. government regulations, planning 
geographical spacing, timing, and actually flying with the Ravens in formation served to help 
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develop strike group tactics and procedures.  In turn, these procedures were disseminated 
through the Fighter Weapons School’s professional publication and bulletins, then formally 
codified into doctrine by TAC.
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 Tactics, Ordnance, and Airframes, 
Electronic warfare procedures were just one facet of SEAD training that General Creech 
sought to adjust.  General Creech made several other changes based on his own interpretation of 
how future conflicts would unfold.  In a sharp departure from his predecessor, General Creech 
directed that TAC increase its percentage of night sorties by up to 70% depending on the 
weapons platform.  This directive was seemingly counterintuitive given Creech’s increased 
insistence on aircraft safety and contemporary Air Force views that night flying was inherently 
dangerous.  From the Air Force’s continued analysis of the Yom Kippur War, NATO 
assessments of Warsaw Pact weapons systems, crew after action reviews of Red Flag rotations, 
and his own operational experience, Creech believed the concealment of darkness would save far 
more aircraft from destruction in the opening weeks of a conflict than would be lost over several 
years of training accidents.  Red Flag increased the number of night sorties flown and also 
diversified the type of aircraft employed through 1986.  Once solely the purview of F-111s, a 
few select F-4 squadrons, and visiting RAF all-weather aircraft, nighttime missions at Red Flag 
by TAC fighters became a regular occurrence by 1984.  TAC Manual 51-50, the aircrew 
qualification “bible,” was also updated to increase the number of nighttime crew, flight, and 
squadron hours required for TFWs to be considered combat ready.  Whether the next conflict 
would come in Europe or elsewhere, TAC (and by extension, USAFE and PACAF) planned to 
conduct 24-hour operations.
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In addition to using night’s cloak to reduce the effectiveness of Warsaw Pact anti-aircraft 
artillery, General Creech was a vocal advocate of lowering vulnerabilities through “stand off,” 
i.e., longer range, accuracy, and the ability to “fire and forget.”  To Creech, the use of Paveway 
weapons in Vietnam had been merely the first step in a precision guided munitions revolution.  
As evidenced by the efforts required to protect Pave Knife F-4s, laser-guided weapons required a 
certain set of conditions to be effective.  Some of this could be mitigated through better 
mountings for the designation pod (e.g., the F-111F’s carriage of Pave Knife in the bomb bay) or 
Pave Penny system that allowed for the reception from ground forces’ laser designators.  
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However, even with these advances, battlefield smoke, dust, or other obscurants still made laser 
guidance a relative dead end.
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The Air Force’s System Command had spent most of the 1970s working on alternative 
methods for weapons’ guidance.  The military technicians were aided by developments in 
computer technology and modern imaging in the private sector, which in turn allowed for the 
miniaturization of infrared imaging equipment.  This led to what the military designated as 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors.  Creech believed that placing these sensors on 
airframes, either inside the aircraft or in external pods, would allow even “day fighters” (e.g., the 
F-16) to conduct night operations.  Furthermore, Creech believed that developing a new strike 
aircraft with this capability and laser designation was a critical task for Air Force Systems 
Command.  As head of TAC, Creech was a strenuous advocate for both the LANTIRN (as the 
proposed FLIR pods were known)  and a new strike aircraft (based on either the F-16 or F-15) in 
order to allow USAF strike packages to be as effective at night and in bad weather as they 
currently were in daylight.
408
 
 F-117 Nighthawk 
Complementing this change to constant operations was an improvement to TAC’s basic 
airframes.  While the proposed Strike Eagle would only be in the technology development phase 
by 1986, the Air Force began to field the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk, the famous “Stealth 
Fighter,” in 1983.  Capitalizing on decades of research, the F-117 employed special materials 
and angular construction to deflect hostile radar signals away from their transmitters.  In this 
manner, the aircraft’s radar cross section was similar to that of a large bird and was thus ignored 
by most fire control or tracking computers.  In order to achieve this capability, the Nighthawk’s 
designers were constrained in the choices of power plant, ordnance, and fuselage shape.  With its 
limited top speed and maneuverability, the F-117 was not a fighter despite its designation.  
However, in the hours of darkness, it was nearly invisible to most contemporary Warsaw Pact 
radars until it was conducting weapons delivery.
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TAC’s planners, in conjunction with USAFE’s staff, prepared a list of targets that the F-
117 would be expected to strike in the opening hours of a European conventional conflict.  Chief 
among these were the known WP-IADS’s command posts and long-range radars located in East 
Germany.  Although concerns for secrecy precluded the USAF from deploying the fighter to 
Europe, Nighthawks were regularly tested against captured Soviet and Western radars over 
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Tenopah from 1983 into1986.  For those individuals aware of the project, the F-117 was 
considered a powerful capability that would allow USAFE and NATO to rapidly degrade the 
WP-IADS’s ability to synchronize its SAMs and interceptors.410 
In addition to developing the Nighthawk, the Air Force also updated the F-111F with 
improved avionics, an upgraded bombing computer, and increased guided munitions capabilities.  
These were expected to make the Aardvark more lethal against WP-IADS command nodes as 
well as to facilitate the destruction of fixed SAM sites.  To help reduce the threat from enemy 
interceptors, the Air Force also provided the entire F-111 fleet with the ability to deliver the 
Durandal anti-runway bomb beginning in 1983.  Under General Creech, TAC doctrine began to 
state expressly that one of the F-111’s primary missions in the initial stages of war would be 
counter-airfield strikes, followed closely by attacks on other IADS critical points.  Rather than an 
afterthought supplementing the main aerial effort attacking advancing Warsaw Pact forces, 
General Creech intended the F-111 to help set the conditions for NATO air superiority.
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 New Eagles 
To improve their ability to defeat airborne Warsaw Pact fighters, USAF fighter wings 
began to replace their initial F-15As with improved “C” models in 1979.  The C models, despite 
being almost cosmetically identical, were a vast improvement due to numerous internal 
modifications.  The most important of these was a new radar coupled with a digital fire control 
unit that allowed the F-15C to acquire, track, and engage a target far faster than the original 
Eagle.  In addition, the new computer and radar allowed for the rapid sorting of targets from 
ground clutter, allowing the Eagle to engage targets at low-altitude while maintaining an altitude 
advantage.  Finally, the Air Force undertook a maintenance modernization program that 
increased both the A and C-model Eagles’ operational readiness rate. 412  
 Missile Development 
Complementing the Air Force’s improvement to the F-15s airframe were the steps the 
USAF took to modernize its missiles.  As a result of the Red Baron study, General Dixon had 
made improvement of missiles a priority for TAC.  Similarly motivated to increase the 
Sparrow’s lethality, the Navy also aided in this developmental process by focusing on improving 
the missile’s rocket motor.  As a result, both services began to field the AIM-7F variant in 1976.  
With improved electronics, a long-range motor, and larger warhead in 1976, the AIM-7F was a 
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marked improvement over the Vietnam-era E-model Sparrow.  Almost as important as the 
missile’s internal modifications, the Air Force also developed a maintenance regime that 
increased the weapon’s reliability. 413 
Despite these advances and the weapon’s adaptation by NATO and the IAF, testing and 
Israeli combat experience made it readily apparent that further improvements were called for.  
Most glaringly, the AIM-7F remained highly susceptible to electronic countermeasures and 
ground clutter.  After briefly considering purchasing British (Sky Flash) or Italian (Aspide) 
variants, USAF System Command instead began to develop an improved AIM-7F.  The 
improved variant would include an even more powerful rocket motor and further incorporation 
of solid-state electronics.  This missile was designated the AIM-7M Sparrow, with the testing 
phase including extensive engagements against targets protected by captured Soviet jammers and 
maneuvering drones operating at low altitude.  The actual production model incorporated most of 
the Aspide and Sky Flash’s improvements while increasing range to over fifty miles.  Adopted in 
1982, the AIM-7M remained the definitive version of the AIM-7 for the remainder of the Cold 
War.
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 For short-range engagements, the Air Force continued to rely upon the AIM-9 
Sidewinder.  The AIM-9J variant used during Operation Linebacker had provided only modest 
improvement over Sidewinders used during Operation Rolling Thunder, thus leading to brief 
attempts to replace the entire missile.  Once these efforts had failed due to cost overruns and 
budget cuts, the Air Force was forced to try other avenues of improvement.  These resulted in the 
AIM-9L, or “Lima” being fielded in 1977.  Like the AIM-7M Sparrows, the AIM-9L took 
advantage of advances in solid state electronics, computer modeling, and tracker technology to 
produce the first heat-seeking missile capable of “all-aspect” engagements.415  This model was 
succeeded by the AIM-9M, or “Mike” variant in early 1982, with the major improvements being 
higher resistance to flare decoys, higher speed, and better control surfaces.  As with the Sparrow, 
both of the new Sidewinders were extensively tested against actively maneuvering drones in 
realistic conditions.  With a maximum range of just over ten miles and a top speed that was a full 
third faster than the AIM-9E/J, the AIM-9L/M suddenly provided both Eagle and Falcon pilots 
with much greater capability in ACM.
416
  
Determining how to best employ these new capabilities was the purview of both the 
Fighter Weapons School and Red Flag.  The former began to propagate new tactics, techniques, 
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and procedures for the F-15 community to use against Warsaw Pact MiGs.  The initial catalyst 
for many of these changes was the Air Force and CIA’s acquisition of MiG-21, MiG-23, and 
MiG-25 airframes from both defectors and former Soviet allies.  As these aircraft were tested 
against F-15s and F-16s, USAF intelligence officers began to realize they had vastly 
overestimated the Flogger’s and Foxbat’s capabilities.  By 1982, this new information had led 
the Eagle and Falcon communities to discuss ways to seize the advantage against Warsaw Pact 
fighters, especially near or just beyond the FEBA.  For the Falcon community, the lack of a 
radar-guided missile limited just how many changes they could make.  Eagle pilots, on the other 
hand, began to discuss conducting repeated “slashing” attacks as a method to rapidly attrit 
Warsaw Pact interceptors.
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Slashing attacks had their genesis during World War II when employed by larger, heavier 
fighters against their lighter opponents.  The tactic’s name derived from how friendly aircraft, 
usually with an altitude and speed advantage, “slashed” through a hostile formation without 
stopping to conduct ACM.  They had fallen out of favor with United States Air Force due to the 
lack of ACM training, perceived lethality of an IADS’s multiple threats, and the Century 
Fighters’ poor maneuverability.  As the Eagle continued into service with the USAF and IAF, 
American and Israeli pilots began to grow more confident in the large fighter’s agility in both the 
horizontal and vertical planes.  At the squadron level, mid-level officers increasingly thought 
about how to use these capabilities against the more rigid and staid Warsaw Pact interception 
tactics.  During exercises against Aggressor squadrons, Eagle pilots began to realize that their 
ability to acquire the smaller F-5Es and T-38s beyond visual range allowed them to “perch” 
above their opponents.  When engaged by simulated long-range missile fire, the Aggressor 
aircraft conducted defensive maneuvers to attempt to break the Eagles’ radar lock-ons, thus 
expending energy and gradually losing the ability to maneuver.  At this point, if the first flight or 
section of Eagles continued to close with the Aggressors and fire head-on shots with 
Sidewinders, the Aggressors would have to conduct further maneuvers to dodge these additional 
shots or be ruled “dead” by Red Flag’s umpires.  The friendly Eagles, on the other hand, could 
continue to pass through at high speed and retain separation from the lighter Aggressors while 
subsequent flights or sections repeated the process.   If the Aggressors attempted to engage the 
second group of Eagles, the first group could then return at high speed from an advantageous 
angle to engage with their remaining heat-seeking AIM-9Ls.
418
 
129 
 
Initial exercises that employed these tactics revealed that they could be quite successful 
against smaller opponents lacking all-aspect missiles.  However, detractors of these changes to 
technique questioned the veracity of the Eagles’s success in the Red Flag environment and 
applicability to a real world scenario.  First, the Red Flag training environment relied heavily on 
ground-based computers to accurately “score” success or failure for both sides.  Although the 
system required both “Red” and “Blue” fighters to carry sensor pods that helped replicate both 
NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons’ effects it was not the real thing.  Second, slashing attacks 
relied heavily on Wild Weasels, electronic jamming and exemplary command and control.  If 
Warsaw Pact SAM systems did not prove as susceptible to EF-111s, EC-130s, or F-4Gs in a 
wartime environment, contemporary analysts warned, even the F-15C’s advanced onboard 
jammers would not prevent subsequent heavy losses.  Lastly, without either an effective ground 
control radar network (e.g., NATO’s SAGE system) or an AWACS aircraft, the Eagles were 
likely to be surprised by additional interceptors in the middle of their attacks.  In exercises after 
exercise, Eagles operating without this support in Red Flag were regularly ambushed by a 
second Aggressor flight.  This then led to a subsequent dogfight in which the second group of 
Eagles was unable to employ their Sparrows, with the Aggressors either inflicting heavy losses 
either on the escort or strike group.
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To the Valley: SEAD Combat Operations, 1981-1982 
Ironically, it was not the United States Air Force that proved their new weapons’ 
lethality.  The first use of the AIM-9L was by the United States Navy during the 19 August 1981 
Gulf of Sidra Incident.  This engagement occurred when two F-14s mounting a combat air patrol 
were attacked by a pair of Libyan Su-22s.  After the Libyan section leader fired an Atoll missile 
from the F-14s’ front-aspect, the USN fighters turned the tables and shot down both Su-22s 
within two minutes.  Despite this outcome, the engagement was not considered much of a 
validation of the AIM-9Ls capabilities because the Libyans were markedly inferior to the USN in 
both training and capability.
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 The Falklands War 
The new Sidewinder’s first full combat test occurred less than eight months later.  On 2 
April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.  Despite extensive economic and military 
ties with the South American nation, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had any 
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indication of the upcoming operation.  Having long claimed the distant, barren islands as 
Argentinian territory, Argentina’s ruling military junta had conducted the operation in order to 
quell domestic unrest by providing a unifying foreign enemy.  The United Kingdom, in response, 
dispatched a naval task force to conduct an amphibious assault to regain their distant possession.  
Inexplicably for two nations that shared several strong military and economic ties, the dispute 
quickly devolved into a short, intense shooting conflict.
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The Argentinian forces held tremendous geographical advantages in the conflict’s initial 
stages.  The United Kingdom’s nearest unoccupied possession to the Falklands was Ascension 
Island.  This was far beyond the range of tactical fighters, so the Royal Air Force (RAF) were 
unable to employ either its new Tornado strike aircraft or its remaining F-4 Phantoms.  For its 
part, the Royal Navy (RN) no longer had any full-sized carriers like the United States Navy’s.  
Instead, the Royal Navy had two smaller carriers, the Hermes and Illustrious, that could carry a 
maximum of 26 and 10 Harrier jet fighters respectively.  Of these 36 fighters, roughly half were 
Fleet Air Arm (FAA) Sea Harriers that were equipped with air-to-air radars with pilots trained in 
aerial combat.  The remaining aircraft were RAF Harriers that were optimized for ground attack 
missions.  Although additional Sea Harriers were deployed to make up for losses, the British 
never had more than twenty fighters available for air combat.
 422
 
Facing the British expedition were the combined forces of the Argentine Air Force 
(AAF) and Naval Aviation (ANA).  These consisted of roughly 50 A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft, 
approximately 16 Dassault Mirage aircraft, an additional 30 Israeli Air Industries Dagger strike 
fighters, and 5 Super Entendard anti-shipping fighters armed with the Exocet missile.   
Counteracting their clear numerical advantage was the fact that all Argentinean strikes required 
tanker support to cross the open ocean from the mainland to the Falkland Islands.  In addition, a 
lack of maritime reconnaissance aircraft made detecting the British fleet difficult until the Royal 
Navy committed to landing in San Carlos Bay on 22 May.  However, even with these modifying 
factors, on paper it appeared to contemporary analysts that the Argentinians would shortly gain 
air superiority and, subsequently, force the Royal Navy to withdraw.  The Daggers and Mirage 
IIIs were faster than the British Harrier and Sea Harrier, with the Argentinean aircraft also 
capable of carrying air-to-air missiles.  Furthermore, given their estimation of British capabilities 
and ability to track FAA patrols, the Argentinians believed their Skyhawks were fast enough to 
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penetrate San Carlos Water, drop their bombs, then escape before the Sea Harriers could 
react.
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As the subsequent conflict proved, both the contemporary analysts and Argentinians 
gravely miscalculated both the Fleet Air Arm’s capabilities and the lethality of the Royal Navy’s 
air defenses.  The British victory’s connection to USAF SEAD doctrine stemmed from two of 
the primary factors in the United Kingdom’s success.  First, the FAA’s wresting of the initiative 
from the Argentinean Air Force followed by their victories of attacking Argentinean aircraft 
proved the value of dissimilar ACM training.  Many of the British Sea Harrier pilots had either 
attended Red Flag exercises as part of United Kingdom’s exchange program or participated in 
dissimilar ACM exercises against USN, USAF, or RAF interceptors.  Therefore, when facing 
Argentinean Mirages on 1 May, the FAA were aware of what steps to take against larger, faster 
fighters.  In contrast, the Argentinean fighters had little understanding of how to engage the 
smaller, nimbler Harriers.  Despite being outnumbered, the Sea Harriers destroyed two Mirages 
in such one-sided fashion that the AAF refused to conduct fighter sweeps for the remainder of 
the conflict.
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In addition to being better trained, the British pilots were better equipped.  The Falklands 
Conflict served as an opportunity for the first use of the new Sidewinders, as the United States 
rushed 200 of the new AIM-9Ls to the United Kingdom in the conflict’s first days.  In contrast, 
AAF aircraft were equipped with either the Israeli Shafrir or AIM-9B Sidewinders that needed to 
be launched from almost directly astern.  The contrast in performance was stark, as the 
Argentinians failed to score a single hit while the Sea Harrier pilots achieved over an 80% 
success rate.
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  So critical was the AIM-9L to British efforts that both Rear Admiral Sandy 
Woodward, the British expedition’s commander, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would 
later credit the Sidewinder as being the most important weapon in the British arsenal.  American 
missiles, it seemed, were as lethal as the USAF claimed.
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In addition to affirming the value of regular ACM training and advances in missile 
technology, the Falklands War also reaffirmed the lethality of modern air defenses.  Both the 
British and Argentinian forces suffered significant losses from radar-guided gunfire and missiles.  
For the Argentinians, the rapidity with which the British established Rapier missiles and anti-
aircraft artillery to support their naval air defense came as an unpleasant shock.  For the FAA / 
RAF attempting to conduct air support operations, the Argentinians’ obsolescent early warning 
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and fire control radars still managed to deny Harriers and Sea Harriers the ability to freely 
conduct close air support operations.  Both the AAF and RAF / FAA fighters had to make 
extensive use of terrain masking, chaff, flares, and electronic countermeasures to minimize their 
losses.  For the British, it was a particularly sobering lesson given the advances the RAF had 
believed it had made since the end of Vietnam.  It would take a conflict several thousand miles 
away to conclusively demonstrate just how far the pendulum had swung back in favor of a well-
prepared attacking force.
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 The Bekaa Valley 
Although the USAF had yet to employ their new fighters in combat, the IAF had already 
demonstrated the F-15s’ and F-16s’ capabilities on several occasions.  The Eagle had scored its 
first air-to-air kill against the Syrian Air Force in June 1979, while the Falcon destroyed a Syrian 
helicopter in April 1981.  This was followed by Operation Opera, the IAF’s long range raid 
against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak on 7 June 1981.  By 1982, IAF F-15s and F-16s had 
destroyed over 20 Syrian MiGs in skirmishes over northern Israel, southern Lebanon, and 
western Syria.  Throughout all of these engagements, the Israelis had escaped without loss due to 
a combination of  planning and their opponents’ shortcomings.  Although the Eagle and Falcon 
were found to be clearly superior to the IAF’s F-4s, the feeling within the IDF was that the newer 
fighters had yet to fully demonstrate their potential.
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The lack of opportunity was due mainly to strenuous diplomatic efforts.  President 
Carter’s push for peace between Egypt and Israel had culminated in a peace treaty between those 
two nations in 1979.  The subsequent return of the Sinai to Egypt and the movement of Egypt 
into the United States’ sphere of influence largely eliminated the threat of another war between 
Israel and Egypt.  In contrast, Israel’s northern border had become even more dangerous due to 
Lebanon’s implosion into a multi-sided civil war in 1975.  Although Syrian intervention had 
briefly reduced the level of violence, by 1979 Lebanon was incapable of enforcing its own 
sovereignty.  This lack of central authority allowed the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) to establish an enclave in southern Lebanon.  The PLO then proceeded to use this enclave 
to strike at northern Israeli settlements and military forces.  To counter this, Israel allied itself 
with Lebanese Christian militias which launched regular attacks against the PLO.  In addition to 
military aid and intelligence, the Israeli Air Force began to provide increasing amounts of air 
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support to the militia in their clashes.  In response, the Syrian Army deployed SAM batteries to 
southern Lebanon in early 1981.  Only intervention by the United States and United Nations, to 
include direct pressure from the Reagan administration on Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin, prevented Israel from immediately launching a ground offensive in response to this 
action.
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Despite this temporary truce, it was readily apparent to external observers that the 
slightest provocation would lead to an Israeli attack north into Lebanon.  Syria’s government 
acted to curtail the PLO’s attacks even as the Syrian Army began to reinforce with additional 
SAM batteries.  Having extended their ground defenses into Lebanon, the Syrians began to 
practice regular aerial interception missions over that country’s southern portion.  In order to 
prevent further escalation, these were controlled from previously established IADS command 
stations in western Syria.  Having established an air defense network, the Syrians then increased 
their ground forces in anticipation of an Israeli attack.  Provided the IAF remained neutralized, 
the Syrian Army was confident a combination of their upgraded equipment, Lebanon’s dense 
terrain, and the IADS neutralization of the IAF would allow them to inflict unacceptable 
casualties on the IDF’s ground forces.430 
 Israeli Preparations 
For their part, the Israeli Air Force had spent the nine years after the Yom Kippur War 
preparing to defeat the Syrian IADS.  After the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force had 
conducted dozens of studies on what had gone wrong.  This had included sending pilots to 
participate in USAF Red Flags as well as establishing their own training facilities in the Negev 
Desert.  The infrastructure at these facilities included the ability to replicate several types of 
SAM emplacements and signatures, from the venerable SA-2 through the more modern SA-6.  
Israeli squadrons repeatedly rehearsed attack runs with live ordnance on these positions, with the 
geographical arrangements modified as Syrian SAM batteries shifted in Lebanon between June 
1981 and June 1982.  Although the test sites were not perfect replicas of southern Lebanon, the 
relative distance and bearings between SAM sites was maintained.  This, in turn, allowed IDF 
squadrons to practice the ingress and egress routes they intended to take when striking the SAM 
locations as well as deconflict timing between separate squadrons.  Electronic and photographic 
reconnaissance missions were flown using both manned and unmanned aircraft in order to 
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establish a Syrian order of battle.  Finally, the IDF and Israeli Army began holding planning 
meetings in order to coordinate mutually supportive artillery and SEAD strikes.
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Doctrinally and materially, the IAF had decided to split the difference between General 
Momyer’s intention to have a Wild Weasel / Iron Hand flight per squadron and the contemporary 
USAF’s practice of maintaining specialized SEAD units.  Although the IAF did not invest in a 
specific airframe such as the F-4G, the Israelis modified several of their Phantoms, Eagles, and 
Falcons with the capability to use the StARM and Shrike.  Israeli ordnance officers modified the 
anti-radiation missiles with pyrotechnics that would aid visual acquisition of the targeted radar 
and SAM site.  This simple change facilitated follow on attacks with Mavericks, rockets, high-
drag bombs, or cluster munitions by other tactical fighters.  Finally, the IDF conducted weapons 
tests on captured SA-3s and SA-6s to determine the most effective ordnance load for aircraft 
striking at Syrian SAM sites.
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Complementing the ground attack plan were similar preparations for dealing with the 
Syrian Air Force.  The IAF modified several Boeing 707s with electronic warfare equipment in 
order to blind the MiGs’ radars and sever communications with ground-based controllers.  F-15 
and F-16 squadrons rehearsed interception techniques that would exacerbate both MiGs’ 
vulnerabilities while maximizing the Eagle and Falcon’s advantages.  Finally, E-2 Hawkeye 
AWACS crews orbiting over northern Israel began to regularly track and time Syrian MiGs’ 
flight times, courses, and patrol habits.  By June 1982, the IAF’s fighter pilots were more 
confident of their ability to shoot down their opposite numbers than any time since 1967.  All 
that remained, in their minds, was the order to execute their plan.
433
 
 Operation Mole Cricket 
After several provocations, that order was executed on 9 June 1982 when the Israeli 
Army initiated Operation Peace for Galilee, the invasion of Lebanon.  The Israeli Air Force’s 
part of the offensive, dubbed Operation Mole Cricket, began with the penetration of Lebanese 
airspace by dozens of unmanned aircraft.  As the IDF had predicted, these contacts caused the 
Syrian IADS’s personnel to begin radiating both their long-range tracking and SAM acquisition 
radars.  The IAF and Israeli Army immediately began striking these while the IAF’s 707s 
initiated jamming of both the communications networks and acquisition frequencies.  Syrian 
MiGs, scrambling as per their doctrine, found themselves airborne in their designated patrol 
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areas unable to communicate with their ground controllers even as the IADS’s SAM batteries 
were being destroyed beneath them.
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With the SAMs neutralized, the IAF’s Eagles and Falcons struck.  Vectored into initial 
position by Israeli E-2s, the IAF often used the Eagles’ superior radars to control Falcon flights 
making the initial interception.  If the Syrians survived the F-16s initial passes, the Eagles then 
closed to complete the MiGs’ destruction.  On 10 June, when the F-16s were often tasked to 
conduct ground attack in support of advancing Israeli Army units, the Eagles validated the 
proposed slashing tactics by destroying dozens of Syrian aircraft themselves.  Within forty-eight 
hours, the Israelis had destroyed over eighty MiGs while losing, at most, three fighters (a pair of 
Phantoms and an Israeli Kfir) to Syrian interceptors.
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  By 11 June, the Syrian Air Force had 
ceded control of Lebanese airspace to the IAF.  With the exception of Syrian Army units’ 
organic, optically-aimed weapons, Syrian forces’ ability to defend themselves against IAF 
attacks had been destroyed.
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 Effect of the Falklands and Bekaa Valley on USAF SEAD Doctrine 
The one-sided nature of the IAF’s destruction of the Syrian IADS came as a shock to 
most military observers.  The Eagle and Falcon had been considered superior to the Flogger 
since inception, while the MiG-21’s obsolescence had been long acknowledged in aviation 
circles.  However, previous analysis of the F-15 and F-16’s abilities with regard to their opposite 
numbers had assumed that pilots flying the MiGs would at least have some warning that they 
were being tracked by hostile fighters.  According to both Syrian and Israeli reports, it appeared 
many of the MiG pilots had been shot down before they were even aware there was danger.  
With respect to the ground based SAMs and AAA, the Israelis had shown little difficulty in 
jamming even the SA-6 or ZSU-23-4’s radars.  Although a large measure of this had been 
accomplished by the IAF’s modernized Boeing 707s, the self-protection jammers carried by 
Israeli fighters had also allowed them to operate more freely.  Publicly, the Soviet military was 
quick to point out that a large part of the Syrians’ defeat was due to the Syrian Air Force’s lack 
of air combat training, poor equipment maintenance, and predictable tactics.  As for the SAM 
sites, the Soviets also felt the Syrian Army’s failure to dig proper emplacements, displace to 
different locations, or execute any degree of deception contributed to their heavy losses.
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  Privately, the Soviet Union’s military leadership was quite concerned over the Syrian 
Air Force’s performance.  The Soviet Air Force began to institute training reforms across Frontal 
Aviation, with more stringent attention paid to ensuring pilots increased their hours of ACM.  
Although full independence was anathema to Frontal Aviation doctrine, increased emphasis was 
also given to ensuring that pilots could act in the absence of GCI guidance.  The development 
and production of the MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker were also expedited, while increased 
funding was allotted to acquire the next generation of SAMs and air-to-air missiles.  The Soviet 
military had been provided a preview of new USAF capabilities at great cost to one of its client 
states.  Chastened at the results, Soviet leaders began to take closing the revealed qualitative gap 
seriously.
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The reaction to the Israeli victory in the USAF and NATO was unsurprisingly positive.  
There had been concerns in the Eagle and Falcon professional communities that USAF training 
had given far too much credit to Third World capabilities in Vietnam’s aftermath.  It was 
undeniable that the Aggressor program had increased the ability of individual pilots and flights to 
perform ACM.  Prior to the Bekaa Valley, however, the fighter community had possessed a 
growing sense that the Aggressor program was creating an unnecessary sense of caution given 
the Eagle and Falcon’s superiority to the Fishbed and Flogger.  The decisiveness of the IAF’s 
victory certainly indicated that both fighters were vastly advanced compared to both MiGs.  This 
advantage was exacerbated when pilot training was taken into account.  USAF’s fighter 
community noted that the IAF’s attention to proper command and control, airborne early 
warning, and electronic warfare support had played a critical role in the ultimate outcome.  
However, combined with the AIM-9L’s performance in the Falklands, mid-1980s’ USAF fighter 
pilots began to have great faith that their training and equipment would more than counter 
Warsaw Pact numbers.
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For the Wild Weasel community, the Israeli methodology further spurred an ongoing 
debate on tactics.  First, the use of drones to decoy the Syrian radars into revealing themselves 
was noted with great interest.  Second, defense suppression pilots noted that the Israelis had 
ingressed to attack the SAMs at medium altitude, with a descent into AAA range being required 
only at the final stages of attacking a SAM battery.  Finally, in several instances the IAF had 
used hunter-killer teams that partnered Phantoms with Falcons, Skyhawks, or Kfir attack aircraft.  
Much as the Vietnam-era F-105s had used Phantoms to complete the physical destruction of a 
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SAM site, the Israelis had relied on Falcons armed with Mavericks, cluster bombs, and high 
explosive ordnance to perform the same function.  This fostered the thought in USAFE that 
perhaps the F-16 was better suited to be a “killer” aircraft than originally thought.  In response, 
the F-4Gs of the 52
nd
 TFW at Spangdahlem began to experiment with nearby F-16 squadrons in 
this role in the conduct of their wartime mission.
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  As with the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli 
plans, tactics, and doctrine sparked changes that would have long-lasting effects on how the 
United States Air Force conducted SEAD. 
   The 31 Initiatives and SEAD 
The Bekaa Valley had influenced the USN, USMC, and US Army’s views on SEAD 
almost as much as it had influenced the United States Air Force’s.  The first two services began 
to consider how Marine artillery and other indirect assets could assist in the delivery of USMC 
close air support either during amphibious operations or during a large-scale land operation. The 
Army began to consider how it could employ its attack aviation helicopters and long-range field 
artillery to also suppress Warsaw Pact or other likely enemies’ air defense systems.  All four 
services brought these different mindsets to the Joint Force Development Group (JFDG), a body 
formed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1983.  The JFDG’s charter was to find ways to 
increase interoperability across DoD in order to facilitate the United States’ ability to conduct 
military operations.
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A great deal of the work on what the Pentagon would designate “Joint-SEAD (J-SEAD)” 
had been done prior to the JFDG’s formation.  After the Bray-Elder agreements and the Army’s 
publication of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, USAF and USA leaders had continued to conduct 
regular professional discussions.  This had resulted in a May 1981 agreement that developed the 
term “Joint Attack on the Second Echelon” (J-SAK) followed by an additional agreement on 
Offensive Air Support (OAS).  The Army, having begun to review its doctrine as it fielded more 
advanced weapons systems, eventually settled on a concept entitled “AirLand Battle.”  Codified 
in the Army’s 1982 edition of FM 100-5, this new operational methodology relied heavily on 
offensive counterattacks rather than shifting between defensive positions or trading ground for 
time as the suggested in 1976.  For the first time since 1945, the U.S. Army’s operational 
doctrine included an implied threat to conduct operations into East Germany should war occur in 
Central Europe.
 442
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The Army had several reasons for this paradigm shift.  First, it signaled to NATO allies 
that the United States would not simply accept a “separate peace” in the event of a conventional 
conflict.  Second, the change in doctrine was intended to force Warsaw Pact commanders to 
maintain an operational reserve rather than commit all their forces to a potential Central 
European offensive.  Lastly, American and NATO political leaders privately believed that 
regaining lost ground in the aftermath of an initial Warsaw Pact offensive would lead to a 
stronger negotiating position and simultaneously lower the likelihood the conflict became 
nuclear.  As an additional bonus, planners felt that NATO forces entering the Eastern bloc during 
a conflict might lead to large-scale uprisings in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.  This, in 
turn, would possibly lead to the Warsaw Pact’s disintegration mid-war resulting in a NATO 
victory.
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Whether it would have actually worked, AirLand Battle doctrine, like the IDF’s success 
in the Bekaa Valley, spurred the Army to act as the USAF’s full partner in developing the 31 
Initiatives.  As its name suggested, the new Army doctrine was unfeasible without Air Force 
participation.  Therefore, in order to achieve success, the Army and Air Force used the 31 
Initiatives to shape a common lexicon regarding the Warsaw Pact’s Integrated Air Defense 
System.  Once this common language was set, the Army (and to a lesser extent, the Marine 
Corps) also fully invested in teaching their staffs, commanders, and soldiers manning to target 
the first echelon’s air defense artillery assets.  Put another way, the Army began to ensure that 
every service member, from the enlisted tank gunner determining what vehicles to shoot to a 
division commander apportioning his artillery assets, was taught the importance of engaging 
Warsaw Pact ADA assets as part of their training.
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For its part, the Air Force continued to refine its SEAD techniques.  Given the Army’s 
participation in suppressing the WP-IADS tactical array, Air Force SEAD planners developed 
methods to exploit the expected gaps that would be created by systems’ destruction in the so-
called “Close Fight.”  The majority of this planning was conducted once the Air Force and Army 
had determined ways to model electronic warfare, J-SEAD, and Warsaw Pact ADA systems’ 
performance in simulated environments.  During Blue Flags, Air Force staffs employed these 
models to plan notional air offensives against not only WP-IADS but other hostile nations’ 
equivalents.  The Air Force’s System Command then applied operational research techniques to 
improve this doctrine, using the Israeli’s operational experiences and their service’s own Green / 
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Red Flag events to refine the models’ accuracy.  This was supported by the Army’s own 
modeling and exercises, all driven by both service’s desire to develop hard data that supported 
their execution of the 31 Initiatives.  Belatedly, the USN and USMC Electronic Warfare 
communities also began to assist in these efforts, albeit in an unofficial fashion.
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  The State of SEAD in December 1985 
The Air Force began 1981 with promising advances in technology, an improved process 
for distributing intellectual thought, the genesis of training infrastructure and, most importantly, 
a plan for synchronizing all these elements into a more effective conventional and strategic force.  
Five years after President Reagan’s inauguration, the Air Force had the most technologically 
advanced training facilities in the world, replaced many of its Vietnam-era aircraft with the more 
advanced F-15 and F-16, and deployed the EC-130 and EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft.  
Much of this improvement had occurred due to the implementation of the 1979 edition of AFM 
1-1, especially with regard to that document’s requirements for SEAD and electronic warfare 
operations.  Air Force senior leaders, by ensuring acquisition processes, training events, and 
personnel training directives reflected their services’ doctrinal tenets, forestalled many of the 
contradictory processes that had contributed to failure over North Vietnam.  Although USAF 
forces did not participate in combat themselves, the success of American equipment in the South 
Atlantic and Middle East seemed to indicate the service was on the correct path.  The Cold War’s 
final years would confirm this hypothesis through combat during Operations El Dorado Canyon 
and Desert Storm. 
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Chapter 6: From the Canyon to the Storm 
In January 1986, the United States’ strategic situation seemed vastly improved compared 
to what it had been January 1981.  Having won a second term in resounding fashion, President 
Reagan had continued his economic, diplomatic, and military policies designed to prevent Soviet 
expansion abroad, strengthen NATO and other alliances, and eventually force the U.S.S.R. to the 
negotiating table with regard to stopping the strategic arms race.  These were largely successful, 
although the desired outcomes were often as much the result of other international actors’ 
decisions as the Reagan administration’s actions.  At any rate, this continuation of policy allowed 
the Air Force to further develop its capabilities against the same predictable WP-IADS.
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Concurrent with the continuation of President Reagan’s foreign policy with regard to the 
Soviet Union was the United States’ increased bellicosity to smaller, less traditional enemies.  In 
in his first term, President Reagan’s foreign policy advisors had firmly believed in the limits of 
American power.  The American intervention in Lebanon had led to a disastrous barracks 
bombing that killed over 240 Marines in October 1983.  It had then proceeded to a gradually 
escalating exchange of fire between the United States’ forces and various factions which 
culminated in airstrikes and shore bombardments against Syrian forces.  By January 1984, the 
fighting had grown so intense that bipartisan leaders from the House and Senate asked President 
Reagan to either withdraw ground forces or request an authorization to use military force from 
Congress.  On the advice of both Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Secretary Weinberger, 
President Reagan chose to end large-scale United States military participation in Lebanon. 
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The Reagan Administration and State Sponsored Terrorism 
The Lebanon debacle highlighted the United States’ difficulty in employing military 
force in support of national objectives.  Although the military had largely shaken off its post-
Vietnam malaise by 1985, the American public was clearly less interested in possibly becoming 
embroiled in ground wars in support of foreign policy goals.  From the administration’s 
perspective, the major issue appeared to be in explaining to Congress and the American people 
why the nation’s military personnel needed to be placed in harm’s way.  Led by Shultz, those 
within the administration who advocated a more robust foreign policy seized upon the issue of 
“state sponsored terrorism” as a justification for military interventions.  Opposing them was 
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Secretary Weinberger, who firmly believed the nation’s military forces should only be 
committed to war in pursuit of clear objectives that the American people, through Congress, had 
agreed were vital to national interest or the country’s very survival.  For all its horrors, terrorism 
did not seem to meet this criterion during President Reagan’s first term.  The Lebanon 
experience only seemed to strengthen Weinberger’s reticence to use military force.448   
A spate of terrorist incidents in 1985 swung the Reagan administration’s opinion back 
towards Secretary Shultz’s more robust views on foreign policy.  The first of these incidents was 
the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 (14 June 1985).  This was followed in short order by the  
Frankfurt Airport Bombings (19 June 1985), Achille Lauro hijacking (7-10 October 1985), and 
the Rome and Vienna airport attacks (27 December 1985).  Such a series of attacks, as well as 
several thwarted attempts, in short succession tilted the advantage back towards Schultz’s 
interventionism.  Having run for two successive elections on a policy of not tolerating overt 
attacks against the United States, President Reagan thought that there needed to be an immediate 
and strong response to the next major incident.  As Hezbollah, the PLO, and other non-state 
actors remained elusive, the Reagan administration would demonstrate its resolve against the 
next state actor it could tie to a terrorist attack.  This, the interventionists believed, would 
simultaneously demonstrate American resolve abroad and also showcase the military’s new 
capabilities
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From the Air Force’s perspective, this change in focus seemed unlikely to involve USAF 
forces.  Most of the named or likely state sponsors of terrorism were located in the Middle East 
or North Africa.  Due to the State Department’s inability to obtain basing rights in the region, 
USAF planners considered SAC’s B-52s to be the only aircraft likely to have the requisite range 
and payload capability to attack likely targets throughout the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf 
regions.  While some planning was given to preparing for possible contingencies against Iran and 
Syria, many of these exercises were seen by Air Force officers as a means of adding variety 
rather than sincere Blue Flag exercises.  Even given the United States’ positive relationships with 
Israel, Saudi Arabia and, increasingly, Egypt, geopolitical factors precluded any thought of 
basing tactical fighters in any of these countries for an aerial campaign.  Nor did it seem likely 
that there was any possibility of even flying shuttle missions through these nations’ more remote 
airfields.
450
  Therefore, Air Force planners believed that President Reagan would continue to 
employ the United States Navy’s carrier fleet to carry out any punitive actions or sustained air 
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campaigns if they became necessary.  USAFE and the 48
th
 TFW carried out some contingency 
planning in the aftermath of the Frankfurt and Vienna attacks, but only in general terms.  
Specific items such as targeting and SEAD preparations were not done, as it seemed highly 
unlikely strikes would be conducted by USAF forces.
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 The Libyan Problem 
The Air Force’s planning assumptions began to unravel by January 1986.  Reliable 
intelligence indicated that, at a minimum, the Frankfurt and Vienna terrorist attacks had been 
planned by Abu Nidal, a Palestinian nationalist and wanted terrorist.  Nidal, in turn, had 
allegedly been able to finance the operations with the aid of Libya.  Ruled by Muammar Qaddafi, 
Libya had also allegedly supported the Irish Republican Army and other terrorist organizations 
in Europe.  In response to these allegations as well as Qaddafi’s stated intent to restrict freedom 
of navigation in the Gulf of Sidra, the Reagan administration had begun to apply economic and 
military pressure against Libya.  In response to this, Libya had requested additional military 
equipment and technical support from the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union quickly provided 
Libya with SA-2, -3, and -5 missiles as well as additional MiG-23 fighters.  These were added to 
Libya’s already existent air defense network, with the SA-5 providing Libya with a true long-
range ability to enforce Qaddafi’s “Line of Death” across the Gulf of Sidra.452 
Emboldened by the new equipment and feeling under increased pressure due to the 
presence of additional American aircraft carriers, Qaddafi directed the Libyan armed forces to 
engage in a series of skirmishes with the United States Navy.  These USN won all of these 
skirmishes without loss, and outcome that demonstrated the Libyan military’s inability to project 
power outside of its own borders.  In addition, Qaddafi perceived that the American’s success 
was causing Libya to lose prestige in both the so-called “Arab world” and with the Soviet Union.  
In response, Qaddafi directed Libyan intelligence services to conduct retaliatory operations 
against U.S. interests in Western Europe.  On 5 April 1986, Libyan operatives (perhaps aided by 
the East German Stasi) successfully attacked a West Berlin nightclub in response to this order.
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 El Dorado Canyon 
To the Reagan administration, the nightclub bombing seemed like a textbook example of 
state sponsored terrorism.  As such, it demanded an immediate and robust response to 
demonstrate the United States military’s ability to project military power.  Furthermore, both 
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President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger believed such a strike needed to include both USN 
and, in order to show Western resolve, USAF elements launched from European bases.  Despite 
this intent, it quickly became apparent to the United States that only the United Kingdom 
intended to provide any level of support to any American retaliatory strikes.  France and Spain 
publicly and vehemently refused even to allow overflight privileges, meaning that any American 
aircraft involved would have to fly over 1,000 additional miles.  West Germany similarly refused 
to allow support aircraft to be redeployed to the United Kingdom.  Rather than demonstrating a 
united front, American plans had exposed schisms in the NATO alliance.
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The long-term impact on NATO was of little immediate concern to USAF planners 
assigned to prepare for Operation El Dorado Canyon.  The Pentagon, apprised of the failure to 
obtain flyover rights, briefly considered either staging the new F-117 Nighthawks from England 
or, due to the long range, employing B-52s.  The former were considered due to the density of 
the Libyan air defenses around Tripoli.  The Stratofortresses possessed the necessary range and 
payload capability to strike from bases in the United Kingdom with minimal refueling.  In the 
end, the Nighthawk was still considered too important an asset to reveal for what amounted to a 
punitive action.  Strategic Air Command, with organizational memory of how compressed 
planning had contributed to early losses in Linebacker II, was loath to risk B-52s without 
extensive tactical fighter support.  Ultimately, the Air Force selected the 48
th
 TFW, based at RAF 
Lakenheath in the United Kingdom, to conduct its part of the strike.
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In the years since El Dorado Canyon, there have been allegations that the Air Force’s 
involvement was purely for political reasons.  As mentioned, President Reagan and his advisors 
wished to send a message to states that supported terrorism that they risked retaliation from all of 
the Western bloc, not just the United States.  However, there were at least two prominent 
military reasons to include the 48
th
 TFW in the strike despite the mission’s extended range.  
First, the 48
th
 TFW was equipped with F-111Fs, the most advanced Aardvark variant available in 
the Air Force’s inventory and the sole tactical fighter capable of all-weather operations.  With the 
Pentagon’s rules of engagement requiring a night attack in order to limit interference by Libyan 
interceptors and reduce anti-aircraft artillery’s effectiveness, the F-111F and the USN’s A-6 
Intruders were the only options available for precision delivery.  Of the two, the Aardvark’s 
speed and terrain following radar made it far more survivable than the Intruder for targets in and 
around Tripoli.
456
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In addition to being faster, the F-111Fs could also carry a larger amount and type of 
ordnance than any aircraft in the USN’s inventory.  According to specifications, the USN’s 
Intruder, F/A-18 Hornet, and A-7 Corsair II could all nominally carry the same 2,000-lb. 
Paveway bombs as the F-111F.  However, employing these both greatly complicated carrier 
launch operations while severely limiting all three aircraft’s range and performance.  In order to 
strike the White House’s list of targets, three to four additional sorties (aerial refueling, fighter 
escort, and SEAD) would have been required for each USN attack armed with precision 
weapons.  Therefore, even with three carriers within range of Libya, the USN quickly realized it 
would be hard pressed to conduct all the tasks necessary to properly meet President Reagan’s 
intent with the aircraft available.  When the number of USN aircraft incapable of flying due to 
maintenance issues was factored in, the need for USAF support was even more apparent by 9 
April 1986.  As a result, Vice Admiral Kelso, the overall force commander, not only asked for 
USAF support but tripled the number of F-111s that had originally been included in the strike’s 
contingency plan.
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In the flurry of planning that followed this request, the USN and USAF’s refusal to fully 
integrate their SEAD doctrine became problematic.  The 48
th
 TFW, in conjunction with USAFE, 
had developed a contingency plan to attack Libya in the aftermath of the Rome and Vienna 
attacks.  The USN’s Sixth Fleet, the primary Navy command that oversaw operations in the 
Mediterranean, had directed its subordinate carriers to do the same.  Although some limited 
discussions had taken place between USAFE and their USN counterparts, this had been very 
general and used broad terms.  Thus, while the 31 Initiatives had at least established a common 
SEAD language, it quickly became apparent that the Air Force and Navy spoke different dialects 
when it came to what “suppression” meant at the operational and tactical levels.458 
By April 1986, USAF planners had fully embraced the concept of rollback even if units 
differed on how this would be conducted.  In short, even with a short strike, a robust SEAD 
package would seek to destroy individual SAM sites even as EF-111s jammed the radars that 
cued these sites to begin looking in a given direction.  In contrast, the USN considered each 
strike to be a separate, distinct contest between an inbound strike group and air defenses in the 
area.  This savage duel was expected to be carried out by individual flights of F/A-18s and A-7s 
specifically targeting whatever ADA assets presented themselves along a likely ingress route.  
However, as long as these sites went off the air, they were considered “suppressed” as far as the 
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USN was concerned.  Therefore, the USN’s SEAD fighters planned to fire anti-radiation missiles 
at long range rather than closing with and finishing a site with cluster bombs or other 
ordnance.
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The problem with the USN’s technique, at least from the 48th TFW’s perspective, was 
that the Air Force’s targets required several F-111s to be over Libyan territory for an extended 
period.  This time only increased as the Air Force strike grew from the original six to eighteen 
aircraft.  While the fighter wing’s package involved its own EF-111s and thus would use the 
same jamming methods honed by repeated Green Flags, the USAF planners were concerned with 
the USN’s less aggressive SEAD techniques.  In order to assuage some of these concerns, the 
USN increased the number of sorties dedicated to SEAD during Operation El Dorado Canyon.  
This included planning a strike on the airfield which housed the only Libyan fighter squadron 
trained for night operations.
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After an extremely compressed planning process, the actual raid took place over the night 
of 14-15 April 1986.  Also as planned, it began with long-range jamming conducted by both 
USN EA-6B’s and USAF EF-111s.  As planned, USN A-6’s successfully cratered several fighter 
runways prior to the F-111Fs crossing the Libyan coast.  Simultaneously, the USN’s relay of 
suppressive missile launches and supporting strikes seemed to diffuse and confuse the Libyan air 
defense efforts.  As the 48
th
 TFW approached its targets, the Libyan defenses managed to destroy 
a single F-111F by either directly shooting it down or causing it to maneuver into the sea.  The 
defenders damaged another aircraft so badly it had to land at an airbase in Spain.  In return, the 
USN and USAF managed to strike over a half dozen targets, including Qaddafi’s main residence.  
Furthermore, due both to stringent rules of engagement and the use of precision munitions, this 
was accomplished with minimal collateral damage.  The Reagan administration, satisfied that the 
operation had sent a clear message, hailed El Dorado Canyon as a successful application of 
American military power to deter hostile activity.
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 El Dorado Canyon’s Legacy 
With the passage of time, El Dorado’s legacy is slightly more mixed.  Strategically, 
Libyan support of terrorist groups simply became more clandestine rather than significantly 
decline.  Operationally, USAF and USN forces had demonstrated that they could strike a 
common target at extended ranges.  Although it had required a great deal of tanker support and 
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the diversion of two aircraft carriers from the western Mediterranean, the United States had 
planned and executed a strike by over one hundred aircraft against what was considered one of 
the better IADS of the world.  While some military analysts comparisons to the contemporary air 
defenses surrounding Moscow or those that ringed Hanoi in 1972 were somewhat hyperbolic, the 
Libyan targets had certainly been well-defended by Soviet-supplied systems.  Publicly, it 
appeared that for the second time since June 1982, Western equipment had easily triumphed in a 
military contest against their Soviet counterparts. 
This perception masked several tactical issues that caused some consternation among the 
Air Force’s tactical leaders.  Only four of the eighteen F-111Fs had scored direct hits on their 
targets as opposed to varying degrees of damaging near misses.  Even accounting for aborted 
attack runs due to the stringent rules of engagement and the rushed planning cycle, this was a far 
lower percentage than the Air Force had expected when it dispatched the strike.  In addition, 
many of these misses had been due to errors imparted by either major system malfunctions or 
errors in the F-111Fs’ navigational systems.  Furthermore, due to these system failures and battle 
damage, fewer than half of the launched aircraft could have conducted a follow on strike by 
midday on 15 April.  This did not build confidence in the 48
th
 TFW’s ability to operate in a high-
intensity, multi-sortie conflict.
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Further complicating an objective assessment of the raid was the fact the Libyans had 
seemingly made a conscious decision not to scramble any fighters.  As noted above, the USN’s 
initial strike had managed to ground the Libyan Air Force’s primary night fighter squadron.  
However, other Libyan units equipped with Mirage F-1 and MiG-23s were seemingly not even 
alerted until ten minutes after the USAF departed Libyan airspace.  Operation El Dorado 
Canyon’s detractors pointed out that this lack of opposition thus disqualified the strike as any 
type of measuring stick for how far the USAF’s capabilities had grown since Vietnam. 463    
Supporters of the strike’s effectiveness, however, pointed out that the primary reason the 
interceptors did not scramble was the effectiveness of American electronic warfare.  Since the 
combination of EF-111s and EA-6B Prowlers had thoroughly jammed the Libyan long-range 
radars, there was no opportunity for their operators to sound a timely alarm.  In Operation El 
Dorado’s aftermath, senior Air Force officials also pointed out that several Third World dictators 
were equipped with the same obsolescent equipment that the Soviets had provided to Qaddafi’s 
IADS.  The not so hidden threat was that what the USAF and USN had accomplished over 
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Tripoli could be replicated elsewhere, with likely much more lethal results to other supporters of 
terrorist organizations.  Not every dictator, the Pentagon reasoned, would receive a last minute 
phone call that likely saved their lives.
464
  
The allure of this seemingly precise and surgical approach was so strong it became the 
basis of a new airpower theory.  Most commonly attributed to USAF Colonel John A. Warden 
III, this methodology implicitly differentiated between conflicts with a great power (i.e., the 
Soviet Union) and application of military force against a regional threat (i.e., most of the “state 
sponsors of terrorism”). Warden alluded to the fact that the former possessed sufficient 
redundancy and the means to conduct immediate, direct retaliation against the United States or 
its allies.  On the other hand, the latter were often despotic dictatorships with centralized power 
structures and minimal ability to retaliate against the continental United States.  Warden then 
posited that, given the difference between the two threats, the Air Force needed to consider a 
new framework with which it could plan this additional conventional mission.  Although the 
formal encapsulation of what would become his famous “five rings” theory did not take place 
until 1994, it began to find its genesis in the aftermath of Operation El Dorado Canyon.  
Regardless of how one viewed its ultimate effectiveness, Operation El Dorado Canyon clearly 
sparked a change in American airpower and, concurrently, how SEAD was considered.
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The Goldwater-Nichols Act and SEAD 
While airpower theorists were still processing Operation El Dorado Canyon’s 
importance, Congress provided a more immediate and unexpected to the development of SEAD 
doctrine.  Familiar with interservice rivalry’s impact on operations from Korea to Vietnam and 
incensed by more recent issues in Operation Eagle Claw (Iran hostage rescue) and Operation 
Urgent Fury (invasion of Grenada), Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Flynt 
Nichols shepherded a military reform bill through their respective legislative houses in 1986.  
Passed on 1 October 1986, Public Law 99-433 was dubbed the “Goldwater-Nichols Department 
of Defense Act of 1986” or, more commonly, “Goldwater-Nichols.”  Less than a hundred pages 
long, the law took major steps to force the Department of Defense to comply with the military 
principle of unity of command while simultaneously seeking to eliminate redundancy across the 
services.
466
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The Goldwater-Nichol Act’s effect on SEAD doctrine was secondary to its primary 
purposes of simplifying military command and increasing joint services cooperation.  In the 
service of the first, Goldwater-Nichols simplified the chain of command by dividing the world 
into combatant commands by geographical region (e.g., Central Command [CENTCOM], Pacific 
Command [PACOM], European Command [EUCOM], etc. or by function, such as Special 
Operations Command [SOCOM]).  Each of these entities, in turn, would have a single 
commander-in-chief, or CINC, whose line of authority encompassed all forces within his or her 
area of responsibility.  Subordinate to this commander would be a component commander who 
oversaw land, sea, or air operations within each combatant command.  Regardless of service or, 
in the case of combined operations, national affiliation, all units which were employed in a given 
sphere of operation would fall under the combatant commander’s designated representative.467 
 Airpower under Combatant Commands 
Strategically, this reorganization of the Department of Defense’s combat power 
immediately served to counter the dilution of effort that had bedeviled air operations in Vietnam.  
In addition, it also provided a level of clarity to the Air Force’s operational objectives by 
simplifying the chain of command  Before Goldwater-Nichols, any communication of strategic 
objectives and end states flowed from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, then to the 
services, and on through those chains of command.  The new act specified that the chain of 
command went from the President of the United States, to the Secretary of Defense, and then to 
combatant commander.  Moreover, once forces were assigned to a given combatant command, 
they were no longer subject to their service’s control or received any guidance from their 
providing unit.  Thus, as intended, awkward planning arrangements such as the Route Package 
system used in Vietnam or the mixed chains of command employed during Operation El Dorado 
Canyon became illegal unless specifically directed by the President in writing.
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Operationally, this now meant that the air component commander, as the combatant 
commander’s designated subordinate, was responsible for allocating sorties for the 
accomplishment of designated missions.  Furthermore, according to regulations and doctrine the 
Department of Defense quickly developed in response to Goldwater-Nichols, the joint forces air 
component commander (JFACC) controlled all airpower within the combatant command.  In 
effect, this meant that any aircraft not required to defend a United States Navy carrier or carry 
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out the USMC’s close air support requirements (protected by law and DoD regulation) was 
subject to direct control by the combatant commander.  This was intended to ensure that all aerial 
capabilities, from a Strategic Air Command B-52 or a USN F-14, were all operating to satisfy the 
combatant commander’s goals as part of a joint plan.469   
The actual mechanics needed to execute this intent took several months to develop, but 
were largely in place by 1988.  Services or, in some cases, nations provided a given number of 
aircraft to a combatant commander based on what was expected to be needed for an operation.  
The JFACC (in most cases, a USAF general) would then take the provided aircraft and allocate 
them against given tasks in support of an air campaign.  Once this process was complete, the 
assignment of sorties, targets, and aircraft would be published as part of an air tasking order 
(ATO) to subordinate units.  These units would then, in turn, have until midnight of the day the 
ATO was issued to make corrections regarding available aircraft, ordnance, or aircrew.  Using 
this methodology, the JFACC was expected to use USAF, USN, USMC, and allied aircraft in a 
manner that gradually overwhelmed an opponent’s air defenses with mass.470 
The Pentagon’s interpretation of Goldwater-Nichols’ guidance with regard to airpower 
met immediate resistance from all of the services.  For the USN, there were immediate fears that 
an ATO would not allocate enough fighters to defend their carrier flight decks against Soviet 
long-range bombers.  The USMC, in addition to sharing this view, also pointed out that their 
ground units were organized with the assumption that fixed-wing aircraft would provide close air 
support as their “flying artillery.”  The Army was concerned that, having just completed the 31 
Initiatives, the Air Force would consider Goldwater-Nichols as a way to escape providing 
tactical fighters for close air support.  Within the Air Force, SAC saw the new JFACC 
methodology as a way of transferring control of strategic assets to a subordinate flag officer who 
would likely have a tactical fighter, versus heavy bomber, background. Although these 
complaints were driven partly by parochialism, as initially presented the JFACC method did little 
to assuage any of these concerns.
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The Air Force Embraces SEAD Doctrine 
Regardless of the interservice battles occurring in Washington, the changed method of 
assigning airpower led to immediate changes within EUCOM’s methods of attacking the 
Warsaw Pact air defense network.  Beginning in 1987, EUCOM began to include USN assets 
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from the Sixth Fleet into its targeting plan for attacking fixed radar and SAM sites in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary.  It also began to include Sixth Fleet EA-6 Prowlers in its 
electronic warfare plan, staging these aircraft through Italy and southwestern Germany in some 
cases.  Finally, by 1988 USAFE had stood up the 65
th
 Air Division, a headquarters subordinate to 
USAFE (which acted as the European Command’s JFACC).  This entity was NATO and the Air 
Force’s first attempt to develop a headquarters whose sole purpose was to command and control 
SEAD throughout the entire European theater.  After many years of disjointed effort, by 1989 
NATO intended to execute a dedicated SEAD campaign against the Warsaw Pact IADS in time 
of war.
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Helping to guide these organizational changes and planning were two major doctrinal 
documents.  The first was Joint Pub (JP) 3-01.2 Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair 
Operations, published on 1 April 1986.  The second was AFM 2-8 Electronic Combat 
Operations.  In Theater Counterair Operations, an entire chapter (VI) was devoted to the 
suppression of enemy air defenses.  In it, the joint planner was reminded that “[a]ir, surface, or 
subsurface forces of a joint force may be employed to suppress or destroy enemy air 
defenses.”473  JP 3-01.2 then goes on to give a detailed discussion of what means are available to 
a joint campaign planner, what facets of an enemy IADS is most susceptible to certain types of 
disruption, and what steps a campaign planner should take to deconflict friendly resources they 
may have available.  Suggestive rather than prescriptive, Theater Counterair Operations clearly 
condensed the lessons of the Bekaa Valley, various Flag exercises, and the USN’s Strike 
University within its pages.  For the first time, the Department of Defense had a handbook on 
how all of its assets could be employed in disrupting and defeating an integrated air defense 
system. 
AFM 2-8 expounded upon the concepts outlined in JP 3-01.2 for a USAF audience.  
From the beginning, it explains that it is an operational document to be used in preparing for 
electromagnetic operations.  The document reiterated the offensive and defensive importance of 
electronic warfare, especially with regard to command and control, air defense, and offensive 
aerial operations.  Most importantly, for the first time in an Air Force document, AFM 2-8 
explicitly stated that SEAD and Joint-SEAD were Air Force tasks carried out specifically to 
neutralize, degrade, or destroy enemy air defenses.  The manual went on to explain that this 
could be done by physical means (i.e., ordnance delivered onto target) or by electromagnetic 
151 
 
deception and jamming.  In the case of the latter, it established that one of the primary tasks of 
the Air Force’s electronic warfare systems was to “deny enemy commanders effective command 
and control of their forces.”474  Finally, AFM 2-8 reiterated the need for dedicated electronic 
warfare ranges and laid out methods for how units could be trained at these facilities.
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Having established these doctrinal underpinnings, Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry 
D. Welch ensured that the Air Force actually followed them.  Blue Flags and other staff exercises 
were modified to include joint assets.  To comply with Goldwater-Nichols, the Air Force also 
assigned its officers to joint staff billets with Navy and Army headquarters.  In this manner, Air 
Force planners were exposed to these services’ capabilities.  Simultaneously, General Welch also 
reformed the Air Force’s educational programs to make certain the service’s field grade and 
senior officers were well versed in the new doctrine.  Lastly, Welch continued the modification 
and acquisition processes continued the programs initiated by General Creech during his time at 
TAC.
476
 
 F-4G Updates 
One of these major modifications was to the F-4G Wild Weasel V. Realizing the initial 
airframe was approaching obsolescence, the Air Force took several steps to increase the F-4G’s 
capabilities by way of a multi-phase performance update program (PUP) from 1983-1988.  First, 
the USAF purchased eighteen additional aircraft to replace F-4Gs lost through attrition and to 
strengthen the Wild Weasel squadrons serving in the Pacific.  Second, Air Force Systems 
Command replaced the F-4Gs’ original engines with new models that were more fuel-efficient 
and did not provide the Phantom airframe’s characteristic smoke trail.  Finally, all F-4G 
fuselages and wings were inspected and, if necessary, replaced.
477
   
Concurrent with these airframe repairs and modifications, F-4Gs underwent a major 
electronics refit.  The aircrew’s flight control equipment, previously analog, was replaced with 
digital upgrades.  The PUP also added a new targeting computer, with the new system decreasing 
the amount of time it took to acquire, locate, and engage a hostile radar.  Data uplinks capability 
was added to facilitate communications with USAF, USN, and NATO command-and-control 
aircraft as well as accompanying tactical fighters.  In order to increase the F-4G’s survivability, 
new electronic jammer capabilities were added for both internal and external carriage.  Finally, 
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the F-4G was given the capability to employ the new AGM-88 high speed anti-radiation missile, 
colloquially known as the “HARM.”478 
 The HARM and Hunter-Killers 
The AGM-88 was the most potent American anti-radiation missile of the Cold War.  
Arising from a United States Navy requirement to replace the Shrike and Standard, the HARM 
took advantage of the same solid state and digital electronics revolution that had made the 
newest Sparrow and Sidewinder so lethal.  With the older Shrike and Standard, hostile radar 
operators had been able to shut down their systems and enjoy fairly good odds that both weapons 
would miss.  The HARM, however, had electronic memory that allowed it to still home in on the 
radar’s previous location and immediately reacquire if the operators turned the system back on.  
If a new radar was acquired mid-flight, the HARM could be redirected to this greater threat using 
the F-4G’s new data links.  With a wholly new rocket motor as opposed to previously produced 
items merely adapted to Wild Weasel use, the missile was both faster and longer-ranged than 
most existing or projected Soviet SAM systems.
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The new capabilities imparted by the AGM-88 brought a great change to Wild Weasel 
tactics.  Previously, the F-4Gs either had to either employ the StARM at great cost to their fuel 
consumption and maneuverability, or employ Shrike and hope they could close the range with a 
SAM site.  With HARM, Wild Weasel V crews believed they could engage and destroy any SAM 
site long before it could successfully guide a missile onto their aircraft.  Given the F-15Cs’ 
demonstrated superiority against contemporary enemy interceptors, the F-4Gs were generally 
unconcerned with being intercepted by MiGs.  However, even if a MiG did manage to get past 
the Eagles, the standard F-4G / F-16 hunter killer team was far from helpless.  F-4Gs continued 
to train in air-to-air combat and carried up to four Sparrows for self-defense, while their paired 
F-16s continued to carry up to four Sidewinders.
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USAFE’s 52nd TFW began to employ the new tactics in 1986, with the practice spreading 
to TAC’s 37th TFW in 1988.  During training, F-4Gs began training to conduct a medium 
altitude ingress towards a target area in order to entice hostile radars to illuminate and track 
them.  Once this occurred, the targeted F-4G planned to shoot a HARM at the offending radar to 
either destroy it or force it to shut down.  Whichever course of action the hostile radar operators 
chose, the F-4G would mark the site’s location and transmit it to friendly aircraft using its 
153 
 
onboard data links.  If the hostile site was a system that the JFACC had targeted for destruction 
in that day’s ATO, the F-4G and its accompanying F-16 Falcon would continue towards it.  If 
the HARM appeared to destroy the radar, the pair of fighters would resume their orbit at medium 
altitude.  On the other hand, if it did not appear the radar had been destroyed but merely turned 
off, the pair of aircraft would close to attack the radar and missile vehicles with Mavericks and 
cluster bombs.
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This change in tactics supported an operational “rollback” mindset.  By 1988, USAFE 
had fully embraced this method in its war plan.  Rather than its previous plan to commit to 
attacking supply lines and second echelon forces in the opening hours of a conflict, USAFE 
intended to destroy the WP-IADS with every sortie not allotted to providing CAS to engaged 
ground forces.  EF-111s, EC-130s and, under the new JFACC model, EA-6Bs would provide 
distant jamming support to disrupt WP-IADS communications and surveillance radars.  Relying 
on this support, the F-4G / F-16 hunter-killer teams would approach at medium altitude to begin 
reducing specifically targeted long- and medium-range SAM sites.  With the advantages 
conveyed to the Wild Weasel hunter-killers by the HARM’s performance and electronic support, 
USAFE planners expected this phase of the engagement to be a near replica of Operation Mole 
Cricket.
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 As the Wild Weasel onslaught unfolded, USAFE held that their Warsaw Pact 
counterparts would commit fighter regiments to the attack.  Based on their knowledge of the 
Warsaw Pact’s inventory, USAF and NATO specifically strove to set the conditions for this fight 
to take place at medium altitude as opposed to decades of planning for low altitude encounters.  
Whether vectored in by E-3 Sentries or conducting fighter sweeps in accordance Theater 
Counterair Operations’ proposed techniques, the Eagles would employ slashing tactics to attrit 
their Warsaw Pact counterparts and gain air superiority.  Rather than attack at low level as they 
had during Operation El Dorado Canyon, USAF strike aircraft would pass through this swirling 
combat at medium or high altitude as well.  Using standoff, they would employ precision-guided 
munitions against critical targets in the WP-IADS.  In this manner, the Air Force believed, they 
would clear the way for joint and allied aircraft to provide the necessary close air support and 
battlefield air interdiction sorties (again, using precision munitions) to cripple an expected 
Warsaw Pact offensive by cutting off fuel, ammunition, and resupply.  By December 1988, the 
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Air Force was quite public in its belief that, at long last, it had attained complete ascendancy 
over the Warsaw Pact.
483
    
 External Evaluations of USAF Capabilities 
The USAF’s internal confidence was measured by that of external observers.  In contrast 
to Hackett and Bidwell’s grim prognostications in the early 1980s, by 1988 many foreign 
observers believed that NATO’s conventional forces in general and its air arms in particular were 
more than sufficient to defend West Germany.  Within the United States, a 1988 GAO report on 
the conventional forces in Europe found that the Western bloc’s air forces appeared to have an 
overwhelming advantage in quality that offset the Warsaw Pact’s quantitative advantages.  When 
discussing airpower, the report specifically stated that its authors could not consider airpower to 
be a potentially decisive factor in a future European conflict.  The contributors then went on to 
state that there were several factors for their belief.  However, many who provided content for 
the report considered air superiority’s advantages as an important offset to the Warsaw Pact’s 
advantage in ground forces.  When discussing their reluctance to raise spending on expensive 
ground warfare systems, NATO governments began pointing to the alliance’s perceived 
advantages in airpower as a reason why further spending was not needed.  Finally, the Soviet 
Union, when discussing conventional arms reductions, specifically pointed to NATO’s airpower 
as one of the alliance’s inherent advantages when discussing mutual concessions.484 
These factors were the clearest indication that the USAF had come of age.  Fifteen years 
after the Yom Kippur War, it appeared that the United States Air Force and its NATO 
counterparts had satisfied all three facets of conventional deterrence.  First, as evidenced by its 
arm negotiators in 1987-1988, the Soviet Union considered NATO tactical airpower as 
threatening to the Warsaw Pact’s military capabilities as the latter’s tank divisions were to the 
West.  Second, NATO’s European members had come to consider airpower to be strong enough 
to offset ground forces’ deficiencies.  Finally, by virtue of both continued investments and public 
statements, both President Reagan and Congress considered the Air Force to be a vital 
component of deterrence not only against the Soviet Union but also other hostile nations abroad.  
Although not the sole factor in this turn of events, the evolution of Air Force SEAD doctrine had 
certainly played a major part. 
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 Soviet Response to USAF SEAD Advances 
The Soviet Union, while attempting to seek reductions in airpower at the treaty table, was 
simultaneously pressing forward with the development of new doctrine and systems.  In the 
aftermath of the Bekaa Valley and Libyan experiences during Operation El Dorado Canyon, the 
Soviet military conducted a thorough review of its equipment and command practices.  Having 
already increased funding and expedited research in support of developing its next generation 
fighters, both PVO Strany and Frontal Aviation asked for an increased portion of the Soviet 
Union’s limited electronics industry’s output.  In part due to Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
policies of glasnost and perestroika but also due to the realization that restricted, staid doctrine 
made the IADS more susceptible to electronic warfare, the Red Army began to increase battalion 
and regimental officers’ independence.  Whereas certain weapons’ release (e.g., SA-5 Gammons) 
had previously required approval at the divisional level, Red Army encouraged all battery 
commanders to use their own discretion when presented with fleeting opportunities.  Older 
systems were retrofitted with solid state electronics, while new mobile SAMs (e.g., the SA-10 
Grumble, SA-12 Gladiator) were just reaching East Germany by late 1988.  Finally, doctrine 
was changed to increase mutual support across unit boundaries in an attempt to counter the 
USAF’s “rollback” plans. 485 
As the ground forces sought to find solutions in changing doctrine and procedures, the 
Soviet Air Force sought to regain parity through material means.  Frontal Aviation began 
fielding the new MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker to Eastern Europe in 1985.  More 
surprisingly, the Soviet Union began exporting the Fulcrum to East Germany and Poland before 
it had completely replaced the MiG-23 Flogger in its own fighter regiments.  Both of these 
fighters, contrary to the MiG-23, were equipped with solid state electronics and an infra-red 
tracking system that was not susceptible to electronic warfare.  The aircraft also carried 
improved radar-guided (i.e., the AA-10 Alamo) and heat-seeking (i.e., AA-13 Archer) missiles, 
either of which were comparable to the Sparrow and Sidewinder.  On paper, each of these 
fighters could easily challenge the F-15C and, given their possession of BVR weapons coupled 
to an advanced radar, easily defeat the F-16.
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Unfortunately for WP-IADS operators, material production was only part of the solution.  
Although training had increased in the aftermath of Bekaa Valley, by 1988 the strains apparent 
on the Soviet economy began to preclude regular training for both SAMs and interceptors.  For 
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the ground forces, problems with maintenance and parts erased many of the gains of new 
systems.  In the air, fighter regiments increasingly found large-scale exercises cancelled, while 
flight and squadron training became increasingly ad hoc and haphazard.  The Soviet Air Force 
attempted to develop a DOC-equivalent beginning in late 1987.  However, even this effort 
became embroiled in bureaucracy and senior officers’ internecine infighting.  Training among 
the other Warsaw Pact air forces was even worse, with many fighter pilots receiving fewer than 
30% the number of flight hours flown by USAF pilots.  Although not as inferior as they were 
often portrayed in contemporary Western professional journals and intelligence estimates, the 
average Warsaw Pact pilot had little experience with night flying, ACM, or independent 
interception.
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United States Air Force SEAD in Desert Storm 
Whether the Soviet Union’s improvements in air defense would have proven a successful 
counter to the United States’ changes in doctrine, equipment, and training would remain 
academic.  In a series of quickly cascading events in 1989, the Eastern bloc seemingly imploded 
upon itself.  Beginning with Hungary opening its borders in June 1989 and concluding with East 
German citizens demolishing the Berlin Wall in November, the former pro-Soviet regimes of the 
Warsaw Pact were swept away in mostly bloodless revolutions.  Even in Romania, the sole 
instance where the transition to a non-Communist government became overtly violent, state 
security forces eventually turned upon their government.  Rather than ending in a conventional 
clash whose likely participants fully expected the fight to spiral into nuclear holocaust, the 
“conflict” for Central Europe ended with the Warsaw Pact peacefully forfeiting.488 
For the United States, the Central European confrontation’s sudden end left the 
Department of Defense seemingly bereft of mission.  President George H.W. Bush, Reagan’s 
former vice-president, had run for election with a security plan that generally continued his 
predecessor’s policies.  Less than a year after inauguration, the Bush administration found itself 
with no real adversary against which it could argue for continued strategic modernization, 
increased conventional capability, and a firmer push for human rights in Eastern Europe.  With 
Mikhail Gorbachev largely agreeing to strategic arms reductions and conventional forces 
reduction in Europe, the prism through which the United States had viewed the world for over 
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four decades seemed shattered.  Pundits and analysts began talking of a “New World Order,” in 
which the United States’ military capacity was largely irrelevant to events.489 
 Iraq Invades Kuwait 
The invalidity of this opinion was revealed on 2 August 1990.  Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein, frustrated with negotiations regarding his nation’s war debt to Kuwait and believing he 
had a tacit agreement from the United States to turn a blind eye to his actions, ordered his army 
to invade Kuwait.  Taken by surprise, the Kuwaiti military engaged in a spirited, but fruitless, 
defense that served little purpose other than to buy time for the royal family to escape.  Within 
twenty-four hours, over a dozen Iraqi mechanized divisions had advanced south to the Kuwaiti-
Saudi Arabian border, halting there to conduct resupply and consolidation operations.  From the 
Saudi perspective, it appeared the Iraqi Army was preparing to continue south to seize the oil 
production facilities along their nation’s Persian Gulf coast.  Lacking the internal means to stop 
the Iraqis, the Saudi government asked the United States for immediate military support.
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From the Bush administration’s perspective, Iraq’s invasion seemed was an act of naked 
aggression.  President Bush had continued Reagan’s policy of relatively warm relations towards 
Iraq due to Saddam Hussein’s antipathy towards Iran.  Now seemingly without warning, Iraq had 
repaid this support not only by invading an allied nation, but also by seeming poised to seize 
enough oil capacity to allow it to influence the world’s markets.  Despite the reticence of 
Secretary Dick Cheney and his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, 
President Bush ordered the deployment of the 82
nd
 Airborne division and a contingent of USAF 
aircraft.  In addition, President Bush ordered General Schwarzkopf, the head of Central 
Command (CENTCOM), to act in his role of combatant commander and prepare for the defense 
of Saudi Arabia.  In putting U.S. military forces squarely astride the Iraqi Army’s path, Bush 
intended to buy time for a diplomatic solution and the building of an international coalition.
491
 
In 1990, CENTCOM had been considered one of the least likely commands to face a 
military operation.  As had been the case during President Reagan’s second term, the Department 
of Defense lacked basing rights in the Persian Gulf region.  Furthermore, although the United 
States Navy had fought several sharp engagements with Iran and suffered casualties while 
escorting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers, a major conflict had seemed unlikely prior to the Iraqi 
invasion.  Therefore, the combatant command had no assigned combat power, and its staff 
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elements were undermanned.  For this reason Lieutenant General Charles Horner, the 
CENTCOM JFACC, asked new Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Dugan for assistance in 
planning an offensive campaign even as his subordinates to prepare for Saudi Arabia’s defense.  
This dovetailed with Secretary Cheney’s guidance to General Powell to prepare a plan to strike 
Iraq itself should the Iraqi Army violate Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty.  With the Army slowly 
building defensive combat power due to the distance from its bases or prepositioned stocks, it 
appeared up to USAF forces to deter an Iraqi conventional attack.
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 Instant Thunder: The Initial USAF Strategic Plan 
In a circumstance of a well-trained person being coincidentally in the correct place at just 
the right time, Colonel John Warden was in charge of Checkmate, the USAF’s primary strategic 
planning cell, in August 1990.  Having come into his own as a prominent theorist with the 
publication of The Air Campaign in early 1988, Warden had finally codified his “Five Rings 
Theory” in the summer of that year.  In this construct, Warden divided a nation’s centers of 
gravity into five concentric rings.  At the outermost ring was the nation’s fielded military forces, 
with the general population the next ring inward.  Next was the nation’s infrastructure, which 
was in turn supported by the system essentials such as petroleum, foodstuffs, and strategic 
materials.  Finally, at the innermost ring was a nation’s leadership, the paralysis of which would 
nominally make the outer four rings defunct.  Warden’s theory held that rather than trying to 
chew slowly and ponderously through the outer rings to finally reach the center, the United 
States should use its advantages in airpower, information warfare, and precision munitions to 
immediately and summarily remove Iraq’s leadership.  Like a man shot in the base of the skull, 
the Hussein regime would then collapse limply upon itself regardless of what the Iraqi Army was 
doing in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
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With Warden’s guidance, Checkmate’s staff quickly came up with a strike plan they 
dubbed “Instant Thunder,” an overt signaling that the strikes would not repeat the gradual 
increases of Operation Rolling Thunder.  After briefing first General Dugan, then General 
Powell, and following this with a brief to General Schwarzkopf at CENTCOM headquarters in 
Tampa, Colonel Warden flew to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to brief Lieutenant General Horner.  In a 
contentious briefing in which Colonel Warden’s personality traits quickly incensed Lieutenant 
General Horner, Warden’s plan was turned over to CENTCOM’s own staff and the theorist 
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summarily ordered home from Saudi Arabia. Warden, in Horner’s eyes, had turned his back on 
established Air Force and joint doctrine in an attempt to push an Air Force-centric war plan.
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After tempers had cooled, the JFACC’s staff found several good options in Warden’s 
plan.  Unfortunately, the major issue with Instant Thunder was that the resources needed to carry 
it out were not in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.  With under 300 combat aircraft between 
forces based in Saudi Arabia and USN carriers in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, Lieutenant 
General Horner believed he lacked the airpower to both defend Saudi Arabia and attack Iraq.
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 KARI: The Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System 
Lieutenant General Horner’s hesitation in attempting to attack Iraqi leadership targets 
was well founded.  Like Muammar Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein had taken advantage of the Soviet 
Union’s willingness to export weaponry in exchange for possible future access during the 1980s.  
Unlike Qaddafi, Hussein also had access to Western technology due to his depiction of Iraq as a 
bulwark against a radical Iran.  This portrayal had also stood him in good stead when attempting 
to obtain funding from his fellow Sunni nations against the potential threat of its large Shia 
neighbor.
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A large part of these resources had been invested in KARI, the French acronym for the 
Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (I-IADS).  Having been embarrassed by the IDF’s 
successful strike against the Osirak reactor, Saddam Hussein had realized that his armed forces’ 
orientation towards Iran left his nation open to attack from other directions.  In response, Hussein 
had developed the establishment of an air defense network that provided for defense against 
attack from any direction, but especially from the south and west.  The heart of this defense was 
the Air Defense Operations Center (ADOC), a heavily fortified building in Baghdad.  Acting as a 
semi-automated mastermind for KARI was a supercomputer located in the ADOC, with 
advanced processors that would facilitate the application of the defense’s resources. 
Like nerve centers connecting a brain to its limbs, reinforced landlines and fiber optic 
networks ran from the ADOC to four Sector Operations Centers (SOCs).  From the SOCs, radio 
and landline communications ran to individual SAMs, fighter bases, and ground control intercept 
centers.  Using this system, the ADOC was able to exert centralized command and control over 
the entire I-IADS in a relatively rapid fashion.  Built in 1986-1987, KARI had served the 
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Hussein regime well in the final year of the Iran-Iraq War and was considered an effective 
system by the JFACC planners.
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The Iraqi Army was responsible for conducting KARI’s ground-based portion.  The 
primary SAMs the Iraqis operated in 1991 were the venerable SA-2 and SA-3 reinforced by 
mobile SA-6s, SA-8s, French Crotales, and the multinational Roland.  At the tactical level, ZSU-
23-4s and various calibers of radar-aimed anti-aircraft artillery provided low-level air defense 
against attacking aircraft. Finally, individual Iraqi forces used a variety of Soviet and Western 
MANPADS to provide short range air defense to its mechanized forces.  In general, the batteries, 
battalions, and regiments were organized along the Soviet templates of the late 1970s. In 1990 
Saddam Hussein expected his ground-based SAMs to cause heavy casualties among attacking 
Coalition air forces and thus quickly sour American public opinion of the war.
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Saddam Hussein similarly expected the Iraqi Air Force to act as a guerilla force rather 
than to challene for air superiority in the traditional manner.  Given that the force was equipped 
with the modern Mirage F1 and Mig-29 in addition to large numbers of obsolescent MiG-23s 
and the outdated MiG-21, this was not an unreasonable expectation.  In 1990, a large percentage 
of the Iraqi pilots had had some experience in conducting operations during the Iran-Iraq War.  
Unfortunately, the majority of those sorties had been in attacks against ground targets as opposed 
to air-to-air combat.  Still, Saddam Hussein and his subordinates believed that, with careful 
husbanding and tactics, the Iraqi fighters could cooperate with the SAMs to score several kills.  
From the Iraqi perspective, the majority of the Coalition’s air arms were equipped with 
comparable aircraft and had not seen combat in decades.  In contrast, the Iraqi Air Force would 
be able to absorb losses and, through the superior coordination provided by KARI, be placed in 
advantageous positions from which to strike.
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 Killing KARI: The Coalition SEAD Plan 
 By early October 1990, the CENTCOM staff believed they had sufficient defensive 
firepower to fully blunt an Iraqi ground offensive.  Furthermore, President Bush had cobbled 
together a sufficiently large coalition that a forced expulsion of Iraqi from Kuwait would have 
international legitimacy.  Finally, CENTCOM had established sufficient infrastructure and 
supplies ashore and naval strength in the Persian Gulf that offensive operations were logistically 
viable.
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Despite his summary dismissal of Colonel Warden, Lieutenant General Horner 
acknowledged that the Checkmate cell had made several correct choices.  First, the use of F-117s 
and Tomahawk cruise missiles to strike targets in the vicinity of Baghdad lessened the risk to 
Coalition aircrews.  Second, the use of precision guided munitions to hit all targets in urban areas 
would lessen the likelihood of civilian casualties that might fracture the Coalition.  Finally, by 
attacking primarily at night, Instant Thunder would have limited the effectiveness of Iraqi 
fighters and anti-aircraft artillery.
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What Horner did not like and expressly told his staff to correct was the lack of adherence 
to existing Air Force and joint doctrine.  Specifically, CENTCOM air planners were given the 
directive to consider Iraqi air defense assets to be the primary target of the war’s first forty-eight 
hours.  Once KARI was defeated, the JFACC would be able to both attack the Iraqi Army at will 
and continue to reduce Iraq’s strategic targets such as its biological and chemical facilities, mass 
communications stations, and regime security apparatus.  In addition, Warden’s emphasis on 
possibly killing Saddam Hussein or other senior members of his regime directly was to be 
removed from the plan’s final iteration.  Horner reasoned that if Iraq’s leader happened to end up 
underneath a bomb, that would be an unfortunate incident.  However, if CENTCOM was seen as 
specifically targeting him, it might fracture the fragile alliance that President Bush had managed 
to collect.
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The CENTCOM air planning cell, dubbed “The Black Hole” for various aspects of its 
personnel’s nature and habits, conceived an operational SEAD plan that adhered almost 
completely to the tenets of JP 3-01.2 and AFM 2-8.  The first phase of the eventual SEAD plan 
would use Army helicopters to destroy several Iraqi radar posts just across from the Saudi 
Arabian border.  Simultaneously, United States Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf would launch 
Tomahawk cruise missiles to begin their journey towards targets in Iraq.  Once the radar sites 
were destroyed, Air Force F-117s would pass through the resultant gaps in KARI’s coverage on 
their way to Baghdad.
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Phase Two of the defense suppression plan would begin with the advance of dozens of 
unmanned drones followed closely by EF-111s and F-4Gs.  As the drones were detected 
concurrent with the inbound Tomahawks, it would appear to KARI that a massive Coalition 
airstrike was unfolding.  This would spur the computer to begin issuing orders for SAM radars to 
begin radiating and tracking targets.  At this point, F-117s in the vicinity of Baghdad would 
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destroy the ADOC with precision-guided munitions.  The ASOCs would also be attacked either 
by additional F-117s, Tomahawks, or AGM-86s launched by B-52s.  Once the radars 
illuminated, the EF-111s would begin to jam them while the marauding F-4Gs began to dispatch 
them with HARMs.
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Phase Three of the opening SEAD campaign would begin with F-111, RAF and Italian 
Tornado strike aircraft, and F-15Es conducting strikes on fighter airfields.  With Tomahawks and 
AGM-86s impacting command posts, the Coalition’s planners expected these air raids to find the 
Iraqi Air Force acting in a disjointed, confused manner.  Planners developed ingress and egress 
routes in order to allow F-15 pilots the best opportunities make use of their AIM-7s in 
engagements beyond visual range.  After some initial friction with the United States Navy, 
additional routes were planned to allow the USN’s F-14s opportunities to employ their long-
range AIM-54 and AIM-7s as well.  The JFACC’s blunt guidance was for as many Iraqi 
interceptor pilots as possible to be shot down without even knowing what was happening.  This 
would be followed by Iraqi runways being cratered and hardened air shelters being destroyed by 
guided weapons aimed at weak points on the roofs.  Finally, SAM sites would be destroyed 
rather than suppressed whenever possible.  Lieutenant General Horner, as a veteran of the first 
attempt to destroy a SAM site during Vietnam, was quite adamant that long-range SAMs would 
be eliminated by aircraft specifically designed for that purpose.
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 Execution 
When it came time to execute the operational plan, the common language of doctrine 
provided a common framework for SEAD at the tactical level.  Having conducted training during 
various Flag exercises, F-111, F-15, and F-4G mission planners at airfields separated by 
hundreds of miles were able to coordinate mission planning and timelines by telephone.  This 
mutual understanding was further solidified by regular rehearsals conducted over the Saudi 
Arabian desert by the strike force components.  By early January, most of the opening night’s 
participants had flown at least five practice sorties, with many of the last being full-scale 
rehearsals in Oman.  As doctrine dictated, EF-111s, F-4Gs, and E-3 Sentry aircrews had 
cooperated to prepare an electronic order of battle of the Iraqi IADS radar and SAM sites.  The 
Air Force, for the first time since 1973, was prepared to employ its full arsenal against a hostile 
IADS.
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On 17 January 1991, with diplomatic options exhausted, the Coalition air attack fell upon 
KARI much as Lieutenant General Horner and his planners had directed.  In the opening 
minutes, the Army’s Task Force Normandy destroyed two radar sites in western Iraq.  The 
subsequent F-117 movements, although slightly delayed, still arrived in time to lobotomize 
KARI by destroying the ADOC with a pair of 2,000-lb. bombs.  What followed was a largely 
one-sided massacre, as the Iraqi air defense units illuminated their radars to find the skies full of 
USN strike aircraft and USAF F-4Gs all carrying HARM missiles.  At one point in the ensuing 
engagement, over 200 AGM-88s were airborne at one time heading towards Iraqi SAM sites, 
with over 50% of these missiles believed to have scored a kill.  As SAM sites were being 
eliminated, the Iraqi Air Force began attempting to commit interceptors only to find these 
aircraft rapidly engaged by lurking F-15Cs and USN F/A-18s egressing from strikes.  In 
exchange for one or two possible kills (a USMC F/A-18 and a USAF F-111), the Iraqis lost nine 
interceptors.
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At the end of the first night, KARI had taken a severe beating.  Although regimental and 
battalion commanders could still control their respective SAM and anti-aircraft artillery units, 
they were unable to coordinate their actions with interceptors.  This situation only deteriorated as 
Coalition aircraft launched their second night of attacks on 16 January.  By the end of the first 
week, with the exception of an ill-fated F-16 attack on Baghdad, Coalition aircraft appeared to be 
able to maneuver at will at medium altitude.  The Iraqi Air Force, having lost almost forty 
interceptors, no longer even attempted to sortie in defense of their own airfields even in 
daylight.
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Within two weeks, Coalition F-111s and Tornadoes were able to operate with such 
impunity they could destroy individual aircraft shelters during daylight from medium altitude.  
While low-level anti-aircraft fire remained dangerous and mobile SA-6s were occasionally able 
to engage aircraft engaging in BAI or CAS, these events were mainly sporadic engagements 
rather than a coherent air defense plan.  Rather than be destroyed in their shelters, the Iraqi Air 
Force began to flee to hostile Iran for internment.  By 1 February, KARI was no more, and 
Lieutenant General Horner’s planners were able to focus almost wholly on operations to set the 
conditions for the ground campaign.
509
 
164 
 
Apogee and Legacy 
If one considers the destruction of Ruby 2 to be the nadir of USAF SEAD doctrine 
development, dismantling KARI was its highest point.  The United States Air Force, in 
conjunction with the Navy, spent over fifty months total attempting to subdue the North 
Vietnamese IADS via direct action.  In contrast, the USAF and its Coalition partners planned, 
rehearsed, then executed the destruction of the KARI system in less than thirty days of combat. 
The difference in outcomes can clearly be traced to the Air Force’s doctrinal changes.  In 
1965, the Air Force had engaged North Vietnam after a decade spent preparing for Massive 
Retaliation.  It employed aircraft whose conception, acquisition, and evolution had been centered 
around the delivery of nuclear weapons of varying yields.  Senior leaders, to include Air Force 
Chief of Staff and head of TAC, had believed that high speed would provide sufficient protection 
against anti-aircraft guns.  Surface-to-air missiles, while a threat, were not expected outside of 
the Soviet Union.  Squadron, group, and wing commanders, without the necessary training 
against a realistically portrayed enemy, were ignorant of the conditions they would face.  The 
resulting carnage and ineffectual operations would spur all to reconsider what happened and how 
to prevent it from doing so again.  The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War merely reinforced the 
notion that the United States Air Force simply had to evolve or cease to be pertinent to the 
national defense. 
The Air Force’s doctrine drove the evolution necessary for the USAF to remain relevant.  
General Momyer, dismayed by the events over Vietnam and his own failure to prepare TAC for 
the Linebacker operations, established the TAC gatherings necessary for mid- and junior-level 
officers to exchange ideas.  Simultaneously, General Momyer found the resources necessary to 
test these thoughts in conditions that simulated those the Air Force expected to find in combat.  
Even as he turned over TAC to General Dixon, Momyer had sewn a multitude of ideological 
seeds through the TAC Symposium, overhaul of the Fighter Weapons Review, and establishment 
of the CORONET ORGAN exercises. 
These doctrinal seeds were what bore the fruits of victory over Iraq in 1991.  Both 
General Dixon and General Creech, Momyer’s successors at TAC, deserve credit for the 
successful harvest.  Dixon, often unheralded or even vilified in subsequent accounts of his term, 
ensured that the “Iron Majors” were protected from internal and external meddling in the 
relatively lean years of the Ford and Carter administrations.  In addition, General Dixon’s 
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emphatic pursuit of realistic training ensured that Air Force doctrine was tested, often against the 
very systems the service expected to face in Europe.  With regard to procurement, Dixon was 
also a strong advocate for the Air Force purchasing what were the right systems for TAC in 
appropriate numbers.  The F-15, F-16, F-4G, and E-3 were all examples of the Air Force 
deciding how it wanted to fight, then ensuring it had the platforms to do so.  Almost as 
importantly, USAF leaders embraced technology and took advantage of the concurrent advances 
in electronic circuitry, processing, and miniaturization to replace or enhance those systems found 
wanting during Vietnam.  Finally, Dixon continued insistence on intellectual development lead 
to the Air Force developing doctrine that, while not perfect, finally shrugged off the dominance 
of nuclear delivery.  In many ways, the publication of the February 1979 Edition of AFM 1-1 
was Dixon’s passing of the intellectual baton to General Creech. 
General Creech, for his part, came to embody the Air Force’s embracement of technology 
at the end of the Cold War.  It was Creech’s resolute pursuit the F-117 that made certain that 
aircraft was available to lobotomize KARI on the opening night on Desert Storm.  His insistence 
on air defense rollback, electronic warfare, night combat, standoff, and precision-guided 
munitions helped reestablish the conventional deterrence that was necessary for the United 
States’ foreign policy.  With a doctrinal vision, General Creech was able to resist the naysayers 
who insisted that USAF systems needed to be simpler and purchased in bulk.  Instead, Creech 
helped craft an Air Force that explicitly stated its quality and chosen realm of warfare would 
more than counterbalance the Warsaw Pact’s greater numbers.  Bekaa Valley, the Falklands War 
and, finally, Operation El Dorado Canyon served as indicators that the Air Force was on the right 
track.  Desert Storm was the final, emphatic confirmation that Creech’s doctrinal instincts had 
merit. 
 Legacy 
The Air Force had not been alone in devising its SEAD doctrine.  Desert Storm also 
served to validate the concepts first discussed in the Elder-Bray conferences, then refined during 
the 31 Initiatives.  Desert Storm was seen as proof that Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair 
Operations was thematically sound, if in need of acquisition support due to problems with USN / 
USMC and Allied aircraft’s identification friend or foe (IFF) transponders.  Goldwater-Nichols 
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had also been validated both through its reorganization into combatant commands and the forced 
purchase of compatible weapons and electronics systems. 
Ironically, the Air Force’s success would actually lead to a reduction in size for both the 
electronic warfare and Wild Weasel communities.  With the Soviet Union’s implosion, the 
United States sought to reduce its military expenditures.  Part of this was an assignation of 
different roles across the “joint” community rather than residing in a single service.  Within five 
years, the EF-111 and F-4G would no longer be part of the Air Force inventory.  The former’s 
role was assigned to the EA-6B Prowler by the Department of the Defense, with the expectation 
that any future operations would employ the entire U.S. military.  The Wild Weasel’s capability 
was replaced by equipping the F-16 with the HARM Targeting System, an electronic pod that the 
F-4G community derisively referred to as “Weasel in a Can.”  Proposals to perhaps modify the 
F-15E Strike Eagle (due to it still being in production) or two-seat F-16s as replacements for the 
F-4G were stalled, then formally rejected within the USAF’s hierarchy.  Believing that the future 
lay in low-observable aircraft such as the then still in development F-22 Raptor and F-35 
Lightning II, the Air Force made another doctrinal shift towards acquiring these systems rather 
than building on its already existent foundation.  Given the believe that there’d been a 
“Revolution in Military Affairs” driven by stealth technology and precision munitions, from the 
Air Force’s perspective it made sense to concentrate limited funds on advanced systems rather 
than legacy technology.
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A full accounting of these decisions lays outside the scope of this paper.  Operation 
Deliberate Force (1995) and Operation Allied Force (1999) are still recent enough that several 
operational planning and tactical execution aspects remain classified.  Moreover, the 
effectiveness of Air Force SEAD depends on whom is asked or what criteria is used.  At least 
one F-117 Nighthawk was lost during Allied Force, and both the weather in the Balkans and 
Serbian tactics curtailed NATO aircraft from operating with impunity throughout the campaign.  
It will be up to other historians to determine whether the Air Force slipped from the perch it had 
so strenuously struggled to attain in the long climb from Ruby 2’s demise to KARI’s 
destruction.
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